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When ENAR decided to go forward and document the impact of counter-terrorism and 
counter radicalisation measures, Europe was reeling from deadly attacks in Paris (2015) 
that triggered a range of policy discussions that resulted in further securisation of Europe. 
Several human rights organisations, including ENAR, were quick to warn policy-makers about 
the potential infringement of human rights and discrimination and stigmatisation of certain 
racialised groups. We developed a toolkit to support organisations to document the impact of 
discrimination and our own research project. 
Through this research, we have seen the impact of these security measures goes very deep, 
and the stigmatisation of certain groups can have a psychological and traumatic impact on 
individuals and communities. In this report, we highlight how structural racism can manifest in 
Europe through policy-making developed under the cover of securitising Europe. In practice, 
policing and surveillance systems used in the name of safety can be harmful and used as a 
fishing expedition to capture data and create environments where people feel unsafe.
This report is the culmination of years of painstaking work, engagement with different groups, 
communities, policy-makers and practitioners. We’ve taken the time to listen to people’s expe-
rience and document the result of structural racism and Islamophobia in policy-making. We 
offer solutions to these harms and reminders of our human rights framework and hope that 
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Islamophobia is a specific form of racism that refers to acts of violence and discrimination, 
as well as racist speech, fuelled by historical abuses and negative stereotyping and leading 
to exclusion and dehumanisation of Muslims, and all those perceived as such. It is a form of 
racism in the sense that it is the result of the social construction of a group as a race and 
to which specificities and stereotypes are attributed, in this case real or perceived religious 
belonging being used as a proxy for race. Consequently, even those who choose not to prac-
tice Islam - but who are perceived as Muslim because of their ethnicity, migration background 
or the wearing of other religious symbols - are subjected to discrimination. Furthermore, it is 
explicitly acknowledged that referring to Islamophobia is different from censorship and that 
critical discussions on religion and religious practices should still be possible.1
Structural racism is a product of a system in which public policies, institutional practices, cul-
tural representations and other norms work in various, often reinforcing ways to perpetuate 
racial group inequity, and has been a feature of the social, economic and political systems in 
which we all exist.2
Institutional racism has been used to describe not only explicit manifestations of racism 
at direction and policy level, but also the unwitting discrimination at the organisation level. 
Indirect, institutional racism is more subtle, hidden but equally pervasive and damaging in 
nature.14It is seen in “processes, attitudes and behaviour which amount to discrimination 
through unwitting prejudice, ignorance, thoughtlessness and racist stereotyping which disad-
vantages minority ethnic people”.3
Discrimination can be direct, indirect or through harassment. EU law provides that direct dis-
crimination occurs ‘where one person is treated less favourably than another is, has been or 
would be treated in a comparable situation, on’ protected grounds such as race. ethnicity or 
religion.4 Indirect discrimination occurs ‘where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or 
practice would put persons having’ a particular protected characteristic is put ‘at a particu-
lar disadvantage compared with other persons unless that provision, criterion or practice is 
objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate 
and necessary’.5 Harassment is deemed to be a form of discrimination in EU anti-discrimination 
and is defined as ‘unwanted conduct’ related to protected ground that has ‘the purpose or 
effect of violating the dignity of a person and of creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, 
humiliating or offensive environment’.6
1 Dermana Seta, Forgotten Women: the Impact of Islamophobia on Women, (ENAR, 2016) <https://www.enar-eu.org/IMG/pdf/forgot-
tenwomenpublication_lr_final_with_latest_corrections.pdf> 
2 Ojeaku Nwabuzo, Racist Crime and institutional Racism in Europe: ENAR Shadow Report 2014-18, (ENAR, 2019) <https://www.enar-eu.
org/IMG/pdf/shadowreport2018_final.pdf>
3 ibid.
4 Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and 
occupation, Art 2(2)(a). 
5 ibid, art 2(2)(b). 
6 ibid, art 2(3). 
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The 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington 
DC instigated a process of restructuring the global, 
regional and national counter-terrorism normative 
frameworks and institutional architecture. At the 
global level the UN Security Council, under its man-
date to maintain international peace and security 
and through the adoption of resolutions binding all 
states, has been at the forefront of establishing the 
new global counter-terrorism framework, obliging all 
states to implement far-reaching counter-terrorism 
measures.7 In Europe, the European Union and the 
Council of Europe have played a pivotal role in devel-
oping counter-terrorism law and policy. The Council of 
the European Union issued its first Framework Decision 
on Combatting Terrorism in 2002 (hereinafter, FDCT 
2002).8 In 2005 it adopted a counter-terrorism strat-
egy9 and a Strategy for Combatting Radicalisation and 
Recruitment to Terrorism.10 In fact, since 2001 the EU 
has adopted well in excess of 200 counter-terrorism 
related measures.11 In December 2020, the Commission 
issued its Counter-terrorism Agenda for the EU propos-
ing further measures and activities.12 The Council of 
Europe adopted a Convention on the Prevention of 
7 UNSC Res 1368 (12 September 2001) UN Doc S/RES/1368; UNSC Res 1373 (28 
September 2001) UN Doc S/RES/1373; UNSC Res 1390 (28 January 2002) UN 
Doc S/RES/1390; UNSC Res 1624 (14 September 2005) UN Doc S/RES/1624; 
UNSC Res 2170( 15 August 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2170; UNSC Res 2178 (24 Sep-
tember 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2178; UNSC Res 2341 (13 February 2017) UN Doc 
S/RES/2341; UNSC Res 2354 (24 May 2017) UN Doc S/RES/2354; UNSC Res 2368 
(20 July 2017) UN Doc S/RES/2368; UNSC Res 2370(2 August 2017) UN Doc S/
RES/2370; UNSC Res 2395 (21 December 2017) UN Doc S/RES/2395; UNSC Res 
2396 (21 December 2017) UN Doc S/RES/2396; UNSC Res 2462 (28 March 2019) 
UN Doc S/RES/2462; 
8 Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of 13 June 2002 on combating ter-
rorism [2002] OJ L164/3, amended by Council Framework Decision 2008/919/
JHA of 28 November 2008 amending Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on 
combating terrorism [2008] OJ L330/21.
9 Council of the European Union (2005) The European Union Counter-Terrorism 
Strategy, 14469/4/05 REV 4, 30 November. 
10 Council of the European Union (2005) The European Union Strategy for Combat-
ing Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism, 14781/1/05, 24 November. 
11 Ben Hayes and Chris Jones, Catalogue of EU Counter-Terrorism measures adopted 
since 11 September 2001 (Statewatch, 2013) 22. <https://www.statewatch.org/
media/documents/news/2013/dec/secile-catalogue-of-EU-counter-terror-
ism-measures.pdf> accessed 01 February 2021.
12 European Commission, ‘A Counter-Terrorism Agenda for the EU: Anticipate, 
Prevent, Protect, Respond’ COM (2020) 795 final.
Terrorism in 2005,13 adding an Additional Protocol 
to the Convention in 2015,14 and a Counter-terrorism 
Strategy in 2018.15 
There has always been concern about the impact of the 
proliferation of international counter-terrorism laws and 
policies on human rights, and there is mounting alarm at 
the marginalisation of human rights norms, institutions, 
and civil society actors in the emerging international, 
regional and national counter-terrorism policy frame-
works and architecture. UN Human Rights Rapporteurs 
have documented the intentional use of counter-terror-
ism security measures in enabling the violation of human 
rights.16 The UN Special Rapporteur on Protecting Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering 
Terrorism has warned of the ‘ongoing misuse of coun-
ter-terrorism law and administrative practices to quell 
legitimate dissent and limit freedom of expression’.17 The 
Special Rapporteur observed that ‘the instrumentaliza-
tion of counter-terrorism, the prevention and countering 
of violent extremism, and protection of national security 
measures is brutal, with members of civil society arrested 
and detained on spurious grounds’.18 The EU Fundamental 
13 Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, CETS No.196. 
14 Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of 
Terrorism, CETS No.217.
15 Council of Europe, ‘Counter-Terrorism Strategy (2018-2022)’ CM (2018) 
86-addfinal. The Additional Protocol has also been ratified by the EU, see 
Council Decision (EU) 2018/890 of 4 June 2018 on the conclusion, on behalf 
of the European Union, of the Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe 
Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism [2018] OJ L159/15.
16 UNGA, Human Rights Council Thirty-eighth Session 18 June – 6 July 2018 ‘Re-
port of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly 
and of association’ (26 July 2018) UN Doc A/HRC/38/34, para 21-27; UNGA, 
Seventy-third Session ‘Interim report of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of 
religion or belief’ (5 September 2018) UN Doc A/73/362, para 22-55. 
17 UNGA, Seventy-third Session ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the 
promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while 
countering terrorism’ (3 September 2018) UN Doc A/73/361, para 7. See for 
example also: CCPR/C/SWZ/CO/1, para 36; CAT/C/RUS/CO/6, paras 34 and 35. 
18 UNGA, Human Rights Council Fortieth Session 25 February – 22 March 2019 
‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism’ (1 March 2019) 
UN Doc A/HRC/40/52, para 8. 
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Rights Agency warns that the EU’s ‘efforts to provide 
safety for its citizens’, through ‘stringent law enforce-
ment – without thorough fundamental rights safeguards 
– could mean that the freedoms the EU currently enjoys 
are encroached upon to the long-term detriment of all’.19 
The risks faced by minorities are particularly acute. The 
UN Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism 
and Xenophobia has raised concerns that ‘racist and xen-
ophobic ideologies rooted in ethno-nationalism regularly 
combine with national security fears and economic anxi-
eties to violate the human rights of non-citizens, indige-
nous peoples and minorities on the basis of race, ethnicity, 
national origin and religion.’20 The European Commission 
against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) has observed ‘a 
dangerous “normalisation” of Islamophobic prejudice’ as 
‘Islam and Muslims continue to be associated with radical-
ization, violence and terrorism’.21
The 2017 Directive on Combatting Terrorism (here-
inafter, DCT) requires the European Commission to 
submit a report by September 2021 on the DCT’s 
impact ‘on fundamental rights and freedoms, includ-
ing on non-discrimination, and the rule of law’.22 
In anticipation of this forthcoming review, this ENAR 
report documents experiences of counter-terrorism and 
counter-radicalisation measures by members of groups 
that are at heightened risk of facing discrimination and 
racism. The analysis and research recognises that the 
EU Decisions and Directive on combatting terrorism, 
while playing a role in structuring and influencing these 
national developments, fall into a policy landscape that 
this shaped by heterogeneous, competing national and 
international institutional actors. Furthermore, security 
policies, practices and discourse are moulded by local 
19 Fundamental Rights Agency, ‘Embedding Fundamental Rights in the Security 
Agenda’, 5 <https://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2015/embedding-fundamen-
tal-rights-security-agenda> accessed 01 February 2021. 
20 UNGA, Human Rights Council Thirty-eighth Session 18 June – 6 July 2018 
‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial 
discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance’ (25 April 2018) UN Doc A/
HRC/38/52, para 63. 
21 European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, ‘Annual Report on 
ECRI’s Activities Covering the Period from 1 January to 31 December 2018’ 
(Strasbourg, Council of Europe, 2019), 10
22 Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 
March 2017 on combating terrorism and replacing Council Framework Deci-
sion 2002/475/JHA and amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA [2017] OJ 
L88/6, Art 29(2). 
social, political, economic and cultural contexts that gen-
erate counter-terrorism policies and practices. This calls 
for careful attention to the ways in which specific national 
contexts construct and implement security policies and 
practices. The ENAR research therefore focuses on five EU 
states: France, Germany, Hungary, Poland and Spain. This 
research will contribute to understanding how EU and 
state-level policies are experienced, and their impact on 
minority groups’ exercise of fundamental rights and free-
doms in these states.
This report begins with an outline of the research meth-
odology. Part I then outlines the legal and policy context. 
Chapter 1 locates current experiences of terrorist attacks 
in a longer historical context and outlines key elements 
of the DCT and EU counter-terrorism and counter-radi-
calisation strategies. Chapter 2 examines the connection 
between the legal frameworks and policy strategies and 
processes of racialisation, Islamophobia and discrimina-
tion. Chapter 3 examines the extent to which the devel-
opment of EU counter-terrorism measures takes into 
consideration and provides protection for human rights 
and the rule of law. Chapter 4 sets out some of the main 
legal and policy developments in each case-study state. 
Part II of the report sets out findings from focus groups 
and stakeholder interviews. It is organised around three 
interconnected themes that emerge from the qualitative 
data: securitised suspicion of Muslim identities and reli-
gious practices (Chapter 5), experiences of securitised dis-
crimination, harassment and abuse (Chapter 6), and the 
impact of living under intense state and social surveillance 
(Chapter 7). Part III outlines some of the key conclusions 
emerging from this research and proposes changes to EU 
policymakers for more effective and robust protection of 
human rights, equality and the rule of law. 
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An effective examination of impacts on fundamental 
rights cannot just be a disembodied analysis of legal 
principles: it also needs to engage with and understand 
the lived experiences of affected individuals, groups, 
and communities.23 Narratives from the experiences of 
racialised minorities have been particularly important 
in providing evidence of individual and systemic dis-
crimination.24 The study of the impact of counter-ter-
rorism and counter-radicalisation measures in Europe, 
particularly on minorities that are the target or focus of 
such policies, remains limited and is largely based on 
research in the UK.25 To contribute to the Commission’s 
review of the impact of the DCT, ENAR has conducted 
research examining the experiences of counter-terror-
ism and counter-radicalisation measures by members 
of racialised groups that are at heightened risk of facing 
discrimination and racism. This report aims to under-
stand how state counter-terrorism and counter-radical-
isation policies are experienced and their impact on the 
exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms on racial-
ised groups at risk of experiencing discrimination. 
23 Asim Qureshi, ‘Experiencing the war “of” terror: a call to the critical terrorism 
studies community’ (2020) 13 Critical Studies on Terrorism 485. 
24 Carol Tator and Francis Henry, Racial Profiling in Canada: Challenging the Myth of 
a Few Bad Apples (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2006), Ch. 5. 
25 Most such studies are qualitative and focus on the UK. See for example J Busher 
and L Jerome (eds.) The Prevent Duty in Education: Impact, Enactment and Implica-
tions (Palgrave MacMillan, London, 2020); MS Abbas, ‘Producing ‘Internal Suspect 
Bodies’: Divisive Effects of UK Counter-terrorism Measures on Muslim Communities 
in Leeds and Bradford’ (2019) 70 British Journal of Sociology 261; N Kapoor and K 
Narkowicz, ‘Unmaking Citizens: Passport Removals, Pre-Emptive Policing and the 
Reimagining of Colonial Governmentalities’ (2019) 42 Ethnic and Racial Studies 45; 
C Heath-Kelly and E Strausz, ‘Counter-terrorism in the NHS: Evaluating the Prevent 
Duty Safeguarding the NHS’ (University of Warwick, Coventry, 2018); L Jarvis and M 
Lister, ‘”As a woman…”; “As a Muslim…”: Subjects, Positions and Counterterrorism 
Powers in the United Kingdom’ (2017) 37 Critical Social Policy 245; L Blackwood, N 
Hopkins and S Reicher, ‘From Theorizing Radicalization to Surveillance Practices: 
Muslims in the Cross Hairs of Scrutiny’ (2016) 37 Political Psychology 597; L Jarvis 
and M Lister, ‘Disconnected Citizenship? The Impacts of Anti-Terrorism Policy on 
Citizenship in the UK’ (2013) 61 Political Studies 656; T Choudhury and H Fenwick 
The Impact of Counter-Terrorism Measures on Muslim Communities in Britain (, Equal-
ity and Human Rights Commission, London, 2011); L Zahra-Macdonald, ‘Securing 
Identities, Resisting Terror: Muslim Youth Work in the UK and its Implications for 
Security’ (2011) 39 Religion, State and Society 177; I Awan, ‘“I Am a Muslim Not an Ex-
tremist”: How the Prevent Strategy Has Constructed a “Suspect” Community’ (2012) 
40 Politics and Policy; M McGovern and A Tobin, Countering Terror or Counter-Pro-
ductive: Comparing Irish and British Muslim Experiences of Counter-Insurgency Law 
and Policy, (Edge Hill University, Ormskirk, 2010); S Vertigans, ‘British Muslims and 
the UK Government's “War on Terror” Within: Evidence of a Clash of Civilizations 
or Emergent De-Civilizing Processes?’ (2013) 61 The British Journal of Sociology 26; 
V Brittain, ‘Besieged in Britain’ (2009) 50 Race and Class 1; A Kundnani Spooked! 
How Not to Prevent Violent Extremism, (Institute of Race Relations, London, 2009); G 
Mythen and S Walklate, ‘“I’m a Muslim, but I'm not a Terrorist’”: Victimization, Risky 
Identities and the Performance of Safety”, (2009) 49 British Journal of Criminology 
736; B Spalek and A Imtoual ‘Muslim Communities and Counter-Terror Responses: 
“Hard” Approaches to Community Engagement in the UK and Australia’ (2007) 27 
Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 185; A Blick, T Choudhury and S Weir, The Rules of 
the Game: Terrorism, Community and Human Rights (Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust, 
York, 2006). 
The data presented in this report is based on research 
carried out in five EU states: France, Germany, Hungary, 
Poland, and Spain. Of these, France, Germany and Spain 
have endured intense periods of political violence at 
different points over the past 60 years and have conse-
quently developed differing domestic policy responses. 
By contrast, Hungary and Poland have had limited expe-
rience of terrorism and their legal and policy frame-
works have developed largely to meet international and 
European legal obligations. 
This research project started in October 2018. Researchers 
with experience, expertise and knowledge of each 
national context undertook initial desk research and 
field-data collection. Field research was conducted first 
in Germany and Poland (December 2018–May 2019) and 
later in France, Hungary and Spain, (June–December 
2019). A common methodology was applied across all 
research sites and carried out in three phases. In phase 
1, researchers collected information about and reviewed 
existing research and analysis of counter-terrorism and 
counter-radicalisation laws and policies. The review incor-
porated academic research, reports by public bodies, 
parliamentary debates, newspaper articles and NGO 
reports. The national researchers’ preliminary report on 
each state identified the groups and communities that 
were a particular focus or target of counter-terrorism 
and counter-radicalisation measures and contributed to 
identifying key actors and organisations with knowledge, 
understanding and experience of policy development 
and implementation. 
In phase 2, the national researchers collected original 
primary data using two methods: (1) expert interviews 
with key stakeholders and (2) focus group interviews with 
members of groups at risk of discrimination who are a 
target for counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation 
measures. The expert interviews provide insights from 
individuals who, through their work or roles in community 
institutions and organisation, offer a broader perspective 
on the impact of security policies. By contrast, the focus 
group participants provide an account of how security 
measures are experienced and understood and their 
impact on the everyday lives of ordinary individuals who 
are not directly involved in implementing or developing 
security policy or leading community organisations. 
Methodology
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The ambition was to complete at least 15 expert interviews 
in each research country. The targets for these were disag-
gregated into five broad categories: policymakers; practi-
tioners; legal experts and human-rights NGOs; other civil 
society organisations; and researchers/academic experts, 
with at least one interviewee from each category. 
In total 96 expert interviews were concluded: 16 each in 
Germany, Hungary and Poland, and 24 in both France and 
Spain. Of the 96 interviews, over a third were with key 
actors in civil society organisations including ethnic asso-
ciations, mosques and religious associations, women’s 
organisations, and community centres providing educa-
tion, youth or other social services. Over a quarter of the 
interviews were with practitioners implementing coun-
ter-terrorism or counter-radicalisation policies includ-
ing police officers, individuals working in the security 
services, teachers, youth workers, social workers, prison 
officers and probation staff. There were interviews with 
13 academic experts, who were able to draw on their own 
research and experience of the field to provide informa-
tion and analysis of the human rights implications and 
impacts of legislation and policy. The 12 legal and human 
rights experts included both lawyers representing cli-
ents directly affected by counter-terrorism measures and 
people working in NGOs analysing and documenting the 
impact of security legislation and policy on human rights. 
Policymakers were contacted in all five states, but it was 
only possible to secure interviews in Germany, Hungary 
and Poland. 
Potential interviewees were approached by the national 
researchers via email correspondence which included a 
letter from ENAR translated into the appropriate national 
language and explaining the context and purpose of the 
research. Interviewees signed interview consent forms 
and their interviews were conducted on the basis of ano-
nymity. The expert interviews were semi-structured and 
in-depth and were conducted in the national language of 
the state. The majority were carried out in person, with a 
few over the phone or using online communication plat-
forms. The interviews lasted between 30 and 90 minutes. 
There was no requirement to record the expert inter-
views, although in several cases a researcher recorded an 
interview for convenience. The national researchers made 
notes during the interviews, and summarised these into a 
memo in English. 
The most direct testimony of the impact of counter-terror-
ism measures is provided by the focus group interviews. A 
total of 115 participants met as 18 focus groups: 3 each in 
France, Germany, Poland and Spain, and 5 in Hungary. The 
general demographics of the focus group participants are 
summarised in Table 2.
Participants were recruited by the national researchers 
using a variety of strategies including personal networks, 
snowball sampling, and local civil society organisations. 
As the aim of the focus groups was to gain insights into 
TABLE 1� EXPERT INTERVIEW SAMPLE 








Legal experts/human rights NGOs 12




TABLE 2� FOCUS GROUP SAMPLE 
DEMOGRAPHICS 
No. of focus 
group 
participants












Country of Birth 
Born in the 
EU 76 66%
Born out-
side EU 33 29%
Data not 
recorded 6 5%
Country of citizenship 














the everyday experiences of the impact of security meas-
ures, leaders of community organisations were excluded 
from participation, although such individuals may have 
been invited to be interviewed as key stakeholders. 
Information about the project was provided to partici-
pants in the language they were able to understand and 
they were required to provide consent to participate in 
the interviews. Participants were given 10 euros to cover 
their travel and time costs. Focus groups were carried out 
in the language that participants were most familiar and 
comfortable with. In Poland, where one focus group was 
conducted in Russian, the national researcher required 
the assistance of an interpreter. With the exception of one 
of the focus groups in France, all focus group discussions 
were audio-recorded, transcribed and then translated 
into English. 
Phase 3 of the research was a feedback and discussion 
round-table with a range of stakeholders (i.e. policy-
makers, practitioners, civil society actors and academic 
experts) in each case-study state. The round-table meet-
ings included a presentation of emergent findings from 
the country, a discussion of these findings, and initial inter-
pretation of the data. The purpose of these sessions was 
to invite comment and challenges from key experts and 
stakeholders and to consider policy implications of the 
findings in the national context. Anonymised field notes 
were taken at each of these sessions. Due to the COVID-19 
pandemic it was not possible to complete a round-table 
session in France, and Poland’s was a virtual round table. 
In Germany, two separate round-tables covered policy-
makers and practitioners, and civil society organisations. 
This report sets out the key findings from the five states, 
identifying key points and common patterns in the data. 
Alongside this report, ENAR is publishing a summary 
country report focusing on relevant key findings and 
national-level recommendations from each state. The rec-
ommendations in this report focus mainly on EU policy. 
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Part I: 
Legal and Policy 
Context
12Part I: Legal and Policy Context
This chapter examines the pivotal role of the EU in 
transforming Europe’s counter-terrorism law and 
policy landscape since 2001. It shows how intensified 
European coordination and cooperation – developing 
pre-emptive offences, enabling intensified surveillance 
and moving from tackling terrorism to preventing rad-
icalisation to violent extremism – has extended the 
reach of EU law and policy but has failed to pay suffi-
cient attention to its impact on human rights and the 
rule of law. As this report will show, the impact of these 
laws and policies most directly affects groups already 
at risk of discrimination, and so risks reinforcing their 
exclusion and marginalisation.
1.1 Terrorism in the European Union 
The modern conception of terrorism has its origins in 
the violence arising out of the French revolution.26 It 
remains a contested concept, used to cover a wide and 
diverse range of actors and groups whose definition 
has eluded terrorism experts27 and the international 
community ‘because it involves difficult questions of 
when violence is justified or legitimate, by whom, and 
for what purposes’.28 
In Europe, policy responses to terrorism developed since 
2001 are themselves shaped by earlier painful memo-
ries and harrowing experiences of terrorist violence. In 
Western Europe there were close to 3,000 deaths from 
terrorism between the end of the Second World War and 
2001.29 Of the 15,484 terrorist attacks recorded in 10 EU 
states between 1970 and 2016, 4 out of 5 occurred before 
2001.30 The 1970s and 1980s were the deadliest decades, 
with at least 150 people killed in terrorist acts every year.31 
26 Gerard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin, The History of Terrorism from Antiquity to Al 
Qaeda (University of California Press, 2007). 
27 Lisa Stampnitzky, Disciplining Terror: How Experts Invented ‘Terrorism’ (CUP, 
2013). 
28 Ben Saul, ‘Minorities and Counter-Terrorism Law’ (2018) 15 European Yearbook 
of Minority Issues Online 1, 5. See also Ben Saul, Defining Terrorism in Interna-
tional Law (OUP, 2006); Gilbert Ramsay, ‘Why Terrorism Can, but Should Not be 
Defined’ (2015) 8 Critical Studies on Terrorism 211. 
29 Jan Oskar Engene, ‘Five Decades of Terrorism in Europe: The TWEED Dataset’ 
(2007) 44 Journal of Peace Research 109, 116. 
30 Mirja Gutheil and others, ‘EU Member States’ policies and laws on persons 
suspected of terrorism-related crimes’ (Study for the LIBE Committee, European 
Parliament, 2017), 27. 
31 ‘People Killed by Terrorism per Year in Western Europe 1970-2015' <https://
www.datagraver.com/case/people-killed-by-terrorism-per-year-in-western-eu-
rope-1970-2015> accessed 01 February 2021 
For some European states, current counter-terrorism pol-
icies and practices also have their roots in colonial coun-
ter-insurgency operations.32 
The terrorist attacks in Europe range across the full spec-
trum of political causes. Europol’s reports on terrorism 
trends identify five broad categories of terrorism: eth-
no-nationalist and separatist, jihadist,33 left-wing and anar-
chist, right-wing, and single-issue. Until 2001 domestic 
counter-terrorism laws and policies in Europe developed 
largely in response to ethno-nationalist and separatist 
conflicts, particularly in France, Spain, and the UK, and 
to violence from groups identified as far-left, far-right 
and anarchist. In France, the Corsican National Liberation 
Front carried out 637 or the 2,580 terrorist attacks that 
occurred between 1970 and 2014.34 In Spain, the Basque 
separatist group Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) carried out 
over 2,000 terrorist attacks.35 Even today, the vast majority 
of terrorist incidents in Europe relate to ethno-nationalist 
and separatist groups. They account for 70% of all ter-
rorist attacks planned or carried out between 2006 and 
2019.36 During this period Europol reported 365 left-wing 
and anarchist attacks, 125 Islamist/Jihadist attacks and 31 
right-wing attacks.37
These figures probably underestimate the extent of 
right-wing terrorism. The 2019 Right Wing Terrorism and 
Violence Trend report identifies 757 incidents which led 
to 326 deaths in Western Europe in 1990–2018. These kill-
ings are likely to be the tip of the iceberg in terms of right-
wing attacks and violence, as racist and political murders 
‘rarely occur in complete isolation from less severe forms 
32 See David Miller and Rizwan Sabir, “Counter-Terrorism as Counterinsurgency 
in the UK War on Terror” in S. Poynting (ed.) Counterterrorism and State Political 
Violence: The ‘War on Terror as Terror’ (Routledge, 2012). 
33 When EUROPOL’s EU Terrorism Situation and Tread (TESAT) reports were first 
published in 2006 they called this category ‘Islamist’, later changing it to ‘reli-
giously inspired’ and now using the term ‘jihadist’. 
34 Erin Miller, ‘Mass-Fatality, Coordinated Attacks Worldwide, and Terrorism in 
France’ (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to 
Terrorism, Background Report, 2015), 5.
35 Gutheil, ‘EU Member States’ policies and laws on persons suspected of terror-
ism related crimes’ (n24), 26. 
36 Data from TESAT reports of 2007–2019 show that of 3,663 failed, foiled or 
successful terrorist attacks in the EU, 2613 were made by separatist and nation-
alists groups. 
37 Data from TESAT reports of 2007-2019. 
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of violence’.38 This inattention to right-wing terrorism 
is also seen in discussions of foreign-terrorist fighters, 
where there is less scrutiny of European foreign fighters 
travelling to Ukraine than to Syria.39 Recognising grow-
ing links and coordination between European far-right 
movements and others outside the EU, in 2020 Europol 
reported on right-wing terrorist attacks outside the EU 
for the first time.40 Following large-scale terrorist attacks 
in Norway, New Zealand, Canada41 and the USA,42 there 
are signs of growing concern of the threat from far-right 
terrorism in Europe. The European Commissioner for 
the Security Union noted the ‘need to keep in mind the 
growing menace of right-wing extremism’.43 In 2019, the 
EU Counter-terrorism Coordinator published his first dis-
cussion paper on right-wing extremism and terrorism in 
the EU.44 Following killings in Hannau, the German Justice 
Minister stated that far-right terrorism was now the big-
gest threat to democracy in Germany.45 
While separatist and nationalist attacks remain the 
most numerous and right-wing terrorism may be under-
counted, in Europe the majority of fatalities from terrorism 
in the last decade have been from ISIS- or Al-Qaeda-related 
terrorism.46 Since 2001 devastating and deadly Al-Qaeda-
and ISIS-inspired terrorist attacks across Western Europe 
which have left over 600 dead have driven the intensified 
development of EU counter-terrorism law and policy. 
EU policies have contributed to embedding and sus-
taining three fundamental innovations in response to 
terrorism across Member States since 2001. First, expand-
ing of the scope of criminal law to include ‘pre-emptive’ 
offences; second, focusing interventions on preventing 
radicalisation to violent extremism; and third, increasing 
38 Jacob Aasland Ravndal and others, ‘RTV Trend Report 2019 Right Wing 
Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe, 1990–2018’ (Centre for Research on 
Extremism, University of Oslo, 2019), 4. 
39 Egle Murauskaite, Foreign Fighters in Ukraine: Assessing Potential Risk (Vilnius, 
Institute for Policy Analysis, 2020). 
40 Europol, European Union - Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2020 (European 
Police Office, 2020), 77–78. 
41 Kevin Dougherty, ‘Canadian PM says mosque shooting a 'terrorist attack on 
Muslims' Reuters 30 January 2017, < https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cana-
da-mosque-shooting-idUSKBN15E04S> accessed 01 February 2021. 
42 Jenny Gross, ‘Far-Right Groups Are Behind Most U.S. Terrorist Attacks, Report 
Finds’ New York Times (24 October 2020). 
43 Mathew Tempest, ‘Commissioner warns of ‘growing menace’ of right-wing 
terrorism in EU’ EURACTIV (27 March 2017) <https://www.euractiv.com/section/
politics/news/commissioner-warns-of-growing-menace-of-right-wing-terror-
ism-in-eu/> accessed 1 February 2021.
44 Council of the European Union, ‘Right-wing Violent Extremism and Terrorism in 
the European Union: Discussion Paper’ 11756/19 Limite, 30 August 2019. 
45 Melissa Eddy, ‘Far-Right Terrorism is No. 1 Threat, Germany is told after Attack’ 
New York Times (21 February 2020). 
46 Seth Jones, Catrina Doxsee and Nicholas Harrington, The Right-wing Terrorism 
Threat in Europe (Centre for Strategic International Studies, Washington DC, 
2020). Between 2009 and 2020 69% of fatalities from terrorist attacks resulted 
from Al-Qaeda and ISIS-related attacks, and 22% were related to far-right 
individuals or networks. 
surveillance through increased data-sharing. While all 
three developments pose significant risks to human 
rights and the rule of law, the focus in this report is on the 
first two. 
1.2 The Development of EU Counter-terrorism 
Policies 
The EU’s emphasis on criminal justice reflects and rein-
forces institutional dynamics focusing attention on 
areas where the Union has competence to develop or 
influence policy. The EU has competence to act on crim-
inal justice and to establish an area of ‘freedom, security 
and justice’ by taking measures to prevent and combat 
crime.47 It can seek to achieve greater security through 
enhanced cooperation, the coordination of relevant 
national authorities, and the ‘approximation of criminal 
laws’.48 In relation to terrorism, while the EU has legisla-
tive competence to ‘establish minimum rules concern-
ing the definition of criminal offences and sanctions’,49 
its room for action is constrained by the need to respect 
Member States’ own responsibilities on issues of inter-
nal security50 and the recognition that national security 
remains the ‘sole responsibility of each Member State’.51 
Regarding policing, the EU’s competence is limited to 
enhanced cooperation amongst EU Member States and 
between the EU and third countries. 
Radicalisation leading to violent extremism and terrorism 
is causing concern in many Member States and beyond. 
The Netherlands and the UK have been among the states 
at the forefront of developing counter-radicalisation pol-
icies. The scope for EU action on radicalisation remains 
constrained by the limits of its competence to act. Unable 
to mandate action, the EU concentrates on influencing 
and shaping national policies by developing strategies, 
establishing platforms, creating networks, exchanging 
best practice, and funding research. Its strategies on ter-
rorism and radicalisation have become integrated into 
broader EU internal security and external relations poli-
cies, and featured in The Hague (2004) and Stockholm 
(2009) programmes. In the latter, the Council called on 
Member States to ‘develop prevention mechanisms, in 
particular to allow the early detection of signs of radical-
isation’, to ‘improve initiatives to counter radicalisation in 
all vulnerable populations’, and to ‘identify best practices 
47 Art 3(2) TEU. 
48 Art 67(3) TFEU. 
49 Art 83 TFEU. 
50 Art 72 TFEU.
51 Art 4(2) TEU.
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and specific operational tools to be shared with other 
Member States’.52 
A central plank of the EU’s work in this area has been the 
establishment in 2011 of the Radicalisation Awareness 
Network (RAN); by 2014 this had evolved into the RAN 
Centre for Excellence. The Centre brings together policy-
makers, law-enforcement and security officials, prosecu-
tors, local authorities, academics, field experts and civil 
society organisations to ‘pool experiences, knowledge 
and good practices to enhance awareness of radicalisa-
tion’.53 Building on the EU’s 2014 Counter-radicalisation 
Strategy, which argues that effective prevention of radi-
calisation requires the involvement of frontline workers,54 
RAN offers training in understanding the process of rad-
icalisation to enable Europe’s social workers, healthcare 
professionals, educators, and police, prison and proba-
tion staff to identify individuals in the process of being 
radicalised.55 Notwithstanding the EU Court of Auditors’ 
warning that RAN’s ‘achievements of specific actions are 
often measured in terms of amount of activity rather than 
effectiveness’, the Commission’s counter-radicalisation 
work has continued to intensify and expand.56 Following 
a report by a High-Level Expert Group on Radicalisation,57 
the Commission established a Steering Group on 
Radicalisation. 
The EU’s increased counter-terrorism action has been 
matched by massive financial investment. Estimated EU 
spending on counter-terrorism increased from 5.7 million 
euros in 2002 to 93.5 million in 2009. In 2016, EU spending 
on ‘Security and Citizenship’ stood at over 4,000 million 
euros.58 
52 The Stockholm Programme: An Open and Secure Europe Serving and Protect-
ing Citizens [2010] C 115/01. See also Cian Murphy and Diego Acosta Arcarazo, 
‘Rethinking Europe’s Freedom, Security and Justice’ in Diego Acosta Arcarazo 
and Cian Murphy (eds.), EU Security and Justice Law: After Lisbon and Stockholm 
(Hart Publishing, 2014).
53 Commission, ‘The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five steps towards a 
more secure Europe’ COM (2010) 673. 
54 Commission, ‘Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism 
Strengthening the EU’s Response’ COM (2013) 941 Final, 4.
55 Ibid, 6. 
56 European Court of Auditors, ‘Tackling Radicalisation that Leads to Terrorism: 
The Commission Addressed the Needs of Member States, but with Some Short-
falls in Coordination and Evaluation’ (2018).
57 High-Level Commission Expert Group on Radicalisation, Final Report (Publica-
tion Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2018) 
58 Gianluca Sgueo, ‘Counter-terrorism Funding in the EU Budget’ (Briefing, Euro-
pean Parliamentary Research Service, 2016). 
1.2.1. Terrorism, pre-crime and pre-emption
After 11 September 2001 the EU moved swiftly to mobi-
lise it powers and resources in the fight against terror-
ism. Among the measures to have the most significant, 
far-reaching and direct impacts on groups at risk of dis-
crimination in Europe was the adoption in 2002 of the 
FDCT. This instigated a ‘viral propagation of anti-terror-
ism law in Europe’ as the number of states with coun-
ter-terrorism legislation leapt from 6 before 2001 to 22 
by the time an updated and revised Framework Decision 
was adopted in 2008.59 This extensive expansion of 
criminalization, initiated in response to extraordinary 
events, does not fall under the tradition of temporary 
emergency counter-terrorism measures but instead 
inscribes permanent changes in the criminal law and 
procedure of Member States.60 The 2017 Directive on 
Combatting Terrorism (DCT), introduced in the wake 
of the attacks on Paris in 2015, reaffirms the provisions 
of the 2002 and 2008 FDCTs while incorporating new 
measures on foreign terrorist fighters, cybercrime and 
radicalisation.61 
The FDCTs established a common European definition of 
terrorism62 and required states to ensure that their national 
laws criminalized nine ‘terrorist acts’,63 as well as ‘terrorism 
related offences’64 and offences linked to terrorism.65 At 
59 Kent Roach, ‘Introduction: Comparative counter-terrorism law comes of age’ in 
Kent Roach (ed.), Comparative Counter-Terrorism (CUP, 2013) 29. 
60 Claire Hamilton, ‘The European Union Sword or Shield: Comparing Counter-Ter-
rorism Law in the EU and the USA after 9/11’ (2017) 22 Theoretical Criminology 
206. 
61 DCT, Art 29(2). 
62 Eugenia Dumitriu, ‘The EU’s definition of terrorism: The Council Framework 
Decision on Combatting Terrorism’ (2004) 5 German Law Journal 585. 
63 The offences are set out in Article 3(1)(a)-(i). Most relate to terrorist offences 
prohibited in numerous international treaties, but two, the protection of natu-
ral resource supplies and threatening to carry out the others acts mentioned in 
art 3 are not found in the existing international treaties. 
64 See Cian Murphy, EU Counter-Terrorism Law: Pre-emption and the Rule of Law, 
(Hart Publishing, 2012), 67–68.
65 The new terrorism-related offences include provocation of terrorism and 
recruitment and training for terrorism. See Murphy, EU Counter-Terrorism Law 
(n57), 69-73. 
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the core of the 2017 DCT, replicating the FDCTs, lies the 
requirement that Member States prohibit in criminal law 
a range of ‘terrorist acts’ whose harms – causing death 
or injury to a person, kidnapping, damage to property, 
release of harmful substances – are already covered by 
ordinary criminal law.66 Such criminal acts become ‘terror-
ist acts’ when carried out for one of three aims: to seriously 
intimidate a population; to unduly compel a government 
or international organisation to perform or abstain from 
performing any act; or to seriously destabilise or destroy-
ing the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or 
social structures of a country or international organisa-
tion.67 Under the DCT these actions constitute ‘terrorism’. 
Through the DCT, the EU adopts a very broad definition of 
terrorism, which is not limited to causing death or injury 
to individuals but includes ‘extensive destruction to […] 
public space or private property likely to […] result in 
major economic loss’ where it is aimed at ‘seriously intim-
idating a population’, or ‘unduly compelling’ action by a 
government or international organisation.68 There is no 
stipulation that an act is wilful, nor is it clear how probable 
an outcome must be to be ‘likely’ or how influenced an 
organisation or government must be to be ‘unduly com-
pelled’.69 An action also becomes a terrorist act if it aims 
at ‘seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental 
political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a 
country’.70 As it makes no normative distinction between 
different types of states, the DCT risks criminalising activ-
ities aimed at overthrowing non-democratic, fascist or 
racist regimes.71 The breadth of the definition of terrorism 
runs counter to the rule of law and the requirements of 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) article 7.72 
An expansive, broad definition of terrorism leaves signifi-
cant discretion to states in determining which of the many 
acts that fall within the scope of the definition are then 
treated as terrorism. The dangers of a broad definition 
66 DCT, Art 3(1). 
67 DCT, Art 3(2)
68 DCT, Art 3. 
69 Amnesty international, International Commission of Jurists and Open Society 
Justice Initiative, ‘European Commission’s proposal for a Directive of the Eu-
ropean Parliament and of the Council on Combating Terrorism and Replacing 
Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on Combating Terrorism: Joint 
submission by Amnesty International, the International Commission of Jurists, 
and the Open Society Justice Initiative and the Open Society European Policy 
Institute’ 2016, 9. 
70 DCT, Art 3(2)(c). 
71 Tarik Gherbaoui, ‘Criminalising Foreign Fighter Travel in Order to Prevent 
Terrorism in Europe: An Illegitimate Assault on Human Dignity?’ in Christophe 
Paulussen and Martin Scheinin (eds.), Human Dignity and Human Security in 
Times of Terrorism (Asser Press, 2020). 
72 EU Charter art 49, ECHR art 7, ICCPR art 15. See: Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, ‘The 
Rule of Law in the European Union - Putting the Security into the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice’ (2004) 29 EL Rev 219. 
were highlighted by the UK’s Independent Reviewer of 
Terrorism Legislation when he expressed concern that 
‘an instinctive reluctance on the part of police and others 
to define terrorism as broadly as the law permits may 
encourage a tendency – itself potentially discriminatory – 
to reserve the word for the categories of perpetrators with 
which it is stereotypically associated.’ This, he cautions, 
risks creating ‘a tendency to categorise Islamist-inspired 
violence as terrorism more readily than what is still often 
referred to as “domestic extremism”’.73 
The small number of right-wing attacks identified as 
terrorism reflects the blurred and contested bounda-
ries between terrorism and hate crime.74 Noreen Van Elk 
argues that ‘the definition of terrorism and consequently 
its evaluation appears to be highly dependent on the a 
priori assumptions one has about political reality in gen-
eral and about terrorism in particular and its causality’.75 
She notes that the 2015 refugee crisis saw a surge in right-
wing activity, with 1,485 violent crimes and 10,373 hate 
crimes. Despite the structural similarities with other forms 
of terrorism, right-wing motivated crimes are not treated 
or perceived as terrorism in the context of the refugee 
crisis.76 Jacob Ravndal, research fellow at the Univesity 
of Oslo Centre for Research on Extremism, suggests that 
the low incidence of right-wing terrorism recorded in 
Europol’s European Terrorism Situation and Trend (TESAT) 
reports reflects the fact that ‘many right-wing attacks 
remain below these governments’ radars, either because 
they are registered as hate crimes rather than terrorism, 
or because they are never registered at all’.77 In Germany 
73 David Anderson, ‘The Terrorism Act in 2013: The report of the Independent 
Reviewer on the operation of the Terrorism Act 2000 and Part 1 of the Terrorism 
Act 2006’. <https://terrorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk/category/
reports/reports-former-reviewers/page/2> accessed 1 February 2021. 
74 See also Eric Shimamoto, 'Rethinking Hate Crime in the Age of Terror' (2004) 
72 UMKC L Rev 829; Helen Taylor ‘Domestic Terrorism and Hate Crimes: Legal 
Definitions and Media Framing of Mass Shootings in the United States’ (2019) 
14 Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism 227. 
75 Noreen van Elk, ‘What’s in a Name? Asymmetries in the Evaluation of Religious-
ly Motivated Terrorism and Right-wing Motivated Violence in the Context of 
the “Refugee Crisis”’ (2016) 8 Journal for Deradicalization 153.
76 ibid, 153-177.
77 JA Ravndal, ‘Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe: Introducing 
the RTV Dataset’ (2016) 10 Perspectives on Terrorism 2, 3
“Many right-wing attacks remain 
below these governments’ 
radars, either because they are 
registered as hate crimes rather 
than terrorism, or because they 
are never registered at all”
Jacob Ravndal
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‘the legal label “terrorism” seems rarely to be applied to 
extreme right-wing violence.’78 For example a right-wing 
shooting of nine people in 2016 was initially identified 
by police as a ‘rampage’ and was only classified as right-
wing terrorism after an independent review by the City 
of Munich.79 Consequently the attack does not feature 
the 2016 TESAT report.80 One analysis finds that between 
2001 and 2017 over 17,000 violent crimes were commit-
ted in Germany by right-wing extremists, including over 
500 arson attacks and 52 attacks involving explosives, yet 
there were fewer than 50 far-right terrorism investigations 
by the federal prosecutors and terrorism charges were 
only brought against 5 individuals during this period.81 
Another notes that between 2014 and 2017 half of the 
21,000–24,000 members of right-wing extremist groups 
were linked to violence in Germany.82
While Roach stresses that ‘much far-right violence satis-
fies conventional definitions of terrorism in the sense that 
it is committed for a political or ideological purpose and is 
designed to intimidate a population or to coerce a govern-
ment to act’,83 Koehler finds that the legal system strug-
gles ‘to label serious acts of extreme right-wing violence 
clearly as terrorism’.84 The failure to adequately report, 
record, and charge right-wing violence and activities as 
78 Daniel Koehler, ‘Recent Trends in German Right-wing Violence and Terrorism: 
What are the Contextual Factors behind “Hive Terrorism?”’ (2018) 12 Perspec-
tives on Terrorism 72, 83.
79 Florian Hartleb, ‘New Dimension of Terrorism: Tracking Right-wing-inspired 
Lone Wolves’ (Open Democracy, 25 March 2020), <https://www.open-
democracy.net/en/can-europe-make-it/new-dimensions-terrorism-track-
ing-right-wing-inspired-lone-wolves/?fbclid=IwAR24pnRuUlzEIHFunkNm6k-
BUcrR1OSnZyx3zsnmzg5bme8AXagRtPZw9l5M> accessed 1 February 2021. 
80 Similarly, Peter Mangs carried out three murders and twelve attempted mur-
ders in Sweden. He aimed to ignite a race war there. However, as the Swedish 
prosecuting authorities did not note his motives, his crimes are not recorded 
on any single-actor terrorism database. See Mattias Gardell, ‘Urban Terror: The 
Case of Lone Wolf Peter Mangs’ (2018) 30 Terrorism and Political Violence 793. 
81 Koehler, ‘Recent Trends in German Right-wing Violence’ (n78) 80-82.
82 Michael Herzog zu Mecklenburg and Ian Anthony, Preventing Violent Extremism 
in Germany: Coherence and Cooperation in a Decentralized System (Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute, 2020), 5. 
83 Kent Roach, ‘Counter-terrorism and the Challenge of Terrorism from the Far-
right’ (2020) Common Law World Review 1, 1. 
84 Koehler, ‘Recent Trends in German Right-wing Violence’ (n78) 85. 
terrorism ‘perpetuates misconceptions about the nature 
of the terrorism threat, encouraging Islamophobia while 
reducing vigilance against all types of terrorism’.85 This 
bias may be further reinforced with the move towards the 
criminalisation of pre-emptive activities, as evidence for 
these are increasingly driven by the targeting decisions 
of intelligence and policing agencies.86 These targeting 
decision will themselves be influenced by implicit under-
standing of what constitutes terrorism and where the 
greatest threat of terrorism comes from. 
The shift away from traditional criminalisation towards 
pre-emption begins with the seemingly innocuous inclu-
sion of not just particular acts of violence but also ‘threat-
ening’ to commit any of the actions set out in the list of 
terrorist acts. Ordinary criminal law already allows charg-
ing a person for ‘attempting’ or conspiring to commit a 
terrorist act; the inclusion of ‘threats’ expands the reach 
of criminal law to bring future possible action within the 
scope of a prosecution for terrorism. It extends the crim-
inal to words that have not manifested as actions that 
would constitute an attempt or plans that would amount 
to a conspiracy. However, a threat is not a plan; a threat is 
an utterance that may be fantasy, loose talk or bravado. 
Bringing threats of future possibilities into the scope of 
terrorism further erodes the link between ‘terrorist acts’ 
and the need for evidence of actual planning for a specific 
act of terrorist violence.
Furthermore, the designation of particular criminal acts 
as ‘terrorist acts’ provides the basis for the criminalisa-
tion of actions related to terrorist activities or threats of 
action related to terrorist activities. These include public 
provocation to commit a terrorist act,87 recruitment for 
terrorism,88 providing or receiving training for terrorism,89 
travelling90 or supporting or otherwise facilitating travel 
for the purpose of terrorism,91 and financing terrorism.92 
Aggravated theft and extortion with a view to commit-
ting a terrorist offence is designated in article 3 as an 
offence ‘related to a terrorist activity’. Drawing up or using 
false administrative documents are also ‘offences related 
85 Jesse Norris, ‘When (and Where) can Right-wing Terrorists be Charged with 
Terrorism?’ (2020) 13 Critical Studies on Terrorism 519, 520. 
86 In the USA undercover operations that lead to terrorism convictions based on 
the actions of police informants that pressurise previously law-abiding defend-
ants to engage in terrorism offences are overwhelmingly targeted at Muslims 
rather than right-wing suspects. See Jesse Norris and Hanna Grol-Prokopczyk, 
‘Racial and Other Sociodemographic Disparities in Terrorism Sting Operations’ 
(2019) 5 Sociology of Race and Ethnicity 416. 
87 DCT Art 5.
88 DCT Art 6.
89 DCT Art 7 and 8.
90 DCT Art 9.
91 DCT Art 10.
92 DCT Art 11. 
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to terrorist activities’ if committed to further a terrorist 
offence, support a terrorist group or travel for terrorism.93 
The DCT also requires states to prohibit the directing of a 
terrorist group or participating in the activities of a terror-
ist group.94 The ways in which a person can participate in 
a terrorist group include, but are not limited to, ‘supplying 
information or material resources, or by funding its activ-
ities in any way’ with knowledge that their participation 
will further the group’s criminal activities. Participation 
therefore only requires knowledge of the group’s unlaw-
ful criminal activities, and not necessarily of its terrorist 
activities. Thus a person can be guilty of participating 
in a terrorist group without knowing that the group is a 
terrorist group. For example, an individual who partici-
pates in an animal rights or environmental organisation, 
knowing of its criminal activity (such as graffiti damage to 
property) but not its terrorist activity would still be liable 
for prosecution on grounds of participation in a terrorist 
group.95 
Beneath the apparent continuity with the pre-2001 crim-
inal justice approach to terrorism, the FDCTs and DCT, 
by introducing the criminalisation of ‘offences related to 
terrorist activities’, signal a shift in the focus of European 
counter-terrorism law from the punishment of activi-
ties that harm or attempt to harm others to state action 
against individuals to pre-empt any possibility of harm.96 
This move towards pre-emption reflects a broader trend 
in the direction of regulating risk in modern societies 
and the emergence in criminal law of ‘actuarial justice’ as 
an approach that seeks to regulate groups and manage 
danger rather than punish or reform individuals.97 
However, the low number of incidents of and individuals 
involved in terrorism precludes the development of ade-
quate models for risk assessment. As Murphy observes, ‘in 
the face of these unknowns, government agencies have 
taken to imagining potential future attacks; replacing the 
statistical basis of actuarial justice with worst case sce-
nario hypothesis’, leading to a shift from what is probable 
to what is possible.98 He identifies three changes that arise 
93 DCT Art 12. Noted exclusion of Art 3(1)(j)
94 DCT Art. 4. Article 2 defines a terrorist group as ‘a structured group of more 
than two persons, established for a period of time and acting in concert to 
commit terrorist offences; ‘structured group’ means a group that is not random-
ly formed for the immediate commission of an offence and that does not need 
to have formally defined roles for its members, continuity of its membership or 
a developed structure.’
95 Murphy, EU Counter-Terrorism Law (n64), 63. 
96 Marieke De Goede, ‘The Politics of Preemption and the War on Terror in Europe’ 
(2008) 14 European Journal of International Relations 161. 
97 Murphy, EU Counter-Terrorism Law, (n64 ) 9-11. 
98 ibid, 11.
from the move to pre-emption. First, a shift in the control 
of coercive power from the criminal justice process and 
its attendant procedural safeguards toward the use of 
administrative measures. Second, the expansion of crimi-
nal law measures beyond those that cause direct harm to 
others, bringing those who support or encourage others 
into the ambit of criminal law and criminalising actions 
that are themselves not harmful to others. Third, a resort 
to non-criminal powers, executive and civic regulations 
and broader surveillance.99 While this report observes all 
three trends across the EU states covered in this research, 
the FDCTs and DCT have contributed most directly to the 
second and third trends noted by Murphy. 
Ordinary criminal law already prohibits actions that 
directly harm people or property, as well as any attempt, 
conspiracy, or aiding and abetting of such action. The DCT, 
through requirements to criminalise public provocation, 
recruitment, travelling or training where these are ‘related 
to’ terrorist activities, extends the reach of criminal law 
beyond actions that directly harm others to activities that 
do not entail direct harm to others in and of themselves. 
The rhetorical connection to potential ‘terrorist offences’ 
suggests a link to harm that does not need to exist. There 
is no requirement for a terrorist offence causing harm to 
others to be planned, attempted or committed, nor is 
there a need, in most cases, to establish a link to a par-
ticular terrorist offence in the DCT. Pre-emption seeks to 
manage risk in a context where the ‘risk of harm is seen as 
simultaneously unknowable and utterly unacceptable’.100 
The expansion of criminal law in this way has been crit-
icised as the criminalisation of the presumed ‘danger-
ousness’ of the individual rather than the harms arising 
from their actions, because ‘the farther punishment is 
removed from a concrete terrorist act, the closer we get to 
a criminal law system aimed at punishing the dangerous 
individual.’101 Such an approach encourages hyper-sur-
veillance and justifies extensive data collection. It is dif-
ficult to place limits on data collection when it informs 
predictions of future possible action; the richer and 
more detailed the data, the more confident the predic-
tion. The risky individual is at risk of being permanently 
watched. However, as the next section will show, a further 
and yet more far-reaching extension of state-led surveil-
lance arises from the expansion of EU policies from crim-
inalising terrorist acts to coordinating action to prevent 
99 ibid, 12-13.
100 ibid, 17. 
101 Valsamis Mitsilegas, ‘European Criminal Law and the Dangerous Citizen’ (2018) 
25 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 733, 743. 
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radicalisation to violent extremism; that is, acting to pre-
vent individuals from holding views and ideas that could 
lead them to support terrorism. 
1.2.2 Prevention of Radicalisation 
While 2001 was the catalyst for greater EU action on 
terrorism, it was only after the Madrid and London 
bombings that the EU adopted its first overarching 
Counter-terrorism Strategy.102 This signalled a broad-
ening of the focus beyond criminal justice to an exam-
ination of the conditions that underpin support of and 
recruitment into terrorism.103 Prevent, one of the four 
pillars of this strategy, with a strategic objective of 
stopping ‘people from turning to terrorism by tack-
ling the factors or root causes which can lead to radi-
calisation and recruitment’, lies at the core of the new 
approach.104 Emphasising its centrality in EU policy, the 
Council adopted a specific sub-strategy for combating 
radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism with an 
accompanying Action Plan.105,106 The strategy was fur-
ther developed and revised in 2008 and 2014.107,108 
Within a short period a proliferation of national, 
European, and global policies appeared addressing rad-
icalisation, a concept which was itself a recent arrival in 
the field of counter-terrorism analysis.109 After 2001 the 
Dutch Intelligence Services was the first of Europe’s secu-
rity practitioners to apply radicalisation as the dominant 
framework from which to attempt to understand the path-
way or route by which ordinary citizens can become ter-
rorists. Peter Neumann, the Director of the International 
Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, argues that the 
concept of radicalisation allowed policymakers a way to 
102 Council of the European Union, 14469/4/05 REV 4, 30 Nov. 2005. See also 
Raphael Bossong, ‘EU Cooperation on Terrorism Prevention and Violent Radical-
ization: Frustrated Ambitions or New Forms of EU Security Governance?’ (2014) 
27 Cambridge Review of International Affairs 66.
103 The EU Declaration on Combatting Terrorism of 25 March 2004 included a 
revised Plan of Action with seven strategic objectives, of which Objective 6 
sought ‘to address the factors which contribute to support for, and recruitment 
into, terrorism’. 
104 See Rik Coolsaet, ‘Radicalization: the Origins and Limits of a Contested Concept’ 
in Nadia Fadil, Martijn de Koning and Francesco Ragazzi (eds), Radicalisation 
in Belgium and the Netherlands: Critical Perspectives on Violence and Security (IB 
Tauris, Bloomsbury, 2019).
105 Council of the European Union, ‘The European Union Strategy for Combating 
Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism’ 14781/1/05 REV 1, 24 November 
2005.
106 European Council, ‘EU Action Plan on Combating Terrorism’ (15358/05); on 4/5 
December 2006 the Council took note of a report on the implementation of 
the Radicalisation and Recruitment Action Plan, revised 12 February 2007.
107 Council of the European Union, ‘Revised EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisa-
tion and Recruitment to Terrorism’ 15178/08, 14 November 2008. 
108 Council of the European Union, ‘Revised EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisa-
tion and Recruitment to Terrorism’ 9956/14, 19 May 2014.
109 On the development of prevention of radicalisation policies at the United 
Nations see Arun Kundnani and Ben Hayes, The Globalisation of Countering 
Violent Extremism Policies: Undermining Human Rights and Instrumentalising Civil 
Society (Transnational Institute, Amsterdam, 2018)
discuss the conditions conducive to terrorism without the 
fear of being seen to excuse or condone it.110 Rik Coolsaet, 
a Senior Associate Fellow at Egmont Royal Institute for 
International Relations in Brussels, views radicalisation as 
primarily a ‘political construct’ that was ‘first raised within 
European police and intelligence circles’ and integrated 
into the EU policy framework soon after.111 
The role and utility of radicalisation as a concept remains 
deeply contested. A key criticism is the focus of radical-
isation theories on the role of ideology and theology 
as a cause of violence. This approach is reflected in the 
European Commission description of radicalisation as 
‘the phenomenon of people embracing opinions, views 
and ideas which could lead to acts of terrorism’ (empha-
sis added).112 Thus radicalisation places individuals’ views 
and opinions under scrutiny and sees ideology as incip-
ient violence. However, as Borum and others note, the 
‘focus on radicalisation […] risks implying that radical 
beliefs are a proxy—or at least a necessary precursor—for 
terrorism. We know this not to be true. Most people who 
hold radical ideas do not engage in terrorism, and many 
terrorists—even those who lay claim to a “cause”—are not 
deeply ideological and may not “radicalize” in any tradi-
tional sense.’113 McCauley and Moskalenko also caution 
against a focus on ideology, noting that ‘individuals with 
radical ideas are 100 times more common than individu-
als involved in radical action; targeting ideas rather than 
actions multiplies the enemy by a factor of a hundred’.114 
The emphasis on individual psychology in radicalisation 
theories is also criticised for shifting the focus from the 
110 Peter Neumann, ‘The Trouble with Radicalization’ (2013) 18 International Affairs 
873. 
111 Coolsaet ‘Radicalisation: the Origins and Limits of a Contested Concept’ (n104), 
30. 
112 European Commission, ‘Terrorist Recruitment: Addressing Factors Contributing 
to Violent Radicalisation’ COM (2005) 313 final, 21 Sept. 2005, 1. 
113 Randy Borum, ‘Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social 
Science Theories’ (2012) 4 Journal of Strategic Security 7, 8. 
114 Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, Friction: How Radicalization Happens 
to Them and Us (Oxford, OUP, 2017) 274. 
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“Even 12 years after its 
inception, radicalisation 
remains ill-defined, complex 
and controversial� The same 
questions of a decade ago are 
still being asked today�”
Rik Coolsaet
wider societal and political context and the role of state 
actions and policies that generate political violence. For 
example, in the EU counter-radicalisation strategies for-
eign policy is not mentioned as a relevant factor in radi-
calisation except in relation to its presence in an ‘extremist 
worldview’ that lead individuals to ‘consider and justify 
violence’ because it ‘distorts perceptions of Western 
policies and increases suspicion of hidden agenda and 
double standards’.115 This appears to delegitimise any 
political analysis suggesting a hidden agenda and double 
standards in Western policies as extremist. It also shifts 
any attention away from issues of policy onto a focus on 
greater coordination and enhanced efforts to change 
perceptions of Western foreign policies. Furthermore, EU 
counter-terrorism policy documents do not refer to state 
terrorism; terrorism is only ever envisaged as the conse-
quence of the actions of non-state actors. The strategies 
are also silent on the impact or implications of coun-
ter-terrorism policies and policing responses; the dynam-
ics of terrorism are disconnected from any state action. 
Thus rather than becoming a way to bring the root causes 
of terrorism back into policy debates, radicalisation soon 
settled as ‘the single most important “root cause” of ter-
rorism within Europe’.116 
For many policymakers and practitioners, the practical 
value of radicalisation is not explaining why some people 
adopt violence in and of itself but the promise that the 
models of radicalisation hold out for enabling preventa-
tive interventions. The DCT calls on Member States to sup-
port professionals with ‘training and awareness-raising 
measures aimed at enabling them to identify and address 
signs of radicalisation’ (emphasis added).117 The latter task 
presumes the existence of reliable ‘signs of radicalisation’. 
Disappointingly for practitioners and policymakers, most 
terrorism researchers stubbornly insist that the lack of a 
terrorist profile is not a failure of research but the out-
come of research.118 Radicalisation research has also not 
yielded a profile of an incipient soon-to-be terrorist, nor 
found any reliable ‘pathway’, ‘conveyor belt’ or ‘staircase’ 
along which it is possible to pick out individuals hold-
ing extreme views just before they move on to engage 
in unlawful violence. Models for explaining radicalisa-
tion ‘narrate the process of becoming radical as both 
115 Council of the European Union, ‘The European Union Strategy for Combating 
Radicalisation’ (n105), 4.
116 Rik Coolsaet and Tanguy de Swielande, ‘Epilogue: Zeitgiest and (De-)Radicali-
sation’ in Rik Coolsaet (ed.), Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalization Challenge in 
Europe (Ashgate Publishing Company, Farnham, 2008) 159.
117 DCT, Recital 33. 
118 See Marc Sageman, ‘The Stagnation of Terrorism Research’ (2014) 26 Terrorism 
and Political Violence 565; Borum, ‘Radicalization into Violent Extremism’ (n113).
contingent and determined’.119 The lack of predictive 
power in the models of radicalisation is a persistent chal-
lenge for European governments, policymakers and secu-
rity practitioners. As Arun Kundnani acutely observes, 
each model of radicalisation posits various relationships 
between ideological, social and psychological factors, as 
well as group and individual dynamics, but they remain 
unable to identify which individuals holding radical ideas 
will cross the line into terrorist violence.120 After a decade 
of studying radicalisation, Marc Sageman, concludes that 
researchers are ‘no closer to understanding the answer to 
our original question about what leads people to turn to 
political violence’.121 Similarly, Rik Coolsaet, a key partic-
ipant in the development of European policy, concludes 
that ‘even 12 years after its inception, radicalisation 
remains ill-defined, complex and controversial. The same 
questions of a decade ago are still being asked today’.122 
Furthermore, ‘the persistent lack of consensus on the 
drivers of radicalisation helps to explain why deradicali-
sation programmes tend to be a potpourri of objectives 
of all kinds, from cohesiveness to repression to counter 
narratives’.123 
With no clear way to identify terrorists, counter-radi-
calisation policies have developed ‘indicators’ for what 
makes individuals ‘vulnerable to’ or puts them ‘at risk’ of 
radicalisation.124 Such formulations enable the use of indi-
cators while allowing for their lack of predictive power.125 
However, the lack of control groups in the research used 
119 Marieke de Goede and Stephanie Simon, ‘Governing Future Radicals in Europe’ 
(2013) 45 Antipode 315, 322. 
120 Arun Kundnani, ‘Radicalisation: The Journey of a Concept’ in C Baker-Beall and 
others (eds.), Counter-Radicalisation: Critical Perspectives (Routledge, Abingdon, 
2015). 
121 Marc Sageman, ‘The Stagnation of Terrorism Research’ (2014) 26 Terrorism and 
Political Violence 565, 569.
122 Rik Coolsaet, ‘All Radicalisation is Local’: The Genesis and Drawbacks of an 
Elusive Concept, Egmont Paper 84 (Royal Institute for International Affairs, 
Brussels, 2016), 5. 
123 ibid, 38.
124 On the development of risk indicators, see for example Rita Augestad Knudsen, 
‘Measuring Radicalisation: Risk Assessment Conceptualisations and Practice 
in England and Wales’ (2020) 12 Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political 
Aggression 37. 
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to develop indicators erodes their value and validity.126 
The UK’s Royal College of Psychiatry warns that the ‘epi-
demiological database needed to construct a valid risk 
assessment instrument does not exist’ and therefore ‘cur-
rent tools and methodologies should be treated with cau-
tion’, particularly as ‘methodologies that seek to predict 
rare events, such as acts of terror, yield consistently poor 
results’.127 The indicators range from personal trauma, 
experiences of discrimination and the search for iden-
tity to political and religious beliefs. Ironically, outcomes 
shaped by institutionalised racism (social marginalisation, 
deprivation, discrimination) become themselves indica-
tors of potential vulnerability to radicalisation. Indicators 
of risk provided by the UK government as guidance for 
schools in England, include a desire for adventure and 
excitement, a search for identity or a search for answers 
to questions of identity, faith and belonging.128 Thus 
126 Marc Sageman, Misunderstanding Terrorism (University of Pennsylvania Press, 
Philadelphia, 2016). 
127 Royal College of Psychiatrists, Counter-terrorism and Psychiatry, Position State-
ment PS04/16 (Royal College of Psychiatrists, London, 2016), 5-6. 
128 Department for Children, Schools and Families, ‘Learning Together to be Safe: 
A Toolkit to Help Schools Contribute to the Prevention of Violent Extremism’ 
(DCSF, Nottingham, 2008). 
‘ostensibly innocuous thoughts, feelings and behaviours 
of children and young people are […] reconstructed as 
deviant and potentially dangerous’. Furthermore, ‘with-
out the initial framing of these features as indicative of a 
susceptibility to violent extremism, it is likely that any rea-
sonable person would simply understand them as famil-
iar characteristics of what it means to BE a child or young 
person.’129 These broad and vague indicators widen the 
reach of counter-terrorism policies, justifying the use of 
greater levels of surveillance deeper into the lives of indi-
viduals and their families and communities.130 However, 
as the next section shows, while the quotidian banality 
of many indicators could apply to anyone, at their incep-
tion European counter-radicalisation policies targeted 
Muslims, and in so doing enabled and embedded institu-
tional racialised suspicion of Muslims. 
129 Vicki Coppock and Mark McGovern, ‘Dangerous Minds’? Deconstructing Coun-
ter-Terrorism Discourse, Radicalisation and the “Psychological Vulnerability’ ” 
of Muslim Children and Young People in Britain’ (2014) 28 Children and Society 
242, 250. 
130 Kundnani ‘Radicalisation: The Journey of a Concept’(n120); see also Jonathan 
Githens-Mazer and Robert Lambert, ‘Why Conventional Wisdom on Radicali-
zation Fails: The Persistence of a Failed Discourse’ 2010 86 International Affairs 
889; Charlotte Heath-Kelly, ‘Counter-Terrorism and the Counterfactual: Produc-
ing the ‘Radicalisation’ Discourse and the UK PREVENT Strategy 2013’ (2013) 15 
British Journal of Politics and International Relations 394
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In setting out its 2005 Strategy on Combatting 
Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism, the 
European Union emphasised that neither radicalisation 
nor recruitment to terrorism are ‘confined to one belief 
system or political persuasion’, emphasising the need 
to develop language that avoided ‘linking Islam to ter-
rorism’.131 The strategy stresses that Al-Qaeda justifies 
its action through a ‘distorted version of Islam’. The 
2008 revised strategy defines ‘radical Islamists’ rather 
than Muslims or Islam as its target. This distinction 
between Islam and Islamism allows policymakers to 
argue that they are focusing on a political ideology and 
not a religion. 
Yet key elements of the 2005 strategy constructed, sus-
tained, and reinforced the perception of Muslims as a 
potential security threat.132 It emphasised the need to 
engage in dialogue with Muslims and identified ‘Muslim 
communities’ as the target for enhanced efforts to change 
perceptions of European and Western foreign policies.133 
However, ‘the suggestion that “Muslim communities” 
must be engaged if terrorism is to be prevented only 
serves to further strengthen the implicit construction of 
the “Muslim” other as a potential terrorist threat’.134 Even 
attempts to highlight Muslim opposition to terrorism 
contain implicit acknowledgement of their perceived oth-
erness and exclusion from European identity and belong-
ing. Thus the Strategy welcomes the rejection of terrorism 
‘by the peoples of Europe […] including Muslims;’135 but 
the need to make clear that Muslims are included in the 
term ‘peoples of Europe’ was a tacit admission that their 
inclusion is not a given and needed to be made explicit. 
The revised Strategies of 2008 and 2014 attempt to over-
come the stigma of the initial focus on Muslims by expand-
ing their remit to ‘all forms of extremism’. Furthermore, 
the explicit mention of Muslims is replaced by reference 
to the need for dialogue with ‘faith groups’, and the need 
131 Council of the European Union, ‘The European Union Strategy for Combating 
Radicalisation’ (n105), 4.
132 Christopher Baker-Beall, The European Union’s Fight Against Terrorism: Dis-
course, Policies and Identity (Manchester University Press, 2016), 142-171.
133 Council of the European Union ‘The European Union Strategy for Combating 
Radicalisation’ (n105), 4.
134 Baker-Beall, ‘The European Union’s Fight Against Terrorism’ (n132), 148. 
135 Council of the European Union, ‘The European Union Strategy for Combating 
Radicalisation’ (n105), 2.
to provide training for imams has been replaced with the 
need for ‘religious training’. While the text of the policy 
no longer mentions Muslims, in reality EU efforts at coun-
ter-radicalisation continued to focus overwhelmingly on 
Muslims and see Muslims and Muslim communities as 
the natural and proper subjects of counter-radicalisation 
prevention policies, and by extension, counter-terrorism 
policing. 
In the process of calling for engagement with Muslims as a 
community, the EU Strategy confirm Muslim communities 
as the natural subject of counter-radicalisation policies 
and counter-terrorism policing. However, the Strategy’s 
emphasis on engagement with Muslims and Muslim 
communities generates a complex frame of governance 
through communities that enables ‘policed multicultur-
alism’; this entails a more stratified approach, in which 
‘trusted’ Muslims exist alongside ‘suspect’ Muslims; the 
latter being further divided into victims, those ‘at risk’ of 
radicalisation, and those who are deemed dangerous and 
‘risky’. 136 The EU Strategy encourages states to work with 
trusted Muslims to ‘ensure that voices of mainstream opin-
ion prevail over those of extremism’. It calls for policies 
to ‘empower moderate voices by engaging with Muslim 
organisations and faith groups that reject the distorted 
version of Islam put forward by Al-Qaeda and others’ and 
‘seeks to encourage the emergence of European imams 
and enhance language and other training for foreign 
imams in Europe.’137 The participation and involvement 
of Muslims in the co-production of counter-radicalisa-
tion and counter-terrorism action bolsters the legitimacy 
of state policies and state actors; at the same time state 
endorsement, resources and engagement seek to influ-
ence the development of Muslim communities’ internal 
leadership.138 The EU counter-radicalisation strategy rein-
forces a dichotomy approach to Muslims that views them 
as either moderate or extremist, echoing a central trope 
of the global war on terror: 
136 Francesco Ragazzi, ‘Suspect Community or Suspect Category? The Impact of 
Counter-terrorism as “Policed Multiculturalism”’ (2016) 42 Journal of Ethnic and 
Migration Studies 724.
137 Council of the European Union, ‘The European Union Strategy for Combating 
Radicalisation’ (n105), 4. 
138 Frederiq Volpi, ‘Constructing the Ummah in European Security: Between Exit, 
Voice and Loyalty’ (2007) 42 Government and Opposition 451. 
2. RACIALISATION, ISLAMOPHOBIA  
AND DISCRIMINATION
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From the beginning of policy-making in the war 
on terror, the ‘Muslim extremist’ became a discrete 
category of identity, a legitimate subject of classi-
fication, control and containment by government, 
for the disclaimer that counter-terrorism does not 
target Islam but instead targets a ‘distorted, per-
verted, twisted’ version of Islam created a distinct 
category of politicised Islam as illegitimate, inau-
thentic belief moored in opposition to legitimate, 
‘mainstream’, depoliticised ‘majority’ Islamic teach-
ings. ‘Extremists’, categorised as a dissociative, devi-
ant milieu, were characterised as the governmental 
subject, the healthy core of the Muslim body divided 
from the sick part of the body.139 
The moderate/extremist and Islam/Islamism binaries rein-
force the perception that the problem of terrorist violence 
lies with Islam, the need to work with Muslims and Muslim 
communities makes Islam both the ‘cure and cause of rad-
icalisation’.140 Thus ‘[i]n the war on terror, every Muslim is 
infected with a dormant virus and must offer an immuni-
sation record; a reassurance that the strain of Muslimness 
they contain is safe.’141 Crucially both extremist and mod-
erate Muslims are objects of policing and policy. They 
exist on a continuum; both are the objects of state inter-
vention and control. By distinguishing moderate Muslims 
from extremists, policing and policy hope to be able to 
focus on extremists without being seen to openly profile 
individuals based on their race or religion. 
However, scholars of race draw attention to the ways in 
which counter-terrorism policies and practices inten-
sify and extend existing processes of the racialisation 
of Muslims.142 The notion of the ‘radical Islamist’ reso-
nates as it is inscribed onto existing Orientalist tropes 
and stereotypes of Muslim men and Islam as innately 
violent and aggressive.143 Such tropes persist, reconfig-
ured and re-presented in claims that the ‘new terrorism’ 
of Al-Qaeda, driven by ‘religious fanaticism’, decoupled 
from wider geopolitical conflicts, differs qualitatively 
139 Randa Abdel-Fattah, ‘Countering violent extremism, governmentality and 
Australian Muslim youth as “becoming terrorist”’ (2020) 56 Journal of Sociology 
372, 378. 
140 Katherine E Brown, ‘Introduction: Radicalisation and Securitisation of Muslims 
in Europe’ (2018) 7 Journal of Muslims in Europe 139. 
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142 See Steve Garner and Saher Selod, ‘The Racialisation of Muslims: Empirical 
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ology 92; Louis Canikar and Saher Selod, ‘Review of Race Scholarship and the 
“War On Terror”’ (2018) 4 Sociology of Race and Ethnicity 165; Amal Abu-Bakare, 
‘Counterterrorism and Race’ (2020) 8 International Politics Review 79. 
143 Edward Said, Orientalism: Western Concepts of the Orient (Routledge, 1978); 
see also Sophia Rose Arjana, Muslims in Western Imagination (OUP, 2014). 
from other forms of terrorism and therefore justifies the 
expanded criminalisation of pre-emptive offences.144 
In placing religious belief or ideology as the distinctive 
driver of the ‘new terrorism’ alongside banal and vague 
indicators of radicalisation, policies for preventing terror-
ism feed paranoia about Muslim extremism.145 
Garner and Selod use the concept of ‘racialisation’ to 
understand and capture the way Muslims experience 
these policies: 
The process of racialization entails ascribing sets of 
characteristics viewed as inherent to members of 
a group because of their physical or cultural traits. 
These are not limited to skin tone or pigmentation, 
but include a myriad of attributes including cultural 
traits such as language, clothing, and religious prac-
tices. The characteristics thus emerge as ‘racial’ as an 
outcome of the process.146 
An important point here is that racialisation is a process 
that brings ‘race’ into being, and is not limited to colour 
or physical characteristics alone but can be constructed 
through cultural traits that include clothing and religious 
practices. Racism emerges from the construction of 
groups into a hierarchy based on characteristics that are 
used to signal innate difference and inferiority to Whites. 
The authors argue that Islamophobia in this context 
should be seen as a form of racism, as it involves a ‘set of 
ideas and practices that amalgamate all Muslims into one 
group and the characteristics associated with Muslims 
(violence misogyny, political allegiance/disloyalty, incom-
patibility with Western values, etc.) are treated as if they 
are innate’.147 Claims that Islamophobia cannot be racism 
because Muslims are not a race miss the point that race is 
a social construct and that religions can be ‘raced’.148 
In liberal democratic states that are committed to equality 
and anti-racism, processes of racialisation are subtle and 
indirect. Sentas’ detailed and sustained analysis of racism 
in counter-terrorism policies in Australia identifies two 
key processes through which counter-terrorism policing 
144 Walter Laqueur, The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruc-
tion (OUP, 1999). 
145 Tim Aistrope, ‘The Muslim Paranoia Narrative in Counter-radicalisation Policy’ 
(2016) 9 Critical Studies on Terrorism 182. 
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147 ibid, 13. See also Ramon Grosfoguel and Eric Mielants, ‘The Long-Durée Entan-
glement between Islamophobia and Racism in the Modern/Colonial Capitalist/
Patriarchal World-system: An Introduction’ (2006) 5 Human Architecture 1, and 
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385.
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and policies are implicated in processes of racialisation; 
firstly through the differentiation and categorisation of 
those subject to counter-terrorism, and secondly through 
‘normalisation’ of this by the repeated and continuous 
exercise of state power against those deemed the natural 
subjects of policing.149 Thus, policies that operate through 
inclusion, participation and engagement with Muslim 
communities may ‘better select suspect populations’, but 
are not race-neutral.150 For Sentas, ‘counter-terrorism law 
and policing, in their different modes bring into existence 
policed subjects who are the objects of counter-terrorism: 
the extremist and the moderate Muslims’.151 It ‘makes 
and remakes a common sense that Muslims [...] must be 
subject to policing’.152 While identification of a person as 
‘moderate’ is clearly not criminalisation, it nevertheless 
involves a ‘racialized process of being made a policed sub-
ject ’ (emphasis added).153 
Anticipating criticism of profiling, policymakers and poli-
ticians have argued that a strategy targeting Al-Qaeda- or 
ISIS-inspired terrorism will inevitably have a dispropor-
tionate impact on Muslims and that the policy requires 
engagement with Muslims and Muslim communities.154 
However, it is neither inevitable nor clear that policies 
targeting terrorists could or should target all Muslims or 
Muslims as a community. The EU Strategy itself recognises 
that only a small minority of the population hold extrem-
ist views, and an even smaller number move from holding 
extremist ideas to enacting violence.155 This is consistent 
with TESAT data. The number of suspects arrested in rela-
tion to ISIS- or Al-Qaeda-related terrorism between 2006 
and 2019 amount to 0.02% of Muslims out of a population 
of 25 million in Europe. Since most individuals who are 
arrested are released without charge after questioning, 
the number charged may be a more appropriate focus. 
Here the proportion falls further to 0.009% of European 
Muslims. Calling on Muslims to work to prevent extrem-
ism ’makes these heterogeneous communities accounta-
ble for governing a tiny minority of extremists.’156 
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Given the collective call to Muslims to engage with 
counter-terrorism combined with constant suspicion of 
Muslims as radicalisation risks it is not surprising that they 
face stigmatisation and experience collective blame for 
terrorism. The surge in violent Islamophobic assaults and 
incidents in the aftermath of terrorist attacks manifests 
a logic that holds Muslims accountable for the actions 
of terrorists.157 Beyond these spikes, the research for this 
report details how the perception of Muslims as a security 
threat permeates and contours their daily experiences of 
discrimination. 
Thus, EU security policies that maintain fear of Muslims as 
a security threat layer onto pre-existing as well as grow-
ing anti-Muslim sentiment. EU survey data shows that 
one in ten Europeans are uncomfortable working with 
a Muslim,158 while one in five do not want Muslims as 
neighbours.159 Across all countries, Europeans were more 
comfortable with their child being in a relationship with 
someone who was Jewish or Buddhist than one with a 
Muslim.160 Consistent overestimation of the size of a coun-
157 See, for example: Chris Allen and Jan Nielsen, Summary Report on Islamophobia 
in the EU after 11 September 2001 (European Monitoring Centre for Racism and 
Xenophobia, Vienna, 2002); C Bozzoli and C Muller, ‘Perceptions and Attitudes 
Following a Terrorist Shock: Evidence from the UK (2011) 27 European Journal 
of Political Economy 89; A Echebaria-Echabe and E Fernandez-Guede, ‘Effects of 
Terrorism on Attitudes and Ideological Orientation’ (2006) 36 European Journal 
of Social Psychology 259; Centre for the Analysis of Social Media, ‘Anti-Islamic 
Content on Twitter’ 24 April 2017 <https://demos.co.uk/project/anti-islam-
ic-content-on-twitter/> accessed 1 February 2021 ; Ria Ivandic, Tom Kirchmaier 
and Stephen Machin, ‘Jihadi Attacks, Media and Local Hate Crime’ Discussion 
Paper 12352 (IZA Institute for Labor Economics, Bonn, 2019), <http://ftp.iza.
org/dp12352.pdf> accessed 1 February 2021. For a discussion of methodolog-
ical challenges in measuring impact of terrorism on hate crime see, Klas Borell, 
‘When Is the Time to Hate? A Research Review on the Impact of Dramatic 
Events on Islamophobia and Islamophobic Hate Crimes in Europe, (2015) 26 
Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations 409. 
158 Kantar, Report on Discrimination in the European Union, Special Eurobarometer 
493, (European Commission, 2019), 87. 
159 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Second European Union Mi-
norities and Fundamental Rights Survey: Muslims Selected Findings, (Publications 
Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2017), 22. 
160 Kantar ‘Report on Discrimination in the European Union’ (n158), 95–97; a similar 
pattern is also found in ‘Eastern and Western Europeans Differ on Importance 
of Religion, Views of Minorities, and Key Social Issues’ (Pew Research Centre, 
Washington DC, 2019)
“‘In the war on terror, every 
Muslim is infected with a 
dormant virus and must offer 
an immunisation record; a 
reassurance that the strain of 
Muslimness they contain is safe�”
Randa Abdel-Fattah
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try’s Muslim population may intensify fears that Muslims 
pose a demographic and cultural threat.161 
The impact of growing anti-Muslim racism is evidenced 
in reports of levels of discrimination in European survey 
data.162 In the 2008 EU Minorities and Discrimination 
Survey, 10% of Muslims reported experiencing religious 
discrimination; by 2015 this had increased to 17%.163 
Overall, 39% of Muslims reported discrimination because 
of their ethnic or immigrant background over the past 5 
years, and a quarter had experienced this in the past 12 
months.164 Less than 10% of Muslims who experience 
harassment report it, and even of those who experience 
physical assault only a minority report it to the police. 
Furthermore, among those who did report it to the police, 
81% were dissatisfied with the way their complaint was 
handled.165 
Such endemic and persistent levels of discrimination 
matter. They constitute a violation of the EU’s commit-
ment to principles of equality, and harm social inclusion 
and integration.166 Furthermore, they undermine the 
goals of engagement in the EU’s counter-terrorism strat-
egies. Muslims who have experienced discrimination, har-
assment or violence have lower levels of trust in the legal 
system and the police.167 More worryingly, almost a third 
of Muslims who have been stopped by the police believed 
that this was because of their immigrant or ethnic minor-
ity background. While 60% of those stopped said they 
were treated respectfully, a significant minority (16%) 
found their treatment during the stop disrespectful.168 
Experiences of state security actors shapes an individ-
ual’s willingness to cooperate and engage with policing 
and security measures. There is now fairly robust and 
consistent research evidence showing that support for 
and cooperation with government policies, including on 
161 Gideon Skinner and James Stannard, ‘Perils of Perception 2018’ IPSOS MORI, 
<https://www.ipsos.com/ipsos-mori/en-uk/perils-perception-2018> accessed 1 
February 2021
162 Marc Helbling ‘Opposing Muslims and the Muslim Headscarf in Western 
Europe’ (2014) 30 European Sociological Review 242; Jolanda van der Noll, and 
Vasillis Saroglou ’Anti-Islam or Anti-religion? Understanding Objection against 
Islamic Education’ (2015) 41 Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 219.
163 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Second European Union, 
(n159) 25. 
164 ibid, 28. 
165 ibid, 48.
166 See Lars Leszczensky, Rahsaan Maxwell and Erik Bleich, ‘What Factors Best 
Explain National Identification among Muslim Adolescents? Evidence from 
Four European Countries’ (2020) 46 Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 260; 
Fenella Fleischmann and Karen Phalet, ‘Identity Conflict or Compatibility: A 
Comparison of Muslim Minorities in Five European Cities’ (2016) 37 Political 
Psychology 447. 
167 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Second European Union, 
(n159) 57. 
168 Ibid 55.
counter-terrorism, increase when state policies and prac-
tices are seen as legitimate.169 
Crucially for the EU and European governments, the value 
of procedural fairness applies not only to the implemen-
tation of policies (through public officials in Member 
States) but also applies to how legal norms and policies 
are developed and formulated. Drawing a distinction 
between ‘police’ and ‘law’ legitimacy – where the former 
is the perceived legitimacy of the police or other state 
officials’ enforcement of the law and the latter is the ‘per-
ceived legitimacy of the laws that are enforced’ – research 
evidence shows that the most important predictor of 
cooperation in counter-terrorism is the perception of 
‘law legitimacy’. Thus procedural fairness in the imple-
mentation of counter-terrorism ‘can potentially have little 
effect if the laws underpinning police action are judged 
as illegitimate’.170 
The perceived legitimacy of policies and policing increases 
where state officials are seen to be treating people fairly. 
This means that experiences and perceptions of discrimi-
nation that undermine evaluations of fairness, and there-
fore legitimacy, also damage efforts at cooperation. 
Social or group identity has an important role in shaping 
the relationship between fair treatment and cooperative 
behaviour. Individuals react not only to how they are 
treated but also to how individuals belonging to a group 
with which they identify are treated. Where they witness 
unfair treatment by the authorities in the decision-mak-
ing concerning members of a social group they identify 
with this influences their willingness to cooperate with 
those authorities.171 Fair treatment by public bodies and 
agents communicate to marginalised groups the extent 
to which they are valued and respected, ‘the way repre-
sentatives of the dominant group treat people from new 
or sub-ordinate groups may be a particularly important 
169 See for example Aziz Huq, Tom Tyler, and Stephen Schulhofer, ‘Mechanisms for 
Eliciting Cooperation in Counter Terrorism Policing: Evidence from the United 
Kingdom’ (2011) 8 Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 728; Tom Tyler, Stephen 
Schulhofer and Aziz Huq, ‘Legitimacy and Deterrence Effects in Counterterror-
ism Policing: A study of Muslim Americans. (2010) 44 Law and Society Review 
365; Adrian Cherney and Kristina Murphy, ‘Policing Terrorism with Procedural 
Justice: The Role of Police Legitimacy and Law Legitimacy’ (2013) 46 Australian 
and New Zealand Journal of Criminology 403; Natasha Madon, Kristina Murphy 
and Adrian Cherney, ‘Promoting Community Collaboration in Counterterror-
ism: Do Social Identities and Perceptions of Legitimacy Mediate Reactions 
to Procedural Justice Policing?’ (2017) 57 British Journal of Criminology 1144; 
Kristina Murphy, Natasha Madon and Adrian Cherney, ‘Promoting Muslims’ 
Cooperation with Police in Counter-terrorism: The Interaction between Pro-
cedural Justice, Police Legitimacy and Law Legitimacy’ (2017) 40 Policing: An 
International Journal 544. 
170 Cherney and Murphy ‘Policing Terrorism with Procedural Justice’ (n169), 417.
171 ibid, 416.
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element of processes of inclusion and exclusion’.172 For 
example, research in Australia suggests that the Muslims 
who felt most stigmatised were also those who were most 
sensitive to signs of procedural justice. Those who felt 
most stigmatised by the public, the media and the police 
were less willing to report information to the police, how-
ever: ‘perceptions of procedural fairness moderate the 
effect of feeling stigmatised on their intention to report 
terror threats to the police’.173 Human rights and the rule 
of law provide a valuable and crucial framework for ensur-
ing procedural fairness, yet as the next section shows, EU 
security and counter-terrorism policies have paid insuffi-
cient attention to protecting human rights and upholding 
the rule of law. 
172 Ben Bradford, ‘Policing and Social Identity: Procedural Justice, Inclusion and 
Cooperation Between Police and Public’ (2014) 24 Policing and Society 22, 39.
173 Kristina Murphy, Natasha Madon and Adrian Cherney, ‘Reporting Threats of 
Terrorism: Stigmatisation, Procedural Justice and Policing Muslims in Australia’ 
(2020) 30 Policing and Society 361, 371. 
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Experiences of systemic and persistent human rights 
violations by state actors are a significant tipping point 
for individuals joining organisations that support vio-
lence. Research by the UN finds that the actions of state 
security actors are ‘a prominent accelerator of recruit-
ment’ into terrorism.174 The Organisation for Security 
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) warns that ‘meas-
ures to combat terrorism that violate international 
human rights standards are counterproductive. They 
undermine the rule of law and the credibility of public 
authorities, as well as their ability to counter the threat 
posed by terrorism’.175 In developing counter-terrorism 
policies, states must remember that provoking heavy-
handed security responses that erode commitment to 
human rights and the rule of law can contribute to the 
strategic calculations of organisations that support vio-
lence.176 Terrorists leverage their asymmetric weakness 
by provoking repressive state responses that enable 
them to exploit the ensuing societal polarisation. In 
Northern Ireland, for example, the IRA ‘worked to pro-
voke harsh measures […] knowing full well the benefits 
it would reap in terms of support and recruits’.177 ISIS 
has also been clear that its attacks in Europe seek to 
ferment polarisation, fuelling hostility and suspicion of 
Muslims, which they hope will eventually lead Muslims 
to leave Europe.178
It has long been recognised that states’ response to 
political violence can undermine the very values that 
they espouse.179 In Klass v Germany, the European Court 
of Human Rights acknowledged that repressive 
174 United Nations Development Programme, Journey to Extremism in Africa: 
Drivers, Incentives and the Tipping Point for Recruitment (New York, 2017), 5. 
175 See OSCE, Countering Terrorism <http://www.osce.org/odihr/countering-ter-
rorism> accessed 1 February 2021.
176 See Myriam Francois-Cerrah, ‘Islamic State Wants to Divide the World into 
Jihadists and Crusaders’ Daily Telegraph (London, 18 November 2015). See also 
AK Cronin, How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist 
Campaigns (Princeton University Press, 2009). 
177 Andrew Silke, ‘Fire of Iolaus: The Role of State Countermeasures in Causing 
Terrorism and What Needs to be Done’ in Tore Bjorgo (ed.), Root Causes of 
Terrorism: Myths, Reality and Ways Forward (Routledge, Abingdon, 2005), 244. 
178 Murtaza Hussain, ‘Islamic States Goal: “Eliminating the Grayzone” of Coex-
istence between Muslims and the West’ The Intercept (17 November 2015) 
<https://theintercept.com/2015/11/17/islamic-states-goal-eliminating-the-
grayzone-of-coexistence-between-muslims-and-the-west/> 1 February 2021
179 Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism verses Democracy: The Liberal State Response, (Rou-
tledge, Abindon, 2010); Gil Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars: State, 
Society, and Failures of France in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States 
in Vietnam (CUP, 2004); Peter Chalk, ‘The Liberal Democratic Response to Terror-
ism’ (1995) 7 Terrorism and Political Violence 10. 
counter-terrorism measures could undermine or destroy 
democracy ‘on the ground of defending it’ and cautioned 
that ‘States may not, in the name of the struggle against 
espionage and terrorism, adopt whatever measures they 
deem appropriate.’180 Lord Hoffman, in the UK House of 
Lords, holding that the British government acted unlaw-
fully in derogating from the ECHR to enable the indefinite 
detention of foreign terrorist suspects, echoed these 
sentiments: 
The real threat to the life of the nation, in the sense 
of a people living in accordance with its traditional 
laws and political values, comes not from terrorism 
but from laws such as these. That is the true measure 
of what terrorism may achieve. It is for Parliament to 
decide whether to give the terrorists such a victory.181
Given these acknowledged dangers, the protection of 
human rights and the rule of law should be hard-wired 
into European policy frameworks. Instead they remain 
marginalised in the EU’s normative frameworks, institu-
tions and structures.
The EU declares respect for the rule of law and human 
rights, including the rights of persons belonging to 
minorities, as fundamental and founding values.182 The 
ECHR binds both Member States of the Union and the 
EU itself.183 Furthermore, EU action in all areas, including 
counter-terrorism, must not infringe the rights set out 
the EU treaty and Charter of Fundamental Rights. For the 
Commission the principles rule of law include ‘legality, 
which implies a transparent, accountable, democratic 
and pluralistic process for enacting laws; legal certainty; 
prohibition of arbitrariness of the executive powers; inde-
pendent and impartial courts; effective judicial review 
including respect for fundamental rights; and equality 
before the law’.184
180 Klass and Others v Germany App no 5029/71 (ECtHR, 6 September 1979) para 
49. 
181 A (FC) and others (FC) (Appellants) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department 
(Respondent) X (FC) and another (FC) (Appellants) v. Secretary of State for the 
Home Department (Respondent) [2004] UKHL 56, 97. 
182 Art 2 TEU. 
183 Art 6 TEU.
184 European Commission, ‘A New EU Framework to Strengthen the Rule of Law’ 
(Communication) COM (2014) 158 final.
3. HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RULE OF LAW
Part I: Legal and Policy Context27
Despite these legal commitments and vocal political 
declarations, many early EU counter-terrorism policy doc-
uments, including the 2004 Declaration on Combatting 
Terrorism and The Hague Programme, were silent on 
their implications for human rights. Only in the European 
Commission’s 2005 Communication Concerning Terrorist 
Recruitment and the EU Counter-terrorism Strategy did 
a strategic commitment to human rights as part of its 
counter-terrorism strategy emerge.185 The implications 
of this commitment and concrete action required remain 
underdeveloped, particularly in contrast to the UN Global 
Counter-terrorism Strategy, one of the organising pillars 
of which is ‘measures to ensure respect for human rights 
for all and the rule of law as the fundamental basis of the 
fight against terrorism’.186
The key legal instruments also lack robust protection 
of human rights. The 2002 FDCT relegates the need to 
respect Convention and Charter rights to anodyne invo-
cations, reminding states that the Decision does not 
override their obligations in international human rights 
law.187 The FDCT neither details specific interferences 
on specific rights that may arise, nor suggests how to 
minimise interferences or points to human rights norms 
that would assist states in implementation.188 The 2008 
Framework Decision contains a more detailed set of safe-
guards, but with most of these located in the non-bind-
ing Preamble, enforcement remains at the discretion of 
national authorities and agents of their criminal justice 
systems.189 Attempts by the European Parliament to intro-
duce human rights safeguards into the operative text of 
the revised Framework Decision were unsuccessful.190 This 
pattern is repeated in the DCT, with safeguards for human 
rights and the rule of law elaborated in non-binding recit-
als,191while the binding text is limited to restating the 
standard phrase that the DCT ‘shall not have the effect of 
modifying the obligations to respect fundamental rights 
and fundamental legal principles, as enshrined in Article 6 
TEU’.192 In fact, the DCT appears to weaken some elements 
185 Baker-Beall ‘The European Union’s Fight against Terrorism’ (n132), 182. 
186 UNGA A/RES/60/288 (20 September 2006). 
187 Art 1(2) FDCT 2002. 
188 This point is also made by the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and 
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering 
terrorism in relation to invocation of human rights law obligations in the UN 
Security Council Resolutions on counter-terrorism. See UNGA ‘Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering 
Terrorism’ (2019) UN Doc A/74/335, para 21. See also Anastasia Tsoukala, 
‘Democracy against Security: The Debates about Counter-terrorism in the Euro-
pean Parliament, September 2001-June 2003’ (2004) 29 Alternatives 417. 
189 Murphy, EU Counter-Terrorism Law (n64), 74. 
190 European Parliament, Report on the Proposal for a Council Framework Deci-
sion Amending Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on Combating Terrorism 
(COM(2007)0650 – C6-0466/2007 – 2007/0236(CNS)), A6-0323/2008. 
191 DCT, Recital 22, 35, 36 and 39. 
192 DCT, Art 23. 
of human rights protection; the explicit references to free-
dom of expression found in Article 2 of the 2008 FDCT are 
relegated to a provision in the DCT’s recital.193
A European Commission report on recruitment to ter-
rorism also cites human rights and the rule of law as fun-
damental to the foundation to the Union, arguing that 
the Union ‘will never tolerate xenophobia or racism’.194 
However, in an acknowledgment of the potential interfer-
ence of rights that counter-terrorism may entail, drawing 
the powerful metaphor of balancing liberty and security 
the strategy notes the importance of maintaining ‘the 
crucial balance between different fundamental rights in 
this area, particularly the right to life on the one hand, 
and the right to freedom of expression and privacy on the 
other’.195 However, as Waldron cautions, invocation of the 
balance metaphor needs to ‘pay some attention to the 
fact that the real diminution in liberty may affect some 
people more than others,’ and that security measures 
may involve a ‘proposal to trade off the liberties of a few 
against the security of the majority.’196 Furthermore, such 
measures may increase protection from terrorism while 
reducing protection from the infringement of individual 
rights by the state.197 
The EU’s inattention to potential human rights harms aris-
ing from its counter-terrorism measures is not surprising, 
given the marginalisation of human rights and the rule 
of law impact analysis in the development of EU coun-
ter-terrorism measures.198 Since 2001 fewer than three 
percent of counter-terrorism legislative measures have 
been subject to public consultations, and three quar-
ters of counter-terrorism measures have been adopted 
without an impact assessment.199 While the EU Counter-
terrorism Coordinator noted the need to understand the 
impact of counter-terrorism measures on minority groups 
in 2010, and the Commission committed to carrying out 
193 DCT, Recital 40, ‘The expression of radical, polemic or controversial views in the 
public debate on sensitive political questions, falls outside the scope of this 
Directive and, in particular, of the definition of public provocation to commit 
terrorist offences’. 
194 Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parlia-
ment and the Council concerning Terrorist Recruitment: Addressing the Factors 
Contributing to Violent Radicalisation’ COM (2005) 313 final, 21 September 
2005, 2. 
195 ibid. 
196 Jeremey Waldron, ‘Liberty and Security: The Image of Balance’ (2003) 11 
The Journal of Political Philosophy 191, 194. See also Stuart Macdonald, ‘The 
unbalanced imagery of anti-terrorism policy’ (2009) 18 Cornell Journal of Law 
and Public Policy 519; C Michaelsen, ‘Balancing Civil Liberties against National 
Security? A Critique of Counterterrorism Rhetoric’ (2006) 29 University of New 
South Wales Law Journal 1
197 ibid, 195. 
198 Valsamis Mitsilegas, ‘Counterterrorism and the rule of law in an evolving Euro-
pean Union: Plus Ca Change?’ (2020) New Journal of European Criminal Law DOI: 
10.1177/2032284420971783
199 Wim Wenisk and others, ‘The European Union’s Policies on Counter-Terrorism: 
Relevance, Coherence and Effectiveness’ (European Union, Brussels, 2017), 17. 
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an impact assessment in 2015 ahead of updating the 
2008 FDCT,200 the EU adopted the DCT without any ex 
ante impact assessment.201 This marginalisation of human 
rights impact assessments was compounded by the 
speed with which the EU adopted the DCT, leaving lim-
ited time for the engagement of civil society and human 
rights experts and thus curtailing public participation and 
accountability.202 
Inattention to human rights impacts before adoption 
has been matched by a lack of scrutiny on human rights 
and rule of law impacts in ex-post evaluations. The 
Commission’s implementation evaluation of the 2002 
FDCT glanced only cursorily at the safeguarding of indi-
vidual rights.203 The lack of attention to potential human 
rights harms is evidenced by recent European Court of 
Justice cases in which EU measures attempting to enable 
broad and enhanced data collection and data sharing 
were ruled to violate individual rights.204 While these 
decisions are welcome, reliance on protecting fundamen-
tal rights through judicial oversight in individual cases 
is constrained by judicial deference to governments on 
issues of national security.205 In this context the review 
of the human rights impact explicitly mandated in DCT 
is a development in the right direction. However, fun-
damental features embedded in legal and policy frame-
works that erode human rights and the rule of law need 
to be addressed through broader democratic political and 
policy processes. 
200 European Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions - The European Agenda on Security’ COM (2015) 185 
final, 28 April 2015, 14. 
201 Council of the European Union, ‘EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy – Discussion 
Paper’ Note 15894/1/10 Rev 1, 29 November 2010, 10-11.
202 See for example, ‘Rush to “fight terrorism” threatens our fundamental rights 
and security’ European Digital Rights (4 July 2016), <https://edri.org/our-work/
rush-fight-terrorism-threatens-our-fundamental-rights-security/> accessed 1 
February 2021. 
203 Murphy, EU Counter-Terrorism Law (n64) 79. 
204 Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger and Others (C-293/12 and C-594/12) [2014] 
E.C.R. I-238 and ECJ, Opinion 1/15 (Grand Chamber) – Draft agreement 
between Canada and the European Union, 26 July 2017. See also Arianna 
Vedaschi, ‘The European Court of Justice on the EU-Canada Passenger Name 
Record Agreement: ECJ, 26 July 2017, Opinion 1/15’ (2018) 14 European Consti-
tutional Law Review 410. 
205 Didier Bigo and others National Security and Secret Evidence in Legislation and 
before the Courts: Exploring the Challenges. (Centre for European Policy Studies, 
Brussels 2015). See also Federico Fabbrini, ‘Courts and the politics of secrecy: 
national security, human rights and the importance of supranational oversight’ 
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This chapter focuses on two central aspects of coun-
ter-terrorism laws and policy that are influenced and 
shaped by EU law, policies and practices in the five 
states covered by this report. First, the shift towards 
pre-emption in the development of criminal law 
offences relating to terrorism; and second, the rapid 
development of counter-radicalisation policies and 
plans accompanied by increased state-instigated sur-
veillance of groups deemed to be at risk of radicalisa-
tion for signs of incipient terrorism. Both developments 
play a critical role in shaping the experiences of groups 
at risk of discrimination examined in this report. A third 
trend is the expansion of the use of executive powers 
against those suspected of involvement in terrorism, 
limiting judicial checks and so eroding the rule of law 
and accountability. While not directly related to any EU 
measures or policies this reinforces the broader trend 
toward pre-emption and prevention. 
This section sets out key laws and policies in each of 
the states covered by this report. Among these France, 
Germany, and Spain, having experienced significant 
levels of terrorism in the last century, had a developed 
and tested existing framework of anti-terrorism laws while 
Hungary and Poland, with little experience of non-state 
actor terrorism, introduced counter-terrorism laws to 
ensure their alignment with EU law prior to their accession 
to the Union in 2003. Supported by the FDCT and DCT, 
all five states have expanded the scope of their criminal 
law to encompass pre-crime and pre-emptive offences, 
criminalising conduct that does not directly entail harm 
to others.206 These offences rely on the assumption that 
present unlawful actions are indicators of future terrorist 
violence. As noted earlier in this report, this opens the 
door to racialised stereotyping, placing greater weight on 
the assumed dangerousness of the individual than on the 
direct danger of their actions. 
While counter-radicalisation only emerged in security 
policy from 2003, it is now deeply embedded in European 
206 European Commission, Report from the Commission to the European Par-
liament and the Council based on Article 29(1) of Directive (EU) 2017/541 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2017 on combating 
terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and 
amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA, COM(2020) 619 final, 30 September 
2020. 
counter-terrorism policy frameworks. The focus on action 
to counter radicalisation has intensified in recent years. 
Notwithstanding initial concerns about the implications 
for human rights and the rule of law, many EU states have 
developed counter-radicalisation policies and action plans 
and adopted an approach that enrols frontline workers 
in sectors such as education, healthcare and social work 
into the state security apparatus.207 This involves training 
both public officials (including educators, youth workers 
and security actors) and members of civil society organi-
sations working on social issues in ‘vulnerable communi-
ties’ to understand pathways to radicalisation and identify 
purported signs of radicalisation. 
4.1 France 
In France, a pre-crime approach to terrorism has been in 
place for several decades. Here the primary tool in pros-
ecutions for preparatory actions has been the offence 
of ‘criminal association in connection with a terrorist 
enterprise’.208 This allows prosecution without requiring 
a specific terrorist action plan and can be used against 
those who provide logistical or financial support. 
According to Human Rights Watch (HRW), ‘the broad 
definition and expansive interpretation of association 
de malfaiteurs translate into a low standard of proof 
for decision to arrest suspects or to place them under 
investigation by a judge. Indeed, casting a wide net to 
ensnare large numbers of people who might have some 
connection with an alleged terrorist network has been 
one of the characteristics of investigations into associ-
ation de malfaiteurs.’209 HRW argues that this has led to 
convictions based on weak and circumstantial evidence 
connecting individuals to those involved in a terrorist 
enterprise through their association, regular contact 
and shared political and religious beliefs. An analysis of 
the evidence underpinning these prosecutions, which 
centred on ideological commitment and religious 
207 The European Commission has compiled information about Member States’ 
counter-radicalisation strategies and related counter-terrorism (CT) strategies. 
See European Commission, ‘Prevent Strategies of Member States’ <https://
ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_
network/ran-and-member-states/repository_en> accessed 1 February 2021. 
208 Law 96-647 of July 22, 1996 introduced the charge of ‘association de malfaiteurs 
en relation avec une entreprise terroriste.’ [criminal association in connection 
with a terrorist enterprise] 
209 Human Rights Watch, Pre-empting Justice: Counter-terrorism law and procedure 
in France (Human Rights Watch, New York, 2008) 2. 
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beliefs in the absence of a direct threat to public order, 
suggested ‘a shift away from the legitimate criminalisa-
tion of preparatory acts threatening public order and 
safety, towards the establishment of mechanisms of 
guilt by association rooted in a form of ‘enemy criminal 
law’.’210 
Prosecutions for the offence of ‘apology for terrorism’ are 
also increasing in use. While the offence dates back to the 
nineteenth century, legal changes in 2014 have seen a 
dramatic increase in investigations and prosecutions and 
a leap from three convictions in 2014 to 306 in 2016.211 The 
latter convictions were the result of 1,850 police investi-
gations, one in five of which were of children and young 
people under the age of 18.212 By 2018, apology for terror-
ism was the most frequently used counter-terrorism crimi-
nal measure in France.213 Yet ‘cases do not typically involve 
direct incitement to violence but usually revolve around 
drunken interactions with the police or provocative – and 
sometimes obnoxious – statements in school courtyards 
or on social media’.214 
In the aftermath of November 2015 attacks in Paris, the 
French government declared a State of Emergency, 
empowering the executive to take extraordinary meas-
ures to prevent possible future attacks.215 Prior to the State 
of Emergency, French anti-terrorism laws had allowed the 
police to search homes and detain suspects only after 
securing a judicial warrant. The powers introduced by the 
State of Emergency removed this important safeguard 
and allowed the executive to act without such a war-
rant. Emergency laws empowered state officials to close 
mosques, raid homes, search premises, and place individ-
uals under residency orders without the obligation to first 
present evidence to an independent judge. Furthermore, 
the threshold for using the emergency powers was much 
wider than under the criminal law. Rather than evidence 
210 Henri Decoeur, ‘The Criminalisation of armed jihad under French law: Guilt by 
association in the age of enemy criminal law’ (2017) 25 European Journal of 
Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal justice 299, 301. 
211 Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Misuse of anti-terror legislation threatens 
freedom of expression’ Council of Europe, 4 December 2018. <https://www.
coe.int/en/web/commissioner/-/misuse-of-anti-terror-legislation-threat-
ens-freedom-of-expression> accessed 1 February 2021. 
212 Nadim Houry,’France’s Creeping Terrorism Laws: Restricting Free Speech’ Just 
Security 30 May 2018, <https://www.justsecurity.org/57118/frances-creep-
ing-terrorism-laws-restricting-free-speech/> accessed 1 February 2021
213 UN OHCHR, ‘Preliminary findings of the visit: UN Special Rapporteur on 
the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental free-
doms while countering terrorism concludes visit to France’ 23 May 2018. 
<https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx-
?NewsID=23128&LangID=E> accessed 1 February 2021
214 Houry, ‘France’s Creeping Terrorism Laws’ (n212). 
215 For concerns relating to the use of powers under State of Emergency see Be-
renice Boutin and Christoph Paulussen, ‘From the Bataclan to Nice: A Critique 
of France’s State of Emergency Regime’ ASSER Policy Brief No. 2016-01 (Asser 
Institute, The Hague, 2016).
of criminal or unlawful activity, the emergency powers 
allowed a search of premises used by a person whose 
‘behaviour constitutes a threat to public order and secu-
rity’. Human rights bodies report numerous examples of 
racist insults and unnecessary damage to property during 
raids.216 
Under the emergency powers 24 mosques were closed, 
700 people were placed under residency orders and 
4,000 properties were raided and searched, resulting 
in terrorism-related charges in 0.3% of cases. 217 
The State of Emergency lasted until November 2017, when 
parliament passed the Strengthening Homeland Security 
and Counter-terrorism Act (SILT). The SILT law retains and 
normalises pre-emptive administrative measures. It grants 
broad powers to the executive and transfers powers to 
authorise security perimeters, close places of worship for 
up to six months, place individuals under house arrest 
and carry out surveillance, search and seizure from the 
judiciary to the executive. This amounts to a profound 
rebalancing of the national counter-terrorism framework 
towards greater executive power with weakened a poste-
riori rather than a priori judicial oversight.218 
Compared to other Western European states, France for a 
long time resisted developing policies for preventing and 
countering radicalisation, preferring to rely on the twin 
approach of criminal prosecutions and the expulsion of 
foreign nationals deemed a terrorist threat.219 However, 
the 2012 attack in Toulouse, the increasing number of 
French citizens travelling to Syria and Iraq to join ISIS and 
a review of policy by the Prefect Yann Jounot led France 
to develop its first counter-radicalisation policies. Since 
216 Commission Nationale Consultative Des Droits De L’Homme, ‘’Statement of 
Opinion on State of Emergency’ 18 February 2016, para 7-10. <https://www.
cncdh.fr/sites/default/files/english_avis_statement_of_opinion_on_the_state_
of_emergency.pdf> accessed 1 February 2021. 
217 Ministry of Interior, ‘Bilan de l’état d’urgence’ [Assesssment of the State of Emer-
gency] 3 November 2017 <www.interieur.gouv.fr/Actualites/L-actu-du-Min-
istere/Bilan-de-l-etat-d-urgence> and Iris Ouedraogo, ‘32 attentats déjoués, 
4457 perquisitions, 752 assignations à résidence : l'état d'urgence en chiffres’ 
[32 thwarted attacks, 4,457 searches, 752 house arrest: the state of emergency 
in figures] Le Journal du Dimanche 1 November 2017,< https://www.lejdd.
fr/Societe/32-attentats-dejoues-4457-perquisitions-752-assignations-a-resi-
dence-letat-durgence-en-chiffres-3480650> accessed 1 February 2021. 
218 Adrián Serrano-Sanz, ‘Normalizing the Exception in the Counterterrorism 
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2014, French officials have made up for this lost time, inun-
dating practitioners and civil society with numerous new 
policies and action plans. Following the attacks in Paris 
in January 2015 it adopted a Counter-terrorism Plan. After 
the attacks of November 2015, the government adopted 
a new Security Pact (PDS), increasing the resources and 
personnel dedicated to countering terrorism. In 2016 
there was a revised Action Plan Against Radicalisation 
and Terrorism (APART). 220 In February 2018 there was a 
further National Plan for the Prevention of Radicalisation 
(PNPR),221 followed by a Plan of Action against Terrorism 
(PACT) in July 2018.222 
4.2 Germany 
Memories of the subversion of democratic institutions 
during the Weimar Republic led the Federal Republic of 
Germany to adopt constitutional provisions enabling 
the state to pre-emptively curtail some fundamen-
tal rights of individuals deemed to threaten the free 
democratic basic order.223 Building on laws and pol-
icies developed in the 1970s against the home grown 
terrorism of the Red Army Faction,224 in the immediate 
aftermath of the 2001 terrorist attack on the USA two 
packages of security measures were introduced that 
expanded surveillance and data-collection powers 
and enabled police and intelligence agencies to target 
‘international terrorism’.225 This included abolition of 
the ‘religious privilege’ that until then had protected 
religious associations from powers enabling federal or 
state governments to ban associations threatening the 
constitutional legal order.226 
220 Government of France, ‘Plan d’Action Contre la radicalisation et le terrorisme: 
Dossier de Presse’ [Plan of action against radicalisation and terrorism: Press 
document] 9 May 2016 <https://www.gouvernement.fr/sites/default/files/
document/document/2016/05/09.05.2016_dossier_de_presse_-_plan_dac-
tion_contre_la_radicalisation_et_le_terrorisme.pdf> accessed 1 February 2021. 
221 Government of France, ‘Radicalisation: les cinq grands axes du plan "Prévenir 
pour protéger"’ [radicalisation: the five main pilliars of the ‘Prevent to Protect 
Plan’] <https://www.gouvernement.fr/radicalisation-les-cinq-grands-ax-
es-du-plan-prevenir-pour-proteger> accessed 1 February 2021. 
222 Government of France, ‘Plan d’Action Contra le Terrorime’ [Plan of Action 
Against Terrorism] <https://www.gouvernement.fr/risques/plan-d-action-con-
tre-le-terrorisme> accessed 1 February 2021.
223 German Basic Law, Art 18. The rights that can be forfeited include freedom of 
expression, assembly, association, privacy of correspondence and communica-
tions, property, and asylum. The key features of a ‘free democratic basic order’ 
are set out in the Federal Act on the Protection of the Constitution and on the 
Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, Art 4. See Federal Ministry 
of Justice and for Consumer Protection, ‘Gesetz über die Zusammenarbeit des 
Bundes und der Länder in Angelegenheiten des Verfassungsschutzes und 
über das Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz’ [Act on cooperation between the 
Federal Government and the Länder in matters of constitutional protection 
and on the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution] <https://www.
gesetze-im-internet.de/bverfschg/> accessed 1 February 2021.
224 See Kevin G. Horbatiuk, ‘Anti-Terrorism: The West German Approach’ (1979) 
3 Fordham International Law Journal 167; Shawn Boyne, 'Law, Terrorism, and 
Social Movements: The Tension between Politics and Security in Germany's 
Anti-Terrorism Legislation' (2004) 12 Cardozo J Int'l & Comp L 41
225 See Oliver Lepsius, ‘Liberty, Security, and Terrorism: The Legal Position in Ger-
many’ (2004) 5 German Law Journal 435.
226 German Basic Law, Art 9(2). 
However, it was the Council of Europe227 and the EU that 
provided the most significant impetus for introducing 
‘pre-crime’ offences into German law.228 The German 
penal code was amended to cover the ‘preparation’ of vio-
lent offences endangering the state,229 and a new offence 
of establishing contacts with the intention of receiving 
instruction for the purpose of committing a serious vio-
lent offence endangering the state was created.230 These 
offences, which extended criminalisation beyond the 
realm of attempts and conspiracy traditionally covered by 
criminal law, have sparked criticism for their ‘criminalisa-
tion of otherwise innocent or ‘neutral’ conduct: conduct 
that is not wrongful apart from the required harmful 
intention, and from which such harmful intention is not 
easily inferred’.231 Pre-crime offences also cover travelling 
abroad with the intention of facilitating terrorism and 
‘encouraging the commission of a serious violent offence 
endangering the state’.232 
Countering extremism and threats to the domestic 
political order have traditionally fallen on federal and 
state-level Offices for the Protection of the Constitution 
(Verfassungsschutz or VS) and the police. The VS is a key 
institution for gathering intelligence and information on 
potential emerging domestic threats. The federal VS dom-
inates public debate on extremism in Germany. It provides 
an annual public report that list ‘extremist’ movements 
and organisations across a range of categories including 
‘Islamist extremism’.233 These are widely disseminated and 
used by public and private bodies. Organisations and indi-
viduals identified by the VS as ‘extremist’ face significant 
stigmatisation and social and economic repercussions. As 
the VS does not have a policing or investigative role and 
its function is political analysis, its information is kept sep-
arate from police data.234 However, where there is a vital 
227 Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism 1 June 2007, 
CETS No. 196
228 Anneke Petzsche, ‘The European Influence on German Anti-Terrorism Law’ 
(2012) 13 German Law Journal 1056. 
229 StGB §89a. 
230 StGB 89b.
231 Andrew Cornford and Anne Petzsche, ‘Terrorism Offences’ in K Ambos, A Duff, 
J Roberts, T Weigend, and A Heinze (eds.) Core Concepts in Criminal Law and 
Criminal Justice (CUP, 2020), 179. 
232 StGB § 91
233 The 2019 report gives details in relation to the following categories: right-wing 
extremism/terrorism; “Reichsbürger” and “Selbstverwalter” (“citizens of the 
Reich” and “sovereign citizens”); left-wing extremism; Islamist extremism and 
terrorism; extremist efforts by foreigners posing a threat to security (excluding 
Islamist extremism); intelligence activities; espionage and cyberattacks carried 
out on behalf of a foreign power; and the Scientology Organisation. Federal 
Office for the Protection of the Constitution ‘Annual Reports’ <https://www.ver-
fassungsschutz.de/en/public-relations/publications/annual-reports> accessed 
1 February 2021.
234 BVerfG, Judgment of the First Senate of 24 April 2013 - 1 BvR 1215/07 -, paras. 
1-233, <http://www.bverfg.de/e/rs20130424_1bvr121507en,html> 
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public interest its information is shared, and so may play 
a role in the identification of and action against so-called 
Gefährder. 
In fact, the identification of and action against ‘Gefährder’ 
is a central plank of pre-emption in Germany. Gefährder, a 
concept emerging from a federal police working group,235 
has been defined as a person concerning whom there are 
facts to justify the assumption that they are planning to 
undertake a significant politically-motivated crime such 
as those listed in the Code of Criminal Procedure, StPO 
s100a.236 Although there may be insufficient evidence 
for prosecution, designation as a Gefährder by a court 
enables the police to restrict an individual’s movements, 
require them to wear an electronic ankle monitor and 
impose bans on social contacts and communications.237 
Such powers, initially applied to non-German nationals,238 
were extended to German nationals after the 2016 attacks 
on the Berlin Christmas Markets.239 In 2017 550 Muslims 
were identified as Gefährder.240 The concept of Gefährder 
illustrates the shift towards pre-crime, undermining the 
presumption of innocence and blurring the distinction 
between unlawful and lawful behaviour by constructing 
lawful actions, activities and associations as ‘pre-criminal’. 
The German jurist and judge Professor Kai Ambos has 
suggested that in targeting dangerous persons rather 
than acts it comes dangerously close to creating a ‘crimi-
nal law of the enemy’.241 
Large-scale counter-radicalisation programmes initi-
ated after the Joint Counter-terrorism Centre’s 2009 
De-radicalisation working group and the Federal Ministry 
of Interior’s 2011 Prevention summit242 paved the way 
for the implementation of so-called selective 
235 Landtag Brandenburg, Drucksache 6/6272.
236 ibid and Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 19/3701.
237 BKAG §55 (Act on the Federal Criminal Police Office and the Cooperation of 
the Federation and the States in Criminal Police Matters) <https://www.ge-
setze-im-internet.de/bkag_2018/BJNR135410017.html> accessed 1 February 
2021.
238 Gesetz über den Aufenthalt, die Erwerbstätigkeit und die Integration von Aus-
ländern im Bundesgebiet (Residence Act), §56. Online at: www.gesetze-im-in-
ternet.de/aufenthg_2004. 
239 German Institute for Human Rights, ‘Written submission to the 123rd session 
of the Human Rights Committee for adoption of the “List of Issues Prior to 
Reporting” for the Federal Republic of Germany’ April 2018, 7. 
240 ‘Blame traded over Berlin Truck Attack’ Deutsche Welle (13 February 2017) 
<https://www.dw.com/en/blame-traded-over-berlin-truck-attack/a-37538489> 
accessed 1 February 2021
241 Kai Ambos (2020) ‘The Terrorist as a potentially Dangerous Person – The German 
Counterterrorism Regime’ Just Security, 28 May 2020, https://www.justsecurity.
org/70264/the-terrorist-as-a-potentially-dangerous-person-the-german-coun-
terterrorism-regime/ accessed 1 February 2021. 
242 ‘German Interior Minister Urges Muslims to combat militancy’ Deutsche Welle 
(25 June 2011). <https://www.dw.com/en/german-interior-minister-urg-
es-muslims-to-combat-militancy/a-15188733> accessed 1 February 2021.
preventive measures243. By 2015, the ‘Demokratie Leben’ 
(Live Democracy) programme had been established by 
the Federal government to provide 100 million euro a 
year to fund federal, regional and local initiatives against 
right-wing extremism and Islamism.244 The Strategy of 
the Federal Government on Extremism Prevention and 
Promotion of Democracy was published in 2016245 and the 
National Programme to Prevent Islamist Extremism was 
published in 2017. 246 The federal government allocated 
400 million euros, directed mainly at civil society organi-
sations, for the implementation of the latter in the period 
2017–20.247
In Germany the emphasis has been on locally-based ini-
tiatives focusing on family and social support. Despite 
prominent calls for more preventive measures, the estab-
lishment and growth of this prevention infrastructure has 
sparked some criticism. It is argued that project-based 
prevention measures are a cheaper alternative that allow 
the welfare state to retreat from its tasks of organising and 
securing sociality.248 Furthermore, the focus on Salafism 
and Islamism as the sole roots of radicalisation is criti-
cised for enabling policymakers and practitioners to take 
other socio-economic and sociocultural factors such as 
inequality and dynamics in foreign policy less seriously249. 
According to the study by the National Centre for Crime 
Prevention, no scientific evaluations are yet available 
that verify the effectiveness of prevention interventions 
243 Wiebke Steffen,’Internationaler Terrorismus: Wie können Prävention und 
Repression Schritt halten?’ [International Terrorism: How Can Prevention and 
Repression Keep Up] BKA-Herbsttagung vom 18. - 19. November 2015, 23. 
,https://www.bka.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Publikationen/Herbsttagun-
gen/2015/herbsttagung2015SteffenLangfassung.pdf?__blob=publication-
File&v=1> accessed 1 February 2021
244 ‘About “Live Democracy!”’ Federal Programme, Federal Ministry for Family 
Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth. <https://www.demokratie-leben.
de/en/federal-programme/about-live-democracy.html> accessed 1 February 
2021. 
245 Federal Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, ‘Strategie der Bundes-
regierung zur Extremismusprävention und Demokratieförderung [Federal Gov-
ernment Strategy for the Prevention of Extremism and Promotion of Democra-
cy]’, 2016. This defines the prevention of extremism to ‘include measures which 
prevent and counteract rejection of the order of values of the Basic Law and 
the Democratic Constitutional State, and also serve the security of the citizens 
in this context […] Measures directed towards people and groups, their envi-
ronment and their network as well as possible offenders to prevent the consol-
idation of problematic attitude patterns and to interrupt attitudinal transition 
towards (violent) action.’ 
246 ‘Nationales Präventionsprogramm gegen islamisitschen Extremismus’, [‘Na-
tional Prevention Programme against Islamist Extremism] https://www.bmi.
bund.de/SharedDocs/downloads/DE/veroeffentlichungen/themen/sicherheit/
praeventionsprogramm-islamismus.html> accessed 1 February 2021.
247 Mecklenburg and Anthony, Preventing Violent Extremism in Germany (n82) 12. 
248 Michail Logvinov, Salafismus, Radikalisierung und terroristische Gewalt: Erklärung-
sansätze, Befunde, Kritik [Salafism, radicalization and terrorist violence: explana-
tions, findings, criticism] (Springer, Wiesbaden, 2017), 123.
249 ibid. 
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against Islamist extremism,250although there are some 
project-based (self-)evaluations.251
4.3 Hungary 
The Hungarian penal code was amended in 2003 to har-
monize national legislation with EU law. A new criminal 
code (Act C of 2012) included a very broad definition of 
terrorism, with ‘terrorist acts’ covering not only violence 
against individuals but also extending to action such as 
vandalism.252 It also criminalised threatening to commit 
a terrorist act253 and failure to report a terrorist act.254 In 
the wake of the 2015 ‘refugee crisis’ the Hungarian gov-
ernment emphasised the perceived threat of terrorism 
from refugees and migrants coming into Europe from 
North African and the Middle East. 
Of the five states covered in this report, Hungary and 
Poland did not have significant counter-radicalisation pol-
icies in place or were in the process of developing their 
policies during the period when research for this report 
was undertaken. In Hungary the training of teachers and 
school staff in identifying signs of radicalisation started 
in 2019 through the Crime Prevention Department of the 
National Police. The department incorporated sessions on 
counter-terrorism and deradicalisation within its existing 
crime prevention training on drugs, domestic violence 
and bullying in schools. While initial training has been 
delivered, at the time of writing there had been no refer-
rals of young people identified as at risk of radicalisation.
The Hungarian government introduced the Sixth 
Amendment to the Fundamental Law to strengthen 
executive powers in response to increased migration to 
Europe in 2014. Relying on the vague concept of a ‘terror 
threat situation’, the Sixth Amendment furnishes the gov-
ernment with far-reaching powers where a ‘terror threat 
situation’ is declared to exist. Within 15 days of such a dec-
laration parliament is required to confirm the existence of 
a ‘terror threat situation’ by a two-thirds majority vote. 
While this is an important check on executive power, the 
declaration of a ‘terror threat situation’ nevertheless pro-
vides the basis for the exercise of exceptional executive 
250 Andreas Armborst and Marcus Kober, ‘Effekte von Ansätzen zur Prävention 
Islamistischer Radikalisierung: Systematische Übersichtsarbeit zu den Meth-
oden und Ergebnissen von Studien zur Evaluation von Präventionsansätzen 
im Bereich Islamismus’ [‘Effects of approaches to the prevention of Islamist 
radicalization: Systematic review of the methods and results of studies eval-
uating prevention approaches in the field of Islamism] (Nationales Zentrum 
Kriminalprävention, Bonn, 2017). 
251 ibid.
252 Criminal Code Section 314
253 Criminal Code Section 316
254 Criminal Code Section 317
powers for a period of 15 days. During this 15-day period 
the executive is able to enact exceptional measures 
including suspending laws, fast-tracking the adoption 
of new ones, and applying special measures (yet to be 
defined) to prevent terrorism. The Sixth Amendment pro-
vides a wide scope for sweeping restrictions to the rights 
to freedom of association and peaceful assembly, privacy 
and freedom of movement. In a political landscape where 
refugees and others are regularly portrayed as a threat to 
security, concerns have been raised that the government 
could apply the measures arbitrarily for political rather 
than security reasons. 255 Thus, ‘the “terror threat situa-
tion” violates the principle of legality, which requires that 
the law be formulated in clear and unambiguous terms’.256 
4.4 Poland 
In Poland, the EU has been a key driver in the develop-
ment of counter-terrorism legislation, with laws initially 
introduced as part of the process of harmonising legis-
lation prior to Poland joining the EU.257 By 2015 Poland 
had launched its first four-year National Anti-Terrorism 
Plan, and in 2018 Poland’s Internal Security Agency 
established a Terrorism Prevention Centre of Excellence 
to focus on terrorism prevention. Poland has not devel-
oped counter-radicalisation policies or programmes. 
The lack of a clear definition of terrorism has fuelled 
concern about a push towards developing pre-emptive 
terrorism offences. An important feature of Poland’s coun-
ter-terrorism law is the concept of ‘an offence of a terror-
ist nature’, first introduced in the Act of 16 April 2004.258 
The United Nations Human Rights Committee found the 
concept ‘overly broad and not adequate in defining the 
crime’s nature and consequences’, and urged Poland to 
ensure that the Polish Penal Code defines such crimes nar-
rowly and in terms of their purpose.259 Such concerns have 
not inhibited the Polish government from building upon 
this concept to establish a range of pre-emptive terror-
ism offences including public provocation of terrorism,260 
255 Amnesty International, Dangerously Disproportionate: The Ever-Expanding Na-
tional Security State in Europe (Amnesty International, London, 2017) 17. Availa-
ble at <https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/EUR0153422017ENG-
LISH.PDF> accessed 1 February 2021. 
256 ibid. 
257 Piotr Daranowski, ‘Poland’ in Kent Roach (ed.) Comparative Counter-Terrorism 
Law (CUP, 2015). 
258 Penal Code article 115 § 20. 
259 Amnesty International, ‘Submission to the United Nations Human Rights Com-
mittee, 118th Session, 17 Oct – 04 Nov 2016 (Amnesty International, London, 
2016). <https://amnesty.org.pl/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/HRC-submis-
sion-Amnesty-International.pdf> accessed 1 February 2021. 
260 Art. 255a. Whosoever disseminates or publicly presents content that could 
facilitate the commitment of an offence of a terrorist nature is punishable by 
three months to five years’ imprisonment.
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terrorist training,261 and crossing the Polish border for the 
purpose of conducting a terrorist offence.
Poland’s 2016 Anti-Terrorism Act significantly increased 
executive powers aimed at preventing ‘events of a ter-
rorist nature’. Poland’s Commissioner for Human Rights 
argued that the legislation infringes constitutional and 
European human rights262 with insufficient procedural 
control and oversight.263 
1 - it enables the Internal Security Agency (ISA) to 
maintain and retain lists of individuals suspected 
of engaging in terrorist activities. A person listed 
on the ISA registry cannot challenge the placement 
or initiate the process to have their name removed 
from it.264 
2 - the head of the ISA can order covert surveillance 
of non-Polish nationals (and Polish citizens with 
whom they communicate, work, or share accommo-
dation) for up to three months.265 
Crucially, in term of accountability and oversight the 
covert surveillance is carried out by executive action 
and does not need prior judicial authorisation unless it 
is deemed necessary to extend the surveillance period 
beyond three months. However, this safeguard can be cir-
cumvented by the executive if they close the surveillance 
procedure and after a few days, open a new procedure 
involving the same person for a further three months. This 
legal lacuna creates the risk of permanent surveillance on 
a rolling three-month basis with no judicial oversight.266 
261 Anti-Terrorism Act of 10 June 2016 Art. 32.5, modified art. 255a of the Penal 
Code. According to art.255a §2 a person who, aiming to commit an offence of 
terrorist character, participates in training that might facilitate the commission 
of such offence has committed an offence punishable with imprisonment 
up to five years. See <http://prawo.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/download.xsp/
WDU20160000904/T/D20160904L.pdf> accessed 1 February 2021.
262 In particular, the Commissioner for Human Rights raised concerns over the 
vague and overbroad definition of ‘an event of a terrorist nature’ (art. 2.7 of the 
10 June 2016 Act); the vague procedures regarding the register of individ-
uals suspected of terrorism (art 6 of the 10 June 2016 Act); and differential 
treatment and uncontrolled surveillance of non-citizens (art. 9. 1 of the 10 June 
2016 Act). See ‘The Commissioner for Human Rights challenges the Anti-Ter-
rorism Act before the Constitutional Tribunal’ 11 July 2016 https://www.rpo.
gov.pl/pl/content/RPO-skarzy-ustawe-antyterrorystyczna-do-TK accessed 1 
February 2021. 
263 Parliament of Poland, ‘Extraordinary subcommittee to consider the govern-
ment's bill on anti-terrorist activities and amending certain other acts (print 
no. 516)’ http://www.sejm.gov.pl/Sejm8.nsf/transmisje_arch.xsp?unid=09D-
B4AC2D8FF0E98C1257FBC0034DDDA accessed 1 February 2021. 
264 Amnesty International, ‘Poland: Submission to the United Nations Human Right 
Committee’ (Amnesty International, London, 2016), 11. https://amnesty.org.pl/
wp-content/uploads/2016/10/HRC-submission-Amnesty-International.pdf 1 
February 2021. 
265 Anti-Terrorism Act 2016, Article 9. 
266 Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, ‘Uwagi Hesinskiej Fundacji Praw 
Czlowieka do projektu ustawy o dzialaniach antyterrorystycznych (druk 
sejmowy nr 516) [Comments of the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights on 
the draft law on anti-terrorist activities (Sejm print no.516)], p. 7 <http://www.
hfhr.pl/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/HFPC_ustawa_antyterrorystyczna.pdf> 
accessed 1 February 2021. 
Moreover, the Law ‘does not provide procedural safe-
guards to ensure that a person, should she or he be made 
aware of surveillance, can challenge it and have access to 
an effective remedy against unlawful surveillance.’267
Under the 2016 Anti-Terrorist Act, the Internal Security 
Agency (ISA), police and border guards can collect finger-
prints, photographs and biometric material from non-Pol-
ish nationals where there are doubts as to their identity 
or the declared purpose of their stay in Poland, or there 
is suspicion of their engagement in a ‘terrorist event’ 
(art. 10). The 2016 Act also amends the 2013 Foreigner 
Act. One important change is the addition of art.329a 
by which the Minister of the Interior can issue a foreign 
national with ‘an obligation to return’ order if there is fear 
or suspicion that they might be involved in terrorist activ-
ity. An obligation to return order does not require priori 
judicial authorization and has immediate effect. As noted 
by Amnesty International, taken together the various 
measures in the 2016 Act ‘[consolidate] sweeping powers, 
including enhanced surveillance capacity, in the hands of 
the Internal Security accountability. Combined with other 
legislative amendments, such as those to the Police Act268 
and the Criminal Procedure Code,269 it creates conditions 
for violations of the rights to life, liberty, privacy, fair trial, 
expression, peaceful assembly, and non-discrimination.’270
4.5 Spain 
Despite Spain’s counter-terrorism measures devel-
oped in response to terrorism from Basque separatist 
groups, it has significantly expanded its counter-ter-
rorism policies in the past decade, adopting its 
first Comprehensive Strategy Against International 
Terrorism and Radicalisation in 2014, updated in 2019 
by a National Counter-terrorism Strategy.271 A raft of 
measures adopted after the attacks on the Charlie 
Hebdo offices in Paris signalled a shift towards the 
development of pre-emptive offences. Unlike earlier 
anti-terrorism laws targeting the actions and activities 
267 The Panoptykon Foundation, ‘Stanowisko Fundacji Panoptykon w sprawie 
projektu ustawy o działaniach antyterrorystycznych’ [The position of the Pano-
ptykon Foundation on the bill on anti-terrorist activities] 
http://obserwatoriumdemokracji.pl/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Panop-
tykon_uat_opinia_10.05.2016.pdf accessed 1 February 2021.
268 Act of 15 January 2016 amending the Police Act and certain other acts (Ustawa 
z dnia 15 stycznia 2016 r. o zmianie ustawy o Policji oraz niektórych innych ustaw) 
Journal of Laws 2016 item 147.
269 Act of 11 March 2016 amending the Criminal Procedure Code and certain other 
Acts (Ustawa z dnia 11 marca 2016 r. o zmianie ustawy – Kodeks postępowania 
karnego oraz niektórych innych ustaw) Journal of Laws 2016 item 437.
270 Amnesty International, ‘Poland: Submission to the United Nations Human 
Rights Committee’ (n264) 10. 
271 Government of Spain, ‘National Counter-terrorism Strategy’ (2019) Available: 
https://www.dsn.gob.es/es/documento/estrategia-nacional-contra-terroris-
mo-2019 1 February 2021.
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of terrorist organisations and their members, the new 
proposals aimed to address increasing concern about 
attacks by individuals inspired, rather than directed, by 
a terrorist organisation; so called ‘lone wolves’. 
The Spanish criminal law code was expanded to cover a 
wider range of pre-emptive terrorism offences272 focusing 
on prohibiting ‘training and indoctrination in hate’. The 
measures prohibiting terrorist training extend beyond 
training in practical skills to encompass ‘ideological train-
ing’ through indoctrination. Controversially, this covers 
not only the indoctrination of others but also self-in-
doctrination, and makes it unlawful to repeatedly access 
online material that incites terrorism. It also prohibits the 
acquisition or possession of documents of this nature for 
the purpose of self-indoctrination in order to commit any 
terrorist offence. 
The pre-crime offences are so wide-ranging that an 
individual may be found guilty of an offence if they are 
simply in possession of a book with the aim of indoctri-
nating themselves to commit a terrorist offence, even if 
they have not read it.273 Depending on the circumstances, 
the mere expression of ideas can justify an investiga-
tion, police control, and even the temporary restriction 
of some individual rights such as the right to privacy of 
communications, to the extent that such a form of expres-
sion is seen as a reasonable indication of the existence of 
danger. While conviction for self-indoctrination entails 
more than the adoption of ideological views and necessi-
tates evidence of decisions to take actions based on these 
ideological views, the level or nature of the action needed 
to support prosecution for ideological training remains 
unclear and uncertain.274 
Human rights experts and organisations have raised con-
cerns about the prosecutions for glorification of terrorism 
introduced in the anti-terrorism law. UN human rights 
experts have warned that the lack of clear definitions in 
the legislation enabled disproportionate and discretion-
ary enforcement.275 According to Amnesty International 
‘social media users, journalists, lawyers and musicians 
272 Organic Law 2/2015 modified measures on terrorism offences in Organic Law 
10/1995.
273 Alberto Alonso Rimo, ‘Is prevention better than cure? The ever-increasing 
criminalisation of acts preparatory to an offence in Spain’ (2020) 9 International 
Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy. Advance online publication, 
https://doi.org/10.5204/ijcjsd.v10i1.1502 accessed 1 February 2021.
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275 UNCHR, ‘“Two legal reform projects undermine the rights of assembly and ex-
pression in Spain” – UN Experts’ 23 February 2015. <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/
NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=15597> accessed 1 February 
2021.
have been prosecuted under Article 578 of the Spanish 
Criminal Code, which prohibits “Glorifying terrorism” and 
“humiliating the victims of terrorism”’.276 The increase in 
the use of this offence since the introduction of amend-
ments in 2015 has included the prosecution of musicians 
and children’s puppeteers.277 The result is ‘increasing 
self-censorship and a broader chilling effect on freedom 
of expression in Spain’.278
Spain launched its National Plan to Fight Violent 
Radicalisation (PEN-LCRV) in 2015.279 It identifies the 
need for the ‘early detection’ of violent radicalism, and 
aim to focus on ‘those communities, groups or individ-
uals at risk or vulnerable.’280 The plan, prepared by the 
Intelligence Centre for Counter-Terrorism and Organised 
Crime (CITCO), places particular emphasis on training offi-
cials and civil society actors to identify signs of radicalisa-
tion. The focus is on local officials (social workers, school 
staff, local police, courts and social entities) meeting and 
exchanging information to assess and manage ‘early 
warnings’ of radicalisation. In addition to the national 
policy there are different regional and local plans and 
protocols. Some, such as the local plans in the Basque 
region,281 Catalonia,282 Madrid,283 and Malaga284 have 
attracted public discussion and controversy. 
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Part II: Research Findings37
5. SUSPICION OF MUSLIM IDENTITY  
AND RELIGIOUS PRACTICES 
Part 1 of this report noted how at its inception, the EU’s 
counter-radicalisation policies focused exclusively and 
explicitly on Muslims and Islam. In placing suspicion 
and scrutiny on Muslim identities and religious prac-
tices it risks enabling discrimination. As states adopted, 
developed, and implemented their counter-radicalisa-
tion policies and action plans, supported by EU coordi-
nation and sharing of best practice, they replicated and 
reinforced a focus on Muslim religious identities and 
practices. At the same time, the DCT’s criminalisation of 
pre-emptive action that occurs before there is any plan 
to commit an attack underpins and legitimises prosecu-
tions that rely heavily on evidence of dangerous associ-
ation and risky identities. Drawing on the testimonies of 
focus group participants and interviews with key actors 
in civil society, this chapter suggests that these devel-
opments have contributed to a securitised suspicion of 
Muslim religious practices and expressions of religious 
identity, making them a source of fear and anxiety and 
triggering further investigation by police or other state 
officials. This suspicion extends to mosques, Islamic 
classes, the act of prayer, and even to Arabic language 
classes. 
5.1 Focus on Muslims and Islam 
Commitments to non-discrimination ensure that legis-
lative measures rarely target specific ethnic or religious 
groups explicitly. Nevertheless, research for this report 
uncovered instances of early drafts of legislation and 
policy papers focusing explicitly on Islam and Muslims. 
For example, the draft regulations accompanying 
Poland’s Anti-Terrorism Act 2016 list activities or actions 
deemed ‘terrorist related’ in a ‘catalogue of terrorist 
incidents’. These included information about any plans 
for establishing Islamic universities, visits to prisons by 
Islamic clerics or representatives of Islamic institutions; 
and participating in chats and forums on radical Muslim 
websites.285 In the final version of the regulations these 
openly discriminatory provisions has been replaced 
with more neutral references to ‘religious groups’ and 
285 Office of the Prime Minister ‘o działaniach antyterrorystycznych oraz o zmianie 
niektórych innych ustaw’ [On anti-terrorist activities and on amending 
other acts] 16 March 2016 <http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/Druki8ka.nsf/0/9C-
CA65458151278AC1257FB50049D701/%24File/516.pdf<B> accessed 01 Febru-
ary 2021.
‘international extremism’.286 Similarly, interviews in Spain 
found that concern about the stigmatisation of Muslims 
led references to ‘Islamism’ to be changed to ‘violent 
extremism’ in the Catalan Counter-radicalisation Protocol. 
While these linguistic changes may reflect an attempt to 
dilute any stigmatisation of Muslims, they nevertheless 
reveal how some laws formulated in neutral language in 
their final version, explicitly targeted Muslims and Islam 
when they were first developed or proposed. 
Formally neutral policies require enactment through 
interpretation and implementation. These processes gen-
erate understandings of the primary targets of policies 
that may not be expressly articulated in the policy itself. In 
Spain, teachers who attended training in relation to coun-
ter-radicalisations protocols reported that it reproduced 
narratives of Muslims as a danger to Europe and empha-
sised the need for vigilance against Muslim students. Thus 
while the documentation did not explicitly name any 
‘target population’ the interviewees reported that it was 
taken for granted in presentations that the discussion was 
about Muslims.287 
Assumptions that violence and extremism are inherent in 
Islam and Muslim cultures can also seep into policy dis-
course. Such assumptions are implicit, for example, in the 
description of some of the training provided by Poland’s 
Terrorism Prevention Centre of Excellence. The brochure 
about the training states that government administration 
bodies can learn about the ‘specificity of the Muslim cul-
ture in the emergence of extremist attitudes’.288 A secu-
ritized racialisation of Muslims is also evident in Poland’s 
2019 draft Migration Policy, which was leaked to the public 
286 ‘Rozporządzenie Ministra Spraw Wewnętrznych i Administracji z dnia 22 lipca 
2016 r. w sprawie katalogu incydentów o charakterze terrorystycznym’ [Regu-
lation of the Minister of the Interior and Administration of July 22, 2016 on the 
catalog of incidents of a terrorist nature] <http://prawo.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/
DocDetails.xsp?id=WDU20160001092> accessed 01 February 2021.
287 Interview, counter-terrorism practitioner, Spain. 
288 Terrorism Prevention Centre of Excellence 2018-19, at 11. Available at <https://
tpcoe.gov.pl/cpt/aktualnosci/1553,Broszura-Centrum-Prewencji-Terrory-
stycznej-ABW.html> accessed 01 February 2021. 
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by the Association for Legal Intervention.289 This early 
draft presents Muslims and Islam as a security threat and 
a group ‘particularly unable to integrate’, because of ‘their 
sense of distinctiveness and superiority over the host 
society’, which consequently drives them to ‘build parallel 
societies.’290 Muslims are viewed as either already danger-
ous or at constant risk of becoming dangerous. The draft 
policy cites the increasing number of conversions to Islam 
as a ‘problem’ faced by Western European states, which, it 
worries, Poland too will soon face.291
While some politicians and policymakers single out Islam 
and Muslims in statements introducing new security 
measures, others struggle for less discriminatory terminol-
ogy. The Spanish government referred to the counter-ter-
rorism measures adopted after 2015 as an ‘anti-jihadist 
pact’. The preamble to legislation, introducing new pre-
crime offences, refers to the need to combat ‘jihadist 
International terrorism’ which, it explains, is ‘characterized 
by having incorporated new forms of aggression, consist-
ing of new instruments of uptake, training or indoctrina-
tion in hate, to use them cruelly against all those who, 
in their extremist and violent ideology, are qualified as 
enemies’. 292 This reinforces the connection of jihad with 
terrorism, further crowding out the varied, complex and 
multiple meanings of the term in Muslim communities. 
289 Association for Legal Intervention, ‘Polska polityka migracyjna wg PiS, czyli 
jeden naród i jedna religia’ [Polish migration policy according to PiS, or one na-
tion and one religion] 26 June 2019 <https://interwencjaprawna.pl/polska-pol-
ityka-migracyjna-projekt-mswia/> accessed 01 February 2021. Written by the 
Department of Migration Analysis and Policy of the Ministry of Interior and 
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was leaked by the Association for Legal Intervention. According to a Ministry 
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tation. https://twitter.com/MSWiA_GOV_PL/status/1143098375417581569 
accessed 01 February 2021
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ministration, ‘Polityka Migracyjna Polski’ [Polish Migration Policy] 10 June 2019, 
< Polityka migracyjna polski (interwencjaprawna.pl)> accessed 1 February 
2021
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of November 23, of the Penal Code, in the matter of crimes of terrorism] 31 
March 2015 <https://www.legislationline.org/download/id/5975/file/Spain%20
Law%202-2015%20amendment%20penal%20code%20terrorism_2015_es-
.pdf> accessed 1 February 2021
5.2 Securitising Muslim religious practices 
Many counter-radicalisation strategies attempt to 
draw a distinction between signs of extremism on the 
one hand and the expression of conservative religious 
views on the other. They argue that security policy does 
not target conservative religious dogma or practice 
but only ‘extremist’ or ‘radical’ beliefs. The problem 
here is the inherent elasticity and ambiguity of the 
terminology. While some states emphasise that coun-
ter-radicalisation measures are not seeking to police 
conservative religious views, interviews for this report 
have highlighted the difficulties that arise when trying 
to draw such clear distinctions. Interviews with practi-
tioners and policymakers yielded numerous examples 
of Muslim religious practices, beliefs and views that had 
attracted the attention of security actors and prompted 
further investigation and questioning. In Spain, inter-
viewees with first-hand experience of counter-radical-
isation training noted that indicators of risk included 
changes in religious practice, changes in appearance 
such as growing a beard, participation in ‘radical’ 
demonstrations, listening to ‘radical’ music, holding 
‘extremist’ views, and participation in combat sports or 
survival training. While the authorities refused to pub-
lish the risk factors presented in the training, a covert 
recording of a four-hour training session for teachers 
obtained by the news website La Directa revealed teach-
ers being instructed to monitor Muslims for a range of 
banal everyday cultural and religious practices, includ-
ing eating halal food, not wearing makeup, not cele-
brating Christmas and St George’s day, wearing henna 
tattoos, removing piercings or growing a long beard.293 
Heightened suspicion of Muslim religious beliefs and 
practices is also reinforced by comments from politi-
cians. France’s Interior Minister, Christophe Castaner, 
suggested that ‘rigorous religious practice’, particularly 
during Ramadan (the month during which Muslims fast), 
should trigger investigation by security services. He also 
named growing a beard, not kissing a person on the 
cheek in greeting, refusal to ‘team up with a woman’, 
‘regular and ostentatious practice of ritual prayer’, and 
the ‘wearing of the full-face veil for a female civil serv-
ant in public spaces’ as signs of potential radicalisation 
293 Vincent Almela and Ainhoa Nadia DouHaibi ‘No Beure Coca-Cola, No Celebrar 
Sant Jordi o Esborrar-se els Tatuatges són Indicadors de "Radicalització Islamis-
ta", Segons els Mossos’[Not Drinking Coca-Cola, Not Celebrating St George's 
Day or Erasing Tattoos are Indicators of "Islamist Radicalisation," According to 
the Mossos] La Directa 18 December 2018 < No beure Coca-Cola, no celebrar 
Sant Jordi o esborrar-se els tatuatges són indicadors de "radicalització islamis-
ta", segons els Mossos - directa.cat> accessed 1 February 2021
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requiring police investigation.294 The vectors of suspicion 
that such statements identify appeared to seep into the 
everyday experience of many of the Muslims interviewed 
for this report. Muslim youth workers who worked with 
marginalised young people recalled having to regularly 
explain basic religious practices to their non-Muslim col-
leagues because so many viewed any Islamic religious 
practice as a potential indicator of radicalisation. Human 
rights defenders also reported that French officials often 
cited ordinary Muslim religious practices when submit-
ting evidence that an individual was a national security 
threat sufficient to justify the use of State of Emergency 
measures.295 
During a focus group in Germany a Muslim teenager 
recalled the example of teachers labelling a classmate 
unwilling to look male teachers in the eye as a potential 
‘radical’.
We had a girl at school who was very ‘radical’ accord-
ing to the teachers. The only reason they gave for their 
assumption was that she didn't want to look one teacher in the 
eye because he is a man. That was the only thing. I couldn't 
judge whether she was really radical or whether she just 
wanted to live out a pious behaviour she had heard of. […] I 
was then asked by the teachers to somehow explain to her in 
an Islamic way that her behaviour is complete nonsense. […] Of 
course you have to be careful, but I think such topics are treated 
very extremely in schools. This girl then also [felt] radical, she 
was like ‘Yes, I'm a bad person if you say so". I don’t think the 
teachers knew what they were doing. Of course if you say to the 
girl, ‘You think wrong and it's dangerous what you do here’ this 
is somehow discriminating against her.
  (Focus Group, Germany)
The comments here illustrate the heightened risk of 
attracting state-led surveillance from displaying reli-
giously conservative behaviour that is interpreted as 
a potential sign of extremism. The teacher in this case 
appears to go so far as to call on the interviewee to 
engage the student in a discussion about the validity of 
her understanding of religious obligations. Yet the stu-
dent’s beliefs, while religiously conservative, are lawful. 
294 ‘Christophe Castaner liste les signes de radicalisation ? "Vous avez une barbe 
vous-même", lui répond un député’ [Christophe Castaner lists the signs of 
radicalization? "You have a beard yourself", answers a deputy] Europe 1, (Paris, 
9 October 2019), <https://www.europe1.fr/politique/christophe-castaner-liste-
les-signes-de-radicalisation-religieuse-vous-avez-une-barbe-vous-meme-lui-
repond-un-depute-3924324> accessed 1 February 2021. 
295 See also Amnesty International, Punished Without Trial: The Use of Administrative 
Control Measures In the Context of Counter-Terrorism in France (2018). 
The teacher, enacting and implementing counter-radical-
isation policies, entangles the state in regulating ways of 
being Muslim. 
The research found that in some cases counter-radicali-
sation measures and procedures are activated against 
Muslims not because of their actions or ideas but because 
of suspicions about those with whom they associate. A 
teacher in Spain recalled a case where the counter-radical-
isation procedure was initiated after a student was truant 
from school. Normally this would have been treated as a 
case of truancy alone with a letter sent to the student's 
parents about her absence from school. The procedure 
was triggered because the student’s friends included an 
individual whom the teacher thought might hold ‘radical’ 
ideas. This led to police notification and an investigation 
of the girl, her family and her friends for possible indica-
tions of radicalisation: 
As a school we must activate [the counter-radicalisation 
procedure] because if we do not do it and something 
happens, inspectors come and ask for explanations. We have 
the responsibility. The Mossos (Catalan Police) come to collect 
the information and that’s it. I sent an email to Mossos, and the 
next day they were here.296 
In this case the procedure was triggered not by the stu-
dent’s actions but by her association and connection to an 
individual believed by the teacher to hold ‘radical’ views. 
Inferring the risk of radicalisation from an individual’s 
association with others infringes on their right to freedom 
of association, it limits the networks and relationships 
that individuals can freely develop. 
In explaining the decision to activate the procedure, the 
interviewee alluded to the pressure on school staff to 
make referrals to security officials. The teachers feared 
that if they did not inform the police and something hap-
pened they would come under scrutiny for their failure to 
report their concerns. The findings here point to how anxi-
ety about the fear of missing genuine cases and the reper-
cussions from this for the individual and their institution 
loom large in decision-making and pressure practitioners 
and institutions to make referrals to security officials. This 
was echoed in interviews in Germany, where a coun-
ter-radicalisation practitioner noted that the emphasis on 
pre-emption and precaution led experienced teachers to 
296 Interview, counter-terrorism practitioner, Spain.
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escalate situations and report them to the VS as soon as 
religious behaviour such as praying is involved in order 
to be ‘on the safe side before anything serious might 
happen’.297 The findings from the interviews in Spain 
and Germany are consistent with research among edu-
cational professionals in the UK, suggesting that the lack 
of veracity in the broad and vague indicators of potential 
radicalisation generate anxiety and fear of missing genu-
ine cases, thus contributing to increased referrals to the 
police for further investigation.298 
A number of interviews revealed the ways in which the 
racial and religious identities of Muslims appear to inform 
concerns that take shape in the imagination of state 
actors and the possible explanations that they expound 
in interpreting and understanding the views, comments 
or actions of Muslims. In one example teachers construed 
the ambition of a Muslim student studying nursing to 
pursue a career helping wounded people in conflict 
zones as a potential desire to travel to Syria. As a result, 
they activated the counter-radicalisation procedure, plac-
ing the student and her family under covert surveillance 
for six months. The student’s Muslim identity and ambi-
tion to pursue humanitarian work led her to be viewed 
with suspicion, triggering the protocol and justifying 
intrusive and extensive surveillance. The psychological 
and social impact of the invasion of her private and family 
life extended well beyond the six months during which 
she was under surveillance. 
Community workers interviewed for this research believed 
that the fear that religious practice and the expression of 
religious identities could be misread as signs of radicalisa-
tion is eroding the trust between families and their social 
workers. In their view this erosion of trust means that indi-
viduals and their families are less likely to engage effec-
tively with the systems of support they need to address 
the difficulties and challenges they face.299 This has the 
potential for a wider knock-on impact on social integra-
tion and life chances. Reluctance to speak openly with 
welfare professionals is one indicator of this. Survey data 
from France suggests that a quarter of Muslims (26.1%) are 
297 Interview, counter-radicalisation practitioner, Germany. 
298 Joel Busher and others, What the Prevent Duty Means for Schools and Colleges 
in England: An Analysis of Educationalists’ Experiences (The Aziz Foundation, 
London, 2017).
299 On research of the experiences of Prevention of Radicalisation programmes in 
social work see Tony Stanley, Surinder Guru and Vicki Coppock, ‘A Risky Time for 
Muslim Families: Professionalised Counter-radicalisation Networks’ (2017) 31 
Journal of Social Work Practice 477; Tony Stanley, Surinder Guru and Anna Gup-
ta, ‘Working with PREVENT: Social Work Options for Cases of ‘Radicalisation Risk’ 
(2018) 30 Practice 131; Håvard Haugstvedt, ‘Trusting the Mistrusted: Norwegian 
Social Workers’ Strategies in Preventing Radicalization and Violent Extremism’ 
(2019) 19 Journal for Deradicalization 149. 
careful about what they say to youth workers and social 
workers for fear of being discriminated against.300 
5.3 Suspicion of mosques and prayer rooms 
The association of Islam with terrorism is reinforced by 
state measures to regulate Islamic education, the train-
ing of imams and the governance of mosques.301 In Spain 
after the 2004 terrorist attacks the Interior Minister, 
José Antonio Alonso, called for greater state control of 
mosques as a counter-terrorism measure.302 In Germany 
public discussion of proposals to require religious cler-
ics to prove their knowledge of German focused only 
on imams. In March 2019 Jens Spahn, a leading member 
of Angela Merkel’s cabinet, demanded that sermons 
in mosques should be in German.303 Reinforcing the 
need for hyper-surveillance and feeding suspicion of 
Muslims and Islam, he argued for greater state control 
and regulation of mosques because ‘the authorities had 
to know what was happening in mosques’.304 German 
policies for Preventing Islamist Extremism called on 
Muslim communities and mosques to engage ‘more’ 
with the prevention programmes, implying a failure to 
do enough. In Poland the initial draft ‘indicators of ter-
rorist incidents’ included opening a mosque. In France 
the association of mosques with terrorism was rein-
forced when executive powers were used to close some 
300 Francesco Ragazzi and others, The Effects of Counter-Terrorism and Coun-
ter-Radicalisation Policies on Muslim Populations in France: A Quantitative 
Study, (Centre for the study of Conflict, Liberty and Security, Paris, 2019), 42. 
See also Hannan Dover and others, ‘Factors associated with Counter Terror-
ism-Related Behaviour Change among Australian Muslims’ (2020) 3 Internation-
al Journal of Islamic Psychology 34. 
301 Yvonne Haddad and Michael Balz, ‘Taming the Imams: European Governments 
and Islamic Preachers since 9/11’ (2008) 19 Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations 
215. 
302 J.A. Rodríguez and J.M. Romero, ‘Es necesaria una ley para poder controlar a 
los imames de las pequeñas mezquitas’ (Is it necessary to have a law to control 
imams in small mosques?) El País, (Madrid, 2 May 2004), <https://elpais.com/
diario/2004/05/02/espana/1083448801_850215.html> accessed 01 February 
2021
303 ‘Spahn will Imame zur Deutschprüfung zwingen’ (Spahn wants to force imams 
to take German tests) Die Welt (Berlin, 30 March 2017) <https://www.welt.de/
politik/deutschland/article163268590/Spahn-will-Imame-zur-Deutschprue-
fung-zwingen.html> accessed 01 February 2021
304 Sigal Samuel, ‘The Push to Ban Arabic Sermons in Europe’s Mosques’ The 
Atlantic (Washington, DC, 12 April 2017) <https://www.theatlantic.com/
international/archive/2017/04/push-to-ban-arabic-sermons-in-european-
mosques/522000/ accessed 01 February 2021
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mosques during the State of Emergency. France’s coun-
ter-terrorism strategy also includes a focus on increased 
state control of the training of imams and supervision 
of mosques.305 
Research for this report suggests that policies and com-
ments framing the mosque as objects of suspicion feed 
a wider societal suspicion of mosques, prayer rooms 
and even the very act of Islamic prayer. Participants in a 
focus group in Germany gave details of a German univer-
sity where communal rooms (often designated as quiet 
rooms or contemplation rooms) used by Muslim students 
for prayers were closed by the university administration, 
citing the fear that such spaces could be used for radi-
calisation. When students started to pray in other spaces 
such as quiet niches in the library or deserted corridors, 
the university instructed their security personnel to patrol 
such locations. Students found praying faced interroga-
tion and questioning by the guards and had their details 
taken to be passed to the university administration. Again, 
in explaining their actions the guards alluded to concern 
about security. Referring to such incidents one participant 
described the experience as leaving them ‘feeling that we 
have to crawl away from something… We are really perse-
cuted at university. It's like a cat and mouse game’.306 For 
these interviewees the prohibition on praying on univer-
sity premises had a direct impact on their ability to carry 
out a basic religious practice; this was particularly difficult 
in winter months, when the shorter days mean that three 
of the five daily prayer times occur during normal working 
hours. 
During focus group discussion in Spain, parents reported 
that their children’s attendance at mosque for religious 
education attracts questioning from school teachers, 
echoing the suspicion of mosques and the association of 
Islamic schools and education with the nurturing of vio-
lence and extremism: 
They are obsessed in knowing what is going on inside 
the mosques […] they are not calm […] They are obsessed 
with that “security”, whether Muslims “plot things” in their 
mosques or if they are organizing crimes in their mosques.
  (Focus group, Spain) 
305 Sylvie Corbet and Jean-Francois Badias, ‘France to end imam, teacher deals to 
counter extremism’ AP News (New York, 18 February 2020), <https://apnews.
com/article/bee22150326aab9b95bd5c99f2794d7e> accessed 01 February 
2021. 
306 Focus group, Germany. 
As leaders of community institutions that are seen as sites 
of suspicion, imams and others managing mosques find 
themselves the subject of intense scrutiny through infor-
mal questioning and visits from police and security offi-
cials. Victoria Sentas’ analysis of race and counter-terrorism 
policing in Australia reveals how informal questioning is 
a vital tool enabling racialised counter-terrorism polic-
ing. Informal questioning ‘secures evidence of collective 
identity’ and produced ‘the individual and the targeted 
community and, in doing so, developed institutionalised 
common sense about those who are policed’.307 The fact 
of being questioned, even informally, confirms the institu-
tions and the community as policed subjects of incipient 
violence. Informal questioning of those involved in run-
ning mosques or community organisations, confirms and 
constitutes their positioning as a suspect community, and 
confirms that Muslims must ‘offer transparency to police 
as a pre-condition to belonging’.308 Whether a person 
answers or not informs the state’s judgment of them, 
and their willingness to be transparent and known to the 
state also informs whether they are seen as ‘extremist’ 
or ‘moderate’. Interviewees in Germany and Spain who 
were active in mosque communities reported that infor-
mal questioning by security officials, while voluntary in 
theory, retained a sharp coercive edge: 
[W]hen you are more active in mosque communities 
you subconsciously know that everything could be 
monitored. And then when something is done against this 
mosque or even said about the mosque you know that your 
name also definitely pops up on the lists. But you take this risk, 
so to speak, if you want to remain active in the communities. 
 (Focus group, Germany)
Leaders of Muslim civil community organisations reported 
that many of mosques they knew received constant visits 
from state security actors; the ‘informal’ visits and conver-
sations during such visits were a normalised part of life 
in a mosque. They believed that the police or security 
officials used these exchanges to gather information and 
intelligence about the mosques and their congregations. 
These collective experiences of Muslim communities led 
them to believe that failure to collaborate would generate 
suspicion and further scrutiny: 
307 Sentas, Traces of Terror (n149), 210.
308 ibid, 211.
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Some communities receive continuous visits from the 
Urban Guard, the National Police, Mossos de Escuadra, 
the Civil Guard, or the CNI [National Intelligence Centre], to 
find out who is who in the community. Many have been asked 
for documentation about the people who are on the mosque 
board. They bother them to know whether they are willing to 
collaborate or not, to gain control over them. Their visits are 
without prior appointment or notice. The collaboration of 
all the centres is sought; there is talk of prevention; but in 
reality it is institutionalized and entrenched Islamophobia.  
 (Leader of Muslim community organisation, Spain)
The experiences reported here are consistent with Sentas’ 
evaluation of informal questioning as part of a policing 
strategy of duress where informal questioning is carried 
out under the implied threat of formal questioning and 
worse for those who fail to cooperate. The interviews 
reveal the informal pressures placed on mosques to prove 
their innocence. The compulsion to cooperate ‘volun-
tarily’ is reinforced by fear of state action. At one end of 
the spectrum interviewees in Spain reported that fail-
ure to cooperate and collaborate lay behind their failure 
to secure permits for activities such as an iftar in public 
spaces; at the other end are reports that imams who 
failed to cooperate were threatened with prosecution for 
apology for terrorism or, if they were not Spanish citizens, 
deportation. 
State security activities disrupt the associational life of the 
community that organises around a mosque. Interviewees 
reported that if a member of the mosque is arrested, even 
if they are released without further action, the mosque 
still finds itself stigmatised, and many Muslims in the local 
community, fearful of being entangled in a web of state 
surveillance, start to disassociate and distance themselves 
from the mosque. This disrupts social life, curtailing the 
ability to maintain associational activities. In France the 
closure of mosques and prayer rooms during the State of 
Emergency was criticized in the focus groups as unneces-
sary collective punishment that removed vital community 
facilities with little understanding of the impact on elderly 
Muslims and young people. 
Some of the mosque leaders interviewed, aware that their 
institutions do not benefit from the usual presumption 
of innocence, said that mosques preemptively collect 
the evidence needed to prove their good citizenship and 
loyalty; for example, many mosques in Catalonia routinely 
and regularly record sermons and make these availa-
ble to the police if needed. In the words of one mosque 
leader, this is a ‘survival strategy’ to avoid ‘entering into 
a confrontation with the State’.309 In Germany a focus 
group participant who was active at their local mosque 
offered an account of the steps the mosque took to keep 
records of visiting speakers and the topics of their talks 
to demonstrate to others that they did not offer a plat-
form for anyone that could be regarded as an extremist or 
radical. Muslim individuals and organisations undertaking 
such actions are seeking to show that they are law-abid-
ing and safe, but in so doing they reinforce the moderate/
extremist dichotomy. 
5.4 Moderate/extremist Muslim identities 
In the Member States covered by this research, security 
officials and counter-terrorism policies often drew a dis-
tinction between Islam on the one hand and Islamism, 
Salafism and Jihadism on the other. This moderate/
extremist dichotomy implicates all Muslims in a poten-
tial for violence while allowing security policies to focus 
on just some Muslims. It retains a focus on identity 
over action, as Islamist and Salafi identities are seen to 
reflect a commitment to ideas that prefigure a propen-
sity to violence. 
Germany’s Federal Ministry of the Interior character-
izes Islamism as the most virulent and dangerous threat 
to the country.310 The VS defines it as ‘a form of political 
extremism’ which aims at ‘partly or fully abolishing the 
liberal-democratic constitution’ of the German state, and 
views Islamism as determining or at least regulating soci-
etal life and political order. 311 In France, after the attacks 
on the Charlie Hebdo magazine Prime Minster Manuel 
Valls declared that ‘France is not at war with Islam and 
Muslim [but] we are at war against jihadism and terror-
ism’.312 The UK’s Independent Review of Anti-terrorism 
law suggested that the analytical value of the term 
‘Islamist’ or ‘Islamic’ terrorism is outweighed by the neg-
ative consequence of linking religion to violence, and 
309 Interview with leader of Muslim community organisation, Spain. 
310 ‘Für die Bürgerinnen und Bürger der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der 
westlichen Staatengemeinschaft wird auf absehbare Zeit der islamistisch 
motivierte internationale Terrorismus die virulenteste Bedrohung bleiben’,[For 
the citizens of the Federal Republic of Germany and Western states, Isla-
mist-motivated international terrorism will remain the most virulent threat for 
the foreseeable future] <https://www.bmi.bund.de/DE/themen/sicherheit/ex-
tremismus-und-terrorismusbekaempfung/terrorismus/terrorismus-node,html> 
accessed 1 February 2021.
311 Verfassungsschutzbericht 2017 (Bundesministerium des Innern, für Bau und 
Heimat, Berlin, 2018), 164. <https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/de/oeffen-
tlichkeitsarbeit/publikationen/verfassungsschutzberichte/vsbericht-2017> 
accessed 1 February 2021.
312 ‘France attacks: “War with terrorism not Islam, PM Valls says’ BBC News (13 
January 2015) https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-30794973 accessed 
1 February 2021.
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proposed the use of ‘Daesh inspired’ terrorism.313 Since 
2019, the Canadian government has stopped using the 
term Islamist, arguing that ‘the Government’s communi-
cation of threats must be clear, concise, and cannot be 
perceived as maligning any groups.’314 The British police 
have also considered avoiding such terminology.315
In Germany, France and Spain there is a particular focus on 
Salafism as a form of Islamism. In Germany the VS refers 
to Salafism as a ‘particularly radical form of Islamism’ and 
directly links the growth in the number of individuals seen 
as Salafi to the increased threat of terrorism.316 In Spain, 
the Catalan government, when introducing the procedure 
for detecting Islamist radicalisation, stressed that Salafism 
should not be stigmatised as terrorism, yet admitted that 
Salafist groups were ‘under special control’, suggesting 
that they faced enhanced surveillance and scrutiny.317 
The UK is one of the few states where the police, draw-
ing a distinction between different strands of Salafism, 
have in the past supported and partnered with Salafi 
communities and Salafi-led organisations in their coun-
ter-radicalisation work.318 Among academic experts, there 
is significant disagreement on the salience of Salafism as 
an indicator and driver of radicalisation.319 
The vague and broadly defined concept of Islamism ena-
bles the label to be used to cover a broad range of polit-
ical activism.320 Civil society actors who organise around 
their Muslim identity feel vulnerable to being denounced 
313 Martin Bentham, ‘Do not refer to “Islamist terrorism” says watchdog’ Evening 
Standard (1 February 2018) <https://www.standard.co.uk/news/uk/don-t-re-
fer-to-islamist-terrorism-says-watchdog-a3755701.html> accessed 1 February 
2021. 
314 Public Safety Canada, ‘2018 Public Report on the Terrorism Threat to Canada – 
29 April 2019 Update’ < https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/pblc-
rprt-trrrsm-thrt-cnd-2018/index-en.aspx> 1 February 2021. 
315 Dominic Kennedy, ‘Police may drop “Islamist” term when describing terror 
attacks’ The Times (20 July 2020). 
316 2013 Annual Report on the Protection of the Constitution, Federal Ministry 
of the Interior, June 2014,22, <https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/down-
loads/EN/publikationen/2014/vsb-kurzfassung-2013-en.html accessed 1 
February 2021. 
317 ‘Un protocol del Govern detectarà si hi ha radicalització islamista a les aules’ 
Catalunyapress 17 November 2015. Catalunya Press, ‘Un protocol del Govern 
detectarà si hi ha radicalització islamista a les aules’ [A government protocol 
will detect if there is Islamist radicalization in the classrooms] 17 November 
2015 <https://www.catalunyapress.cat/texto-diario/mostrar/376700/proto-
col-govern-detectar-hi-radicalitzacio-islamista-aules> accessed 1 February 
2021.
318 Robert Lambert, Countering Al-Qaeda in London: Police and Muslims in Partner-
ship, (Hurst and Co, London, 2011) 
319 Some of these contentions are reflected, for example, in the public disagree-
ment between Professors Oliver Roy and Gille Kepel. See Oliver Roy, ‘The Isla-
misation of Radicalism’ MadaMasr 11 January 2016, <https://www.madamasr.
com/en/2016/01/11/opinion/u/the-islamization-of-radicalism . See also 
Nadia Henni-Moulaï, ‘Olivier Roy: France's government fails to understand 
the nature of radicalisation’ Middle Eastern Eye (23 November 2020), <https://
www.middleeasteye.net/news/france-islam-olivier-roy-authorities-fail-
ure-radicalisation accessed 1 February 2021; Gilles Kepel with Antoine Jardin, 
Terreur dans l’Hexagone: Genèse du djihad français [Terror in the Hexagon: The 
Genesis of French Jihadism] (Gallimard, Paris, 2016).
320 See Arun Kundnani, The Muslims are Coming: Islamophobia, Extremism and the 
Domestic War on Terror (Verso, London, 2014)
as Islamists. The social and political stigma and risk of 
interference with their political and social rights due to 
being labelled Islamist or extremist by the state demands 
that any process by which individuals are identified or 
named should be based on careful definition using objec-
tive criteria that is open to challenge and scrutiny. 
In Germany, the VS plays a dominant role in identifying 
groups and organisations as Islamist. VS officials acknowl-
edged in interviews that they are regarded as ‘experts in 
the field of Islamism’.321 This, they recognise, makes it ‘hard 
to debate anything around Islam without the involvement 
of the VS’.322 For Muslims, the impact of being identified by 
the VS as an Islamist can be devastating, even when such 
a claim is later successfully challenged. Individuals and 
organisations reported profound social and economic 
impacts of being labelled Islamist. At the same time, indi-
viduals found that the criteria, processes and evidence by 
which the VS reached its conclusions remained unclear 
and opaque, limiting their right to due process and erod-
ing their right to a presumption of innocence. 
The influence and asymmetry of knowledge between the 
VS and other German state actors even affects the devel-
opment and delivery of counter-radicalisation policies. 
According to an interviewee working in the Federal Office 
for Migration and Refugees, the VS remains dominant 
in setting the agenda of an interdepartmental working 
group on prevention of Salafism. Relying on data and 
information from the VS, which it keeps confidential, 
other officials in the working group are unable to chal-
lenge claims made by the VS. In one example the Federal 
Office for Migration and Refugees suspended a project for 
workshops training imams to challenge Salafists coming 
to their mosques because one of the project’s partners 
had members that the VS considered were linked to the 
Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamist organisation.323 
For many people of faith, their religious beliefs and 
values are not only an important source of identity but 
provide motivation for social and community activism.324 
However, the suspicions and fears of activism or mobilisa-
tion attached to Muslims’ religious identity curtails their 
ability to participate in public life in ways that are mean-
ingful to them. The Muslim founder of a charitable non-
profit NGO concerned with environmental protection and 
321 Interview, policing and security practitioner, Germany. 
322 Interview, policing and security practitioner, Germany. 
323 Interview, policymaker, Germany . 
324 Tim Peace, European Social Movements and Muslim Activism: Another World but 
with Whom? (Palgrave, London, 2015). 
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sustainability had felt since 2001 that his activism was 
always under suspicion and needed to be explained: 
The majority of society is somehow conditioned in regard 
to certain topics surrounding Islam since 9/11. I feel that I 
have to justify and vindicate my activism and my presence as a 
Muslim man as such at all times.325
Even an organisation that is not a religious association 
can find itself racialised and viewed as a Muslim organi-
zation because of the issues it works on or the identity of 
those involved in the organisation. In one example, a local 
secular civil-society organization in France working with 
young people excluded from school faced questioning 
from local officials after it offered Arabic language classes 
on its premises. The organisation’s director believed the 
hostility towards it arises from the fact that many of their 
clients are women wearing the hijab, and the association 
of the hijab and Arabic with extremism and terrorism: 
[W]e are impacted mainly because there are women who 
wear the hijab who attend the association; they bring 
their children, for example, for the Arabic language course. […] 
it's not terrorists but ‘the Muslim’ who they’re afraid of, and 
that's why we've been suspected and accused of proselytizing.
 Director, civil society organisation, France
325 Interview, civil society organisation, Germany. 
The director wryly contrasted this with their English lan-
guage classes, which do not attract suspicion or adverse 
attention. He patiently pointed out that he had signed 
the Charter of Secularism, that the classes at the centre 
welcomed both men and women and the participants 
included both women who wore the veil and women 
who did not. Despite these facts, the organisation was 
suspected of proselytising by state officials. Marwan 
Muhammad, the former director of the French civil rights 
organisation the Collective Contre Islamophobie (CCIF), 
argues that the accusation is rooted in a fear in French 
society that ‘militant Islamism, under the guise of asso-
ciative action, is aimed at weakening social cohesion’.326 
According to Muhammad, such accusations would have 
little traction ‘if minds were not as effectively prepared to 
consider the presumed Islamicity of [the association] and 
other negative social markers such as the ethno-racial, 
social and residential origin carried by its president as the 
suspicious and hidden source of an anti-republican polit-
ical enterprise’.327 
326 Marwan Mohammed, ‘Stigmatiser pour “mieux” gouverner la ville. Accusation 
de “communautarisme” et répression politique à l’échelle locale’ (Stigmatizing 
to 'better' govern the city. Accusation of 'communitarianism' and political 
repression at the local level’, in Marwan Mohammed and Julien Talpin (eds.) 
Communautarisme? (PUF, Paris, 2018) 69-83. 
327 ibid. 
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The previous chapter has outlined how the enactment 
and implementation of counter-terrorism policies has 
securitised Muslim identities and religious practices as 
indicators of potential radicalisation and sources of sus-
picion and fear. This chapter focuses on experiences of 
discrimination, harassment and abuse that also draw on 
fear and suspicion of Muslims as potentially threatening 
public safety and security. Drawing on data from the 
focus group discussions and interviews with civil soci-
ety organisations, the findings offer qualitative insights 
into lived experiences of discrimination, harassment, 
and abuse, and the impact of these on the enjoyment 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms. While the 
focus in this chapter is on interpersonal experiences, it 
begins with statements from public figures that gener-
ate the backdrop against which individual acts of dis-
crimination and abuse take place.
6.1 Discrimination and public discourse 
What politicians say matters. Where they articulate and 
amplify hate against a group, they can increase the risk 
of hate crime328 and domestic terrorism.329 As Professor 
Solanke observes, ‘individual perpetrators take the 
cue for their behaviour from public norms and narra-
tives – these act as a resource for discriminatory ideas 
and create a backdrop for face-to-face discriminatory 
behaviour’.330 In Europe, the perception of Muslims as a 
threat to society is the strongest determinant of public 
anti-Muslim sentiments.331 Anti-Muslim conspiracy the-
ories and tropes, once relegated to fringe groups, are 
increasingly accepted as part of mainstream political 
discourse in some European states.332 Thus the expe-
riences of everyday interpersonal discrimination and 
328 N Parveen, ‘Boris Johnson’s burqa comment “led to a surge in anti-Muslim 
attacks”’ The Guardian (2 September 2019). <https://www.theguardian.com/
politics/2019/sep/02/boris-johnsons-burqa-comments-led-to-surge-in-anti-
muslim-attacks> accessed 1 February 2021.
329 James A. Piazza, ‘Politician Hate Speech and Domestic Terrorism’ (2020) 46 
International Interactions 431. 
330 Iyiola Solanke, Discrimination as Stigma: A Theory of Anti-discrimination Law 
(Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2017), 13. 
331 Sabri Ciftci, ‘Islamophobia and Threat Perceptions: Explaining Anti-Muslim 
Sentiment in the West’ (2012) 32 Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 293. 
332 John Mulhall, Going Mainstream: The Mainstreaming of Anti-Muslim Prejudice 
in Europe and North America, (Hope not Hate, London, 2017); Ivan Kalmar, ‘The 
east is just like the west, only more so: Islamophobia and populism in Eastern 
Germany and the East of the European Union’ (2020) 28 Journal of Contempo-
rary European Studies 15. 
abuse recalled in the focus group discussions emerge 
from a canvas of social norms thick with racialised 
stereotypes about Islam and Muslims, recalling and 
reconfiguring Orientalist tropes of Muslims and Islam 
as innately violent and a threat to European values and 
identity.
In states with small Muslim populations such as Poland 
and Hungary the significant level of anti-Muslim prejudice 
manifests as ‘Islamophobia without Muslims’.333 Research 
participants in both countries identified leading politi-
cians as the key actors fanning the flames of anti-Mus-
lim discrimination and harassment. The arrival of large 
numbers of refugees in Europe during 2015 was a critical 
point at which the expression of anti-Muslim sentiment 
escalated and moved from the margins of society to take 
centre stage in political debate. 
The Hungarian government’s ‘national consultation’ 
on immigration and terrorism involved posting to every 
household in Hungary questionnaires that were con-
demned by the European Parliament as ‘highly mislead-
ing, biased and unbalanced’ as they sought to establish 
‘a biased and direct link between migratory phenomena 
and security threats’.334 Reinforcing this link and concur-
rent with the consultation, a ‘public information cam-
paign’ included erecting billboards across Hungary with 
the statement, ‘Did you know the attack in Paris was car-
ried out by immigrants?’
In 2016, during a referendum campaign on whether the 
EU should establish quotas for the settlement of refu-
gees, the Hungarian government repeatedly stated that 
European values needed to be protected from the threat 
posed by Islam.335 Prime Minister Orban described the 
arrival of asylum seekers in Europe as ‘a poison’ and said 
that ‘every single migrant poses a public security and 
333 See Katarzyna Górak-Sosnowska, ‘Islamophobia without Muslims? The Case of 
Poland’ (2016) 5 Journal of Muslims in Europe 190; Gert Pickel and Cemal Öztürk, 
‘Islamophobia without Muslims? The “Contact Hypothesis” as an Explanation 
for Anti- Muslim Attitudes – Eastern European Societies in a Comparative 
Perspective’ (2018) 12 Journal of Nationalism, Memory & Language Politics 162.
334 European Parliament, ‘Resolution on the Situation in Hungary’ 10 June 2015 
(2015/2700(RSP))
335 United States Department of State, ‘2016 Report on International Religious 
Freedom – Hungary’, 9. <https://www.state.gov/reports/2016-report-on-inter-
national-religious-freedom/hungary/ 
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terror risk.’336 Further government consultations in 2017, 
intensified the popular fear of Islam, terrorism and mass 
migration with claims that civil society support for ref-
ugees was aimed at the Islamisation of Europe.337 State-
controlled media reinforced and amplified the political 
rhetoric demonizing migrants and Muslims. Staff at the 
state-funded MTVA network said that they were required 
to focus on stories linking refugees to violence and crime, 
even when these were known to be false.338 
The intensified Islamophobic political rhetoric was noted 
in the focus groups in Poland and Hungary. Immigrants 
who had lived in Hungary and Poland for many years as 
well as European-born Muslim converts contrasted life 
before and after 2015, a critical turning point after which 
their life was palpably different and worse:
So, before 2015, it didn’t happen [...] how to put it, such 
aggressive remarks and I guess I didn't even notice if 
they were, because I just wandered around like any normal 
person. But after 2015, because they specifically referred too 
often to the fact that the scarf on my head was a negative thing, 
or that I myself existed was negative [...] I feel that everyone 
gained a lot of confidence [to abuse Muslims and migrants]. So 
since it’s widely accepted and we can read on billboards how 
dangerous we are, everyone feels that they are empowered and 
they have the right to do that.  (Hungary, Focus Group) 
For this woman state propaganda changed the public’s 
perception of her from a ‘normal person’ to her mere 
existence being a ‘negative’ thing. In addition, the inter-
viewees felt that the government propaganda enables 
and allows racism and that people felt empowered to act 
on their prejudices. Some said that they now feared the 
weeks leading up to any elections as they anticipated that 
politicians would revive their rhetoric against Muslims 
and migrants.
336 ibid.
337 Zsolt Sereghy, ‘Islamophobia in Hungary National Report 2017’ Enes Bayraklı 
and Farid Hafez (eds.), European Islamophobia Report 2017 (SETA, Foundation 
for Political, Economic and Social Research, 2018), 313. http://www.islamopho-
biaeurope.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/EIR_2017.pdf 
338 Daniel Nolan and Shaun Walker, ‘Hungarian journalists admit role in forging an-
ti-migrant 'atmosphere of fear'’ The Guardian (London, 13 April 2018) <https://
www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/13/hungary-journalists-state-tv-net-
work-migrants-viktor-orban-government
In Poland, candidates in the October 2015 presidential and 
parliament elections played on fears and anxieties about 
the ‘Muslim terrorists’ ‘flooding into Europe’. The head of 
the Law and Justice Party (PiS), Jaroslaw Kaczyński, draw-
ing on xenophobic tropes of foreign contagion, argued 
that Muslim refugees carry parasites that can be danger-
ous to Europeans.339 By 2016 ‘Islamophobic views were 
brought further mainstream not only in politics, but also 
in media, education and other spheres of life.’340 
Despite the growing hostility of the political discourse, 
most respondents in Poland considered it a safe country to 
live in; they felt welcomed in their neighbourhoods. There 
were many stories of solidarity, kindness and support in 
everyday interactions with Polish friends and neighbours. 
However, alongside this positive experience there was a 
sense of unease and tension, a fear that these good rela-
tions were fragile and could change at any moment. This 
tension was captured by one respondent who spoke of 
‘feeling safe but living in fear’: 
When you are living, you feel safe, we live safe, but we 
live in fear. Everybody is living in fear. […] For example, 
if you look to the news, if you look to the political speech, if 
you look - “we don’t want hostels”, “we don’t want foreigners 
in our country” – this is the political speech. Sometimes, […] 
people […] they will take this speech and put it in action. […] if 
the people […] listen to the government, then this speech will 
become action. As I told you, the government, they have this 
speech and they start to put it in practice in terms of policies 
and procedures in the immigration office or for residence cards 
or whatever.  (Focus group, Poland)
The hostility directed at migrants, Muslims and refugees 
by politicians maintains a fear that negative public atti-
tudes could rapidly and dramatically deteriorate and 
descend into violence. The pervasive fear of collective 
punishment from a public backlash in the wake a terror-
ist attack was experienced after the news broke of the 
murder of Mayor of Gdańsk in January 2019. Media reports 
339 ‘Kaczyński: Parasites and protozoa in the organisms of refugees that are 
dangerous for Poles’ Newsweek 13 October 2015, <https://www.newsweek.
pl/polska/jaroslaw-kaczynski-o-uchodzcach/89mwbx3> accessed 1 February 
2021. 
340 Konrad Pędziwiatr, ‘Islamophobia in Poland: National Report 2016’ in Enes 
Bayraklı & Farid Hafez (eds.), European Islamophobia Report 2016, (SETA, Foun-
dation for Political, Economic and Social Research, 2017), <http://www.islam-
ophobiaeurope.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/EIR_2016.pdf> accessed 1 
February 2021.
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that this was a ‘terrorist attack’341 left Muslims in fear and 
bracing themselves for a possible backlash if the attacker 
was a Muslim. A woman recalled the moment the news 
reached her:
I was at work when they showed this on TV, a Syrian man 
who works with me was also very afraid. We waited to 
know who did it, and calmed down only when we found out 
that the attacker was not a foreigner, not a Muslim. I don’t know 
about others, but I was afraid. (Focus group, Poland)
Another participant expressed the views of many others 
when she said that the situation in the country would 
have ‘completely changed’ if the killer had been Muslim, 
as it would have confirmed the message from politicians 
that Muslim are a threat to Polish society. The participants 
live in fear of the potential backlash from any violent 
incident in which the perpetrator has a Muslim name or 
background, they believe they will be held collectively 
responsible for the actions of an individual with whom 
they share no connection other than a shared religious 
identity. 
6.2 Discrimination in the use of counter-terrorism 
powers 
The previous chapter identified instances where legis-
lation and policies explicitly and directly target Muslim 
identities and religious practices as indicators of risk 
and radicalisation. As such, these point to discrimina-
tory treatment by the state in its laws and policies. The 
focus in this section is on three issues. First, experiences 
of discrimination arising from the use of broad powers 
that allow police or other security officials to stop, ques-
tion and search individuals. Second, the potential for 
arbitrariness and discrimination in decisions to charge 
people with terrorism offences. Third, lack of account-
ability for the use of immigration powers in pursuing 
security objectives. 
The power to stop and search is usually exercised on the 
basis of legislation that grants significant discretion to 
security officials in determining who to stop, and so it is 
341 ‘Piotr Niemczyk: To był atak terrorystyczny. Trzeba natychmiast uruchomić 
programy walki z mową nienawiści’ [Piotr Niemczyk: It was a terrorist attack. 
Hate speech programs must be launched immediately] 15 January 2019 http://
www.tokfm.pl/Tokfm/7,130517,24366605,piotr-niemczyk-to-byl-atak-terro-
rystyczny-trzeba-natychmiast,html> > 1 February 2021. 
difficult to challenge. In fact, legal challenges have tended 
to succeed where they focus on the breadth of the dis-
cretion conferred by the legislation and the ensuing risk 
of discrimination rather than on proving actual discrimi-
nation in the exercise of the power in a particular case.342 
Proving discrimination to the standard required for a legal 
challenge is complex.343 
In many EU states historical experiences of being over 
policed and under protected inform the fraught relation-
ship between minority groups and the police. Surveys 
show that Muslims and racialised minorities believe police 
stops to be based on unfair and unjustified profiling.344 
Across all five case-study sites there was a widespread 
perception among participants that Muslims are profiled 
and selected for questioning by police and security offi-
cials on grounds of their perceived race, ethnicity and 
religion. Some interviewees’ experiences of increased and 
intensified stops and controls in the aftermath of a terror-
ist incident, especially when the attack had occurred in 
another European state, had reinforced the sense of being 
unfairly profiled. Many participants believed that expres-
sions of religious identity risked further investigation from 
police due to racialised profiling. For some participants 
the increased police focus on Muslims has become nor-
malised as part of their life: 
The worst thing is that we assume that this is normal. As 
we are Muslims this is our turn to live like this. I think it 
takes a radical change for things to be different. What is the role 
of the institutions? Protect society in general. In this case, one 
part of society is being protected from the alleged damage that 
another part could do. These institutions are causing damage to 
this last part. I feel discriminated against 24 hours a day, every 
day of the year. Just by the fact of being and declaring that I am 
a Muslim I become a suspect.  (Focus group, Spain)
342 Gillan and Quinton v United Kingdom (2010) 50 EHRR 45
343 See: Eda Seyhan, A Human Rights Guide for Researching Racial and Religious Dis-
crimination in Counterterrorism in Europe, (Amnesty International/Open Society 
Foundations: London, 2021). 
344 In a survey in France 43.4% of Muslim respondents thought police stops were 
mostly or totally unjustified, compared to 31.9% who thought they were fairly 
or totally justified. Muslim respondents were twice as likely to find this target-
ing mostly or totally unjustified compared to the control group (34.4% com-
pared to 15.1%). Ragazzi and others, ‘The effects of counter-terrorism’ (n300) 
45. See also Fabien Jobard and Rene Lévy,’Racial Profiling: The Parisian Police 
Experience’ (2011) 53 Canadian Journal of Criminology and Criminal Justice 87. 
On Germany see Jeremie Gauthier, ‘Cultural profiling? Police prevention and 
minorities in Berlin’ in Thierry Delpeuch and Jacqueline Ross (eds.), Comparing 
the democratic governance of police intelligence: New models of participation and 
expertise in the United States and Europe (Elgar, Cheltenham, 2016).
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Airports are a space where Muslims find their reli-
gious identity becomes a proxy for terrorism risk and 
so encounter discriminatory surveillance.345 A teenage 
German Muslim recalled the following incident at an air-
port security check and reflected on the justifiability of 
such practices: 
As a Turkish Muslim with a beard I have been checked 
thoroughly. I thought to myself, ‘What is going on here?’ 
I am a completely normal person like everyone else. All my 
other friends went through security normally. When I wanted to 
go through I was taken aside. There was a classmate behind me 
wearing a headscarf. She was taken into a room. She later told 
me that she was frisked everywhere […]. Well, ok, bad things 
have happened before. But you don't have to control every 
person so hard.
 (Focus Group, Germany) 
This interviewee feels that he is targeted based on his 
religion and ethnicity as a ‘Turkish Muslim with a beard’. 
While it is difficult to know the reason for being stopped 
on a particular occasion, his experience, combined with 
that of this classmate, a female who wears a headscarf, 
reinforces his sense of facing religious profiling, as it is 
their common Muslim identity that unites them and distin-
guishes them from their friends. The interviewee believes 
such stops should target people who are potential secu-
rity threats, not those who are ‘completely normal’. The 
incident reminded the teenagers that their Muslim iden-
tity precludes them from experiencing public spaces, like 
airports, as ‘completely normal’ people; their Muslimness 
ensures that their experience is different and distinct from 
that of their non-Muslim friends. 
Yet attributing discrimination to the exercise of coun-
ter-terrorism policing powers is complex. Research sug-
gests that prior experiences of discrimination inform and 
shape how individuals respond to counter-terrorism laws 
and policies, and that ‘the more a person has experienced 
discrimination, the more likely it is that he or she will per-
ceive counter-terrorism policies as discriminatory’.346 Thus 
345 See for example Leda Blackwood, Nick Hopkins and Steve Reicher, ‘I know who 
I am, but who do they think I am? Muslim perspectives on encounters with air-
port authorities, (2013) 36 Ethnic and Racial Studies 1090; Leda Blackwood, Nick 
Hopkins and Steve Reicher, ‘Flying While Muslim’: Citizenship and Misrecog-
nition in the Airport’ (2015) 3 Journal of Social and Political Psychology 148; 
Baljit Nagra and Paula Muarutto, ‘Crossing Borders and Managing Racialized 
Identities: Experiences of Security and Surveillance Among Young Canadian 
Muslims’ (2016) 41 Canadian Journal of Sociology 165; Saher Selod, Forever 
Suspect: Racialized Surveillance of Muslim Americans in the War on Terror (Rutgers 
University Press, New Brunswick NJ, 2018) 49-74. 
346 Ragazzi, The Effects of Counter-Terrorism and Counter-Radicalisation Policies 
(n300) 77.
the ‘potential discrimination linked to counter-terrorism is 
difficult to distinguish from all the other forms of discrim-
ination that Muslims face, particularly in their relations 
with the police’.347 
There were also concerns that broad and vaguely-drafted 
terrorist offences leave significant space for arbitrary 
or discriminatory decisions when it came to charging 
people for terrorism. The Hungarian case of Ahmed 
Hamed illustrates the expansive scope of the definition of 
terrorism and the potential this creates for the misuse of 
counter-terrorism laws against refugees and migrants. In 
September 2015 Ahmed was one of a group of refugees at 
the Serbian-Hungarian border who were seeking to enter 
Hungary. After guards used tear gas and water cannons 
against the crowds at the border, which included elderly 
people, women, and children, Ahmed participated in 
throwing stones at the guards over the border fence. For 
this he was convicted of committing ‘acts of terror’ and 
initially sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment (a re-trial 
reduced this to 5 years). The decision to charge Ahmed 
with a terrorism offence rather than a public order offence 
was widely criticized by human rights groups and inter-
national governments. The US government reflected 
many of their concerns in its statement that the convic-
tion involved a ‘broad interpretation of what constitutes 
“terrorism”’.348 
In Spain many of the focus group participants were wor-
ried about the wide scope and unjustified use of pre-emp-
tive terrorism offences, fearing that they could be used to 
prosecute individuals who were not engaged in anything 
close to planning a terrorist attack and had no intention 
to do so. Among Muslim parents there was particular con-
cern that laws criminalising viewing ideological materials 
placed young people at risk of criminalisation for online 
browsing, fearing that ‘any day they may take our chil-
dren, without having to show many things’.349 
347 ibid.
348 Mark Toner, ‘Sentencing by Hungarian Court of Ahmed Hamed’ 6 December 
2016 < https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/12/264924.htm> ac-
cessed 01 February 2021. 
349 Focus group, Spain. 
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In Hungary and Poland, where many of the focus groups’ 
interviewees were refugees or recent migrants, the lack 
of transparency and procedural rights in immigration 
processes were a key concern. Many felt that decisions 
on visas, citizenship and immigration applications were 
tainted by discriminatory stereotypes and assumptions 
that link them to threats to national security: 
There are some changes, but they are not official/
announced legislation changes, we feel that there are 
some hidden unofficial directions, changes behind the scenes 
that are affecting us. An example would be naturalization appli-
cations and processes. In many cases applications are rejected 
without any logical justification or reasons. Somehow, unex-
plained situations. I know a case of a Yemeni lady who has an 
ill daughter and she applied three times and it didn’t work. Her 
husband and all her children are Hungarian citizens, and she 
was still rejected without a good reason. So there is no clear 
law about that, but they are being racists with those types of 
decision. (Focus Group, Hungary)
In the absence of information about the basis on which deci-
sions have been made the, interviewees drew on rule-of-law 
standards of procedural fairness in reaching a conclusion of 
discrimination. A focus group participant in Poland artic-
ulated the fear that the lack of procedural safeguards will 
allow national security to be misused to achieve immigra-
tion objectives, as ‘anything can be thrown in the name of 
counter-terrorism’. 
The arrest and deportation from Poland of Ameer 
Al-Khawlany illustrates challenges to the rule of law 
and due process in this area. Ameer is an Iraqi national 
and a PhD student at Jagiellonian University in Krakow. 
Between October 2016 and April 2017 he was arrested 
and detained by order of the Internal Security Agency 
(ISA) on the basis that he posed a threat to national secu-
rity. Media reports suggest that Ameer was arrested after 
refusing to cooperate with the ISA by providing informa-
tion on immigrant and Muslim communities in Poland. 
Despite an open letter from his university’s staff calling 
for transparency and fair treatment, neither Ameer nor his 
lawyer were informed of the basis of his arrest, detention 
and deportation. Most worryingly, he was deported with-
out notification to his lawyers.
6.3 Securitised discrimination, harassment and 
abuse in daily life 
Recurrent daily encounters of discrimination are asso-
ciated with negative outcomes for mental and physical 
health.350 The negative impact of everyday discrimination 
becomes compounded when combined with discrimi-
nation from law enforcement agencies.351 While there is 
an emerging body of literature documenting micro-ag-
gression experienced by Muslims, the focus here is on 
open, explicit and aggressive forms of discrimination 
and abuse.352 Muslim participants in this research drew 
a clear link between the political discourse and security 
policies that generate fear and suspicion of Muslim iden-
tities and religious practices and the discrimination and 
abuse that they faced. In their view the former enables 
and encourages the latter. 
Many focus group participants felt that the state’s suspi-
cion of Muslims permitted ordinary citizens to be wary of 
them and emboldened discrimination, harassment and 
abuse. The association of Islam with violence and suspicion 
of Muslims as incipient extremists and potential terrorists 
left many research participants feeling forever vulnerable 
to encountering discrimination and abuse. They pointed 
to personal examples of discrimination and abuse rooted 
in fear of Muslims. They recalled instances where carrying 
everyday items such as shopping bags led to verbal abuse 
in public spaces: 
Two Polish men entering the bus, on the seats facing me. 
Then they look at my face and the two plastic bags. One of 
them started talking. At the beginning, their way of looking at me 
was not positive. And one of them asked me ‘Are you sure there is 
no bomb in your plastic bag?’  (Focus group, Poland) 
350 Tene Lewis, Courtney Cogburn, & David Williams, ‘Self-reported experiences 
of discrimination and health: Scientific advances, ongoing controversies, and 
emerging issues’ (2015) 11 Annual Review of Clinical Psychology 407. 
351 A survey of American Muslims reported that ‘Muslims who reported being 
called offensive names and being singled out by law enforcement officials 
had a higher probability of having clinically significant levels of depressive 
symptoms’. See David Hodge, Tarek Zidan, & Altaf Husain, ‘Depression among 
Muslims in the United States: Examining the Role of Discrimination and Spirit-
uality as Risk and Protective Factors’ (2016) 61 Social Work 45, 49.
352 For discussion on micro-aggressions experienced by Muslims see Izram 
Chaudry, ‘“I felt like I was being watched”: The hypervisibility of Muslim stu-
dents in higher education’, (2021) 53 Educational Philosophy and Theory 257. 
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The threat of abuse causes some to hide their Muslim iden-
tity by avoiding actions or activities that reveal their Muslim 
identity: 
I was someone who did salat (prayer) anywhere – not any 
more. And when it comes to going to the beach or the pool. 
I used to think "I go as I want." Not any more – now if I have to wear 
a bikini, I wear it. I want to go unnoticed. I had a group of Spanish 
friends, we were traveling. I prayed in front of them because I 
wanted to show them what Islam is. Now, I can't even think of it. 
I don't even want to be asked if I'm Muslim... I want to go totally 
unnoticed. I don't want to get attention.  (Focus Group, Spain) 
In Warsaw a student from East Africa explained how while 
riding on a bus with fellow Muslims, they felt that the atmos-
phere created by their presence on the bus, was ‘so tense’ 
that they waited until they got off the bus to greet one 
another with ‘salamu alaykum’. Another person mentioned 
needing to mute his smartphone application for the adhan 
(a call to prayer), as the opening words, ‘Allahu akbar’, an 
ordinary Islamic phrase used in daily prayer, have become 
synonymous with terrorism. Fear of discrimination, harass-
ment and abuse is leading Muslims to increasingly censor 
their use of Islamic and religious expressions. 
6.4 Discrimination and abuse targeting Muslim 
women 
Consistent with other research on Islamophobia in 
Europe, research for this report found that Muslim 
women, whose religious identity becomes hyper-visible 
when they wear the hijab, face constant and continuous 
discrimination including verbal and in some instances 
physical abuse in everyday encounters in the street.353 
353 According to the EU FRA, ‘Muslim women who wear headscarves (or the very 
few who wear niqabs) in public are more likely to experience bias-motivated 
harassment than those who do not – 31%% compared with 23%’ See European 
Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (n159) 41. See also Chris Allen, Arshad 
Isakjee and Ogtem Young, ‘Maybe we are hated’: The experience and impact of 
Anti-Muslim Hate on British Muslim Women (Birmingham, University of Birming-
ham, 2013); Dermana Seta, Forgotten Women: The impact of Islamophobia 
on Muslim Women, (ENAR, Brussels, 2016); Tell Mama, Gendered Anti-Muslim 
Hatred and Islamophobia, (Faith Matters, London, 2018); Ragazzi, The Effects of 
Counter-Terrorism and Counter-Radicalisation Policies (n300). 
As a woman wearing a headscarf, when I am out on the 
street I have in mind that I can become a victim of abuse or 
attacks, even assaults. I couldn't then say that I feel very safe, espe-
cially when I'm out at night at the train station, especially at times 
when football fans or drunk people are out and about. I have heard 
comments from drunk people behind my back and I didn't feel very 
safe then. In my city there is also a known quarter where very right-
wing people live and hang out. […] I don't have any problems in 
everyday life but I know that I am wearing a risky piece of clothing.
 (Focus group, Germany) 
The testimony above reflects the pervasive sense of inse-
curity that some Muslim women reported living with. The 
possibility of abuse and attack is something that they must 
‘have in mind’ when out on the streets. This insecurity 
increases around particular locations or at specific times. 
It reveals how many Muslims do not enjoy the freedom 
to move without restriction or interference in the towns 
and cities where they live but must carefully navigate to 
avoid hotspots where there is a heightened risk of abuse. 
However, other testimonies show that even spaces believed 
to be safe can be the site for violent attacks: 
After the Charlie Hebdo events I was at the library with a 
friend of mine, both wearing the veil. At some point this 
old guy, a man, walked by us. He totally tried to rip her veil off… I 
was choked… He totally wanted to. Yes, I had never felt such an 
excluding feeling about my hijab before. And when I saw this, I 
was so choked. And my friend was so traumatized. And now it has 
been a while, anyway, but I was so choked. He really wanted to 
take it off her, he was determined… But you know, she started to 
question herself and her hijab a lot. (Focus group, France) 
The clear picture that emerges from the testimony of focus 
groups across all five states is one in which many Muslim 
women’s experiences of verbal abuse have become a nor-
malized part of their daily life. Women in focus groups in 
all five countries gave numerous examples of the harass-
ment and abuse they encountered. In one vivid example a 
young student who wears a headscarf provided details of 
prolonged verbal abuse she that faced on a train journey: 
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The other day […] I was simply yelled at while passing by 
because of my religion, which happens to me more often, 
that I get yelled at on the street, which is why I had to laugh 
again because it happens to me so often. One of the most blatant 
moments, which was also stupid for me at that moment, was that 
my sister was on the phone at that moment. […] It was hard for her 
to see that this was happening and that she couldn't do anything. I 
was insulted by someone in the train for almost half an hour, I was 
yelled at, I was almost attacked, and nobody reacted. In front of me 
was someone who was scared, and I was the one who was being 
attacked, but I just tried to calm her down because I'm so used to 
it, unfortunately, that I went into the defence mode and said OK, 
nothing happens, everything is fine […] You've gotten used to it a 
little bit, like when you have toothache you don't go crazy, and the 
bad thing for me was that my sister was on the phone and she went 
crazy because she was afraid, because she heard all that, how she 
shouted and insulted me from a to z, that I was a suppressed some-
thing else, which I also found funny. Because it sounds paradoxical 
that she insulted me and at the same time said that I would be 
oppressed.  (Focus group, Germany) 
Among the disturbing details in this narrative is the brev-
ity with which she passes over the first incident of being 
yelled at in the street since this happens ‘so often’, to focus 
on her experience in the train. Here, equally worrying is the 
calmness with which the participant reacted to the abuse 
because she was ‘so used to it’. Earlier experiences had 
taught her how to act and behave to survive such verbal 
assaults. The testimony from participants in this report sug-
gest that for most women such experiences are no longer 
exceptional but are viewed as part of the routine of life, ‘like 
a toothache’. 
The consequence of such hostility is that some Muslim 
women are forced to think twice before they wear a hijab 
or wear a headscarf to reduce their risk of exposure to vio-
lence and abuse. A Polish Muslim woman admitted that she 
sometimes chose to wear a hoodie instead of a headscarf, 
avoiding being identified as Muslim and so protecting her-
self from potential incidents. The visibility of the difference 
signified by the headscarf is captured in a comment by a 
Hungarian Muslim woman: ‘We are a good enemy because 
we can be seen well; we are visible with the headscarf’. 
However, the majority of female interviewees who wore 
the hijab continued to do so after encountering abuse. 
6.5 Reporting Discrimination 
The findings in this research are consistent with survey 
data that find that the vast majority of Muslims do not 
officially report the harassment and abuse they experi-
ence.354 While most respondents did not report discrim-
ination and abuse to the police, those who did try to do 
so were often dissatisfied with the response. A student 
in Hungary who reported an incident of verbal abuse in 
the street to the police found that she was not taken seri-
ously, and remembers the experience as humiliating and 
traumatic. 
In many cases where verbal abuse took place in the street 
and the perpetrator was not known to the victim, reporting 
it to the police or other authorities was seen as ineffective 
and unlikely to result in any action. For some, harassment 
and abuse has become such an everyday occurrence that it 
is no longer seen as serious enough to report: 
In my case it has to be something very, very, very serious 
[...] Because I can't imagine going to a police station to say 
that they have verbally assaulted me on the street [...] They won't 
even pay much attention to me. I don't know, it's the perception I 
have, I think, I never would, it has to be very serious. 
 (Focus group, Spain) 
The comment suggests that everyday low-level harassment 
and abuse are not seen as something that will be taken 
seriously and so the time and effort of reporting abuse is 
retained only for ‘very, very, very serious’ incidents. Many 
comments pointed to a belief that Islamophobic abuse 
would not be recognised or understood, and consequently 
its impact is marginalised: 
354 ‘Overall, nine in ten Muslim respondents (91%) did not report the most recent 
incident of harassment they experienced to either the police or any other organisa-
tion or service […] The most often-cited reasons for not reporting the most recent 
incident of bias-motivated harassment was that nothing would happen or change 
by reporting it (43%). 41% of respondents who experienced bias-motivated harass-
ment did not report the incident anywhere because they thought it to be minor; 
13% said that reporting would have been too bureaucratic; 9% that they were able 
to deal with the problem themselves; and 8% that they would not be believed or 
taken seriously.’ European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (n159) 46. 
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The police wouldn't take such things seriously. In Germany 
our religion is not so highly regarded. In the eyes of the 
police officers we are not harassed, or we are just seen as small 
and unimportant. If we say something to them we are not taken 
seriously, but if someone else would say something to the police-
men, then they would help him. So for example if I would say that 
some person has insulted me in a racist way then the policeman 
would say: ‘Well, the person certainly didn't mean it like this’ or 
‘Don't take it personally’.  (Focus group, Germany)
This comment points to the way in which negative public 
discourse relating to Islam and Muslims informs the 
respondent’s anticipation that any complaint will be dis-
missed and its damage minimized. Many who recalled 
examples of abuse did not feel that their experience would 
be viewed by police or other authorities as harassment. For 
some the perception that abuse would not be taken seri-
ously contributed to a feeling of marginalisation, of being 
considered ‘small and unimportant’. A Hungarian Muslim 
civil society organisation reported that the police failed 
to take their concerns about intimidation and harassment 
seriously in the days leading up to a planned far-right 
anti-Muslim demonstration outside their mosque. 
Official state policies seen as unfairly targeting and discrim-
inating against Muslims contributed to some interviewees’ 
reluctance to seek protection from unlawful discrimina-
tion and harassment from public institutions. The French 
woman assaulted in a library mentioned earlier explained 
that she had not reported it to the police as she feared 
that she would not be taken seriously, and would in fact be 
blamed for provoking the attack by wearing the veil: 
At the time and even now, you are saying, we are in France, 
it might disturb them. There’s a point where you feel like 
you actually might be the problem. I don't know if you understand. 
I went through different phases with my hijab. At one time, it's 
true, you are wondering why so much fury, it's crazy. Maybe it 
actually really is a problem. […] it's like with the girls who were 
assaulted on public transport. When they go to file a complaint 
they are told ‘it's your fault’ [...] so yes, I felt like it is kind of the 
same. We don't really trust [the police]. We’re afraid of being 
humiliated.  (Focus group, France)
Interviews with civil society organisations and comments 
in focus groups suggest that Muslims in Hungary are 
reluctant to report hate crime and abuse because they see 
the rise in Islamophobia as instigated and driven by the 
government and ruling party politicians. One interviewee 
referred to the police as ‘Orban’s soldiers’ and said that she 
would not report abuse to them ‘because I don’t trust the 
police as much as I don’t trust the person who hurt me’. 
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7. SURVEILLANCE AND SUSPICION 
This chapter examines experiences of surveillance and 
the impact on individuals and communities of thinking 
that they are or could be being watched for signs of rad-
icalisation or activities suggesting they supported ter-
rorism, by public officials (state surveillance), by fellow 
citizens (social surveillance) or by other Muslims (commu-
nity surveillance). These three layers of surveillance are 
interconnected. A crucial part of surveillance is, as John 
Fiske observes, the ‘coding’ of that which is ‘normal’ and 
that which is ‘abnormal’ or ‘dangerous’.355 For Muslims, 
coding through surveillance inscribes understanding of 
the moderate and extremist Muslim. The testimony of 
the focus group participants highlights two responses to 
state and social surveillance, generated to placate fears 
and suspicion: the performance of ‘safe’ identities, show-
ing themselves as ‘moderate’ Muslims that condemn ter-
rorism, and connected to this always being careful when 
expressing their thoughts and ideas in case these are 
misinterpreted or misunderstood as signs of extremism 
or support for terrorism. The research also found that a 
key impact on a community of being under surveillance 
is fear of expressing solidarity with those who are sus-
pected by the state.
The most direct experience of state surveillance for young 
Muslim men in particular is police and security-led checks 
and stops in the street. The previous chapter noted per-
ceptions of discrimination and profiling in encounters with 
law enforcement officers. In this chapter the qualitative 
data from the interviews provide an insight into the impact 
of state surveillance. Young male interviewees reported 
being stopped by the police multiple times. A participant 
in a focus group in Spain described the experience of 
constant police stops, particularly when young men are in 
a group, as leaving them knowing they are watched and 
‘feeling under constant guard’. The qualitative data offers 
an insight into the cumulative experience of multiple regu-
lar police stops. While being stopped once may be a small 
interruption or inconvenience in the course of a day, the 
collective impact of multiple stops accumulates over time. 
An interviewee sought to convey the range of feelings trig-
gered by police stops: 
355 John Fiske, ‘Surveilling the City: Whiteness, the Blackman and Democratic Total-
itarianism’ (1998) 15 Theory, Culture & Society 67, 72. 
[A]t the family level it generates more insecurity and more 
fear. You know that [the police] ask for identification... You 
say ‘well, they want identity [documents]... nothing …nothing has 
happened’ […] In reality it is something that weighs you down 
more and more every time.  (Focus group, Spain)
The interviewee here was trying to convey the modulation 
between the momentary annoyance in each individual 
instance when ‘nothing happens’ and the collective psy-
chological force of multiple stops that ‘weighs you down 
more and more’. 
Focus group participants also expressed concerns about 
covert state surveillance of their communications and 
online activities. The lack of judicial checks and oversight of 
the increased executive power to monitor communications 
were prominent issues in the public debate about Poland’s 
2016 Anti-terrorism Act and were echoed by some inter-
viewees in Poland, who gave examples of questioning by 
state officials that led them to believe that their calls and 
online activities were being covertly monitored. 
The approach to counter-radicalisation and counter-ter-
rorism that calls on everyone in society to be involved in 
looking out for danger widens the net of state surveillance. 
It co-opts not only a wide array of public officials but all cit-
izens to the surveillance of Muslims. France and Spain have 
set up websites and telephone hotlines to enable citizens 
to report their suspicions. In 2015 Spain launched a ‘stop 
radicalism’ campaign and within its first year 2550 reports 
were made to the state, of which 935 were classified as ‘of 
interest’.356 The campaign did not specify a particular focus 
but rather called on citizens to report ‘any indication that 
may lead to radicalisation or extremist, intransigent or 
hateful behaviour for racist, xenophobic, belief or ideolog-
ical reasons’.357 By calling on citizens to report their suspi-
356 Laura L Caro, ‘Avisos ciudadanos identifican a 12 yihadistas unidos a Daesh’ 
(Citizen notices identify 12 jihadists who joined Daesh) ABC Espana (31 October 
2016), <https://www.abc.es/espana/abci-avisos-ciudadanos-identifican-12-yi-
hadistas-unidos-daesh-201610310722_noticia.html> accessed 1 February 
2021.
357 <https://stop-radicalismos.ses.mir.es/ ‚ En esta página tienes todos los canales 
para comunicar cualquier indicio que pueda derivar en radicalización o con-
ducta extremista, intransigente o de odio por razones racistas, xenófobas, de 
creencias o ideológicas.‘ [On this page you have all the channels to communi-
cate any indication that may lead to radicalization or extremist, intransigent or 
hate behaviour for racist, xenophobic, belief or ideological reasons.]
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cions while providing no indication of what to look out for, 
the state authorised the population to fall back on their 
racialised imaginings of the terrorist threat. 
In Spain coordination and collaboration between security 
forces and frontline workers was previously restricted to 
those belonging to a terrorist organisation. This has now 
been extended to anyone deemed as risk of radicalisation. 
This expansion in the scope of the surveillance has gen-
erated concerns about the stigmatising impact of coun-
ter-radicalisation policy’s exclusive focus on Muslims.358 The 
lack of a profile for identifying incipient terrorists and refer-
ences to migration as well as ethnic and religious identities 
as salient factors in vulnerability to radicalisation enable 
extensive state surveillance deep into Muslim communi-
ties. The Catalan protocol on counter-radicalisation, the 
PRODERAI, describes radicalisation as the outcome of mul-
tiple ‘risk factors’ that encompass all areas of life for young 
Muslims including personal development, the family envi-
ronment, and the educational and social contexts.359 The 
PRODERAI sees the development of identity and belong-
ing and loss of contact with family in the diaspora as risk 
factors for radicalisation and incipient terrorism, securitis-
ing otherwise commonplace experiences of immigration, 
integration and adolescence. According to data provided 
by the government of Catalonia, between 2016 and 2018 
just over 5,500 professionals received training in relation to 
the PRODERAI, and during this period schools in Catalonia 
activated the counter-radicalisation protocol in over 300 
cases, resulting in information being sent to the Ministry 
of the Interior. There is no further information provided on 
the characteristics of these cases or whether they resulted 
in police or judicial action. 
In France, calls for increased state and social surveillance 
intensified following the killing of police at the Paris police 
headquarters in 2019. President Macron called for France 
to become a ‘society of vigilance’, arguing that ‘the admin-
istrative services alone, and all the combined services of 
the state alone, will not be able to overcome the Islamist 
“Hydra”’. He called on everyone to be vigilant for signs of 
radicalisation, to ‘be on the lookout at school, at work, in 
places of worship, close to home, for the slackenings, the 
358 Zyab Ibanez, ‘Multi-Agency Training Exist Strategies for Radicalized Youth - 
National Report Spain’ (Institut de Govern i Politiques Publiques/Universitat 
Autonoma de Barcelona, 2019), 4. <https://www.iprs.it/wp-content/up-
loads/2019/01/1.2-MATES-Informe-Nacional.pdf 
359 See Observatory to Prevent Violent Extremism, ‘Consideraciones sobre el Proto-
col de prevenció,
detecció i intervenció de processos de radicalització islamista en Cataluña (PRODE-
RAI)’ 6. <https://opev.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Briefing-paper-PROD-
ERAI.pdf> accessed 1 February 2021.
deviations, the little gestures that signal a distancing from 
the laws and values of the republic’.360 
The conscription of all citizens to report signs of radicalisa-
tion leaves Muslims feeling vulnerable and under contin-
uous surveillance by the state, their neighbours and their 
colleagues. A research participant in Spain gave a vivid 
description of the psychological impact of this: 
[…] you feel that you are watched, observed, you know. 
And that happens, from the police to the people, you know, 
because in the end your neighbour, even if he is your neighbour, 
can be a police watchman [...] I think they are sometimes waiting 
for some Moor to do something […] While their Catalan or Spanish 
children are playing in the same neighbourhood, you know [...] 
But if a Moorish child does something. But of course, police sur-
veillance affects neighbours, who eventually end up doing police 
work. You don’t feel safe in any context. (Focus group, Spain)
Muslims feel unsafe and insecure in their homes and find 
themselves having to be alert to their neighbours’ poten-
tial misreading or misunderstanding of everyday activities, 
particularly expressing any aspect of their religious identity 
that could be misread as a sign of extremism and lead to 
being reported to security officials, triggering further sur-
veillance, investigation, and questioning. The fear of their 
comments, actions, and activities being misunderstood or 
misinterpreted also applies to online digital spaces. Some 
interviewees were nervous and wary of posting their views 
on social media: 
I don’t know, I choose to restrain myself from writing some 
comments on the Internet, even in a joking manner. All in all, 
you never know where it ends up. I’m also conscious of the words 
I’m using in my conversations, so that it doesn’t get misinterpreted. 
So it does influence the comfort of conversations. 
 (Focus group, Poland) 
Having to weigh up the risk of comments being mis-
construed is an additional constraint that circumscribes 
Muslims’ freedom to express their ideas and opinions. In 
Spain parents were concerned that online surveillance 
combined with broad counter-terrorism offences con-
cerning viewing ‘extremist’ material could lead to young 
360 Adam Nossiter, ‘In Paris Knife Attack, Missed Signals and Calls for Vigilance’ New 
York Times (8 October 2019) <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/08/world/
europe/paris-knife-attack.html> accessed 1 February 2021. 
Part II: Research Findings55
Muslims being unfairly criminalised. The qualitative data 
here is consistent with surveys of Muslims in France show-
ing that counter-terrorism measures have a chilling impact 
on free expression, with Muslims censoring their discus-
sion of topics related to foreign policy and society.361 Such 
self-censorship undermines their ability to participate in 
public debates and deliberate as citizens on issues of public 
concern on a basis of equality.
Interviewees recalled how the gaze of suspicion generates 
pressure to show colleagues, acquaintances and strangers 
that they condemn terrorism and violence:
I believe that the fact that we always feel the need to justify 
ourselves, to leave, to say ‘not in my name’, is also linked 
to fear. Because you say, I’m going to express myself, because if I 
don’t the police will come later. It is an unconscious fear. 
 (Focus group, Spain)
The interviewees here do not enjoy the freedom to express 
themselves in their own terms, and find themselves having 
to police their actions and activities and how they present 
their identities in anticipation of how others will read their 
identities, actions and bodies:
You grow up wanting to justify why you aren’t guilty. Yes, 
today I feel more insecure showing my Islam publicly than 
before. Because it causes me discomfort to show my spirituality 
in such basic things as going to the mosque, taking a picture and 
sharing it on social media [...] I already ask ‘What will they think?’ 
I already know that there is suspicion about me. I know that there 
are many people who have thought about it. 
 (Focus group, Spain)
Stereotypes linking Muslims to violence and terrorism 
create the background context that shapes their exchanges 
and encounters with acquaintances and strangers. An inter-
viewee in Hungary reported how Muslims’ need to show 
themselves as ‘moderate’ and ‘safe’ inhibits their ability to 
respond to abuse and harassment. 
361 Ragazzi, The Effects of Counter-Terrorism and Counter-Radicalisation Policies 
(n300), 46.
[…] so somewhere my rights have to be defended and I 
have the right to defend myself, so I stand up and if I stand 
up little bit more strongly then they can say that Islam is a violent 
religion because then [...] it is turned back on me’. 
 (Focus group, Hungary)
The interviewee, believing his actions are unlikely to be 
understood as the free actions of an individual, risks con-
firming the stereotype of Muslims as violent and aggres-
sive. While enacting strategies to ensure they are seen by 
others as ‘safe’ and ‘moderate’, and therefore not ‘extrem-
ists’, Muslims find that they are actually reinforcing the 
framework of the moderate/extremist dichotomy. 
Many Muslim research participants felt worn down 
and exhausted from living under suspicion, having to 
prove their loyalty and belonging, even having to show 
they are ‘normal’. One called it a ‘situation of tiredness’. 
Another described how they expended precious time 
and vast energy countering stereotypes and proving their 
‘normality’:
‘[…] I consider myself as a nice person, I come from a cul-
ture where friendliness is a default. […] I am still not used 
to it but now I can deal with it a little bit easier. The thing is that I 
feel like that I always have to put a lot of effort […], I don’t want to 
put myself in a situation where the other person reacts in a rude 
way, where I feel offended, insulted, because that would ruin my 
day. I feel like a lot of energy is wasted because I always try to be 
too nice, to be extra nice, even when I go to an officer at the desk, 
extra careful, extra, extra, so you don’t get in any confrontation 
or something like this. And this makes you feel really frustrated, 
because you are putting all your energy into looking like a normal 
person for them and you still get a rude reaction.
 (Focus group, Hungary) 
The emotional toll of the racialised association of Muslims 
with terrorism and violence burdens them with the addi-
tional labour of proving their humanity and allaying the 
fears and anxieties triggered by their presence. Across the 
different case-study states many Muslims have responded 
to the negative stereotypes of Islam by assuming respon-
sibility for educating people about Islam and Muslims in 
order to disrupt and control the narrative. At times the line 
between acknowledging the burden of the imposition 
of collective responsibility and the internalisation of that 
responsibility can seem blurred:
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I think if we Muslims are positive about it – so for example 
I try to smile, be happy, and have a balanced life, and then 
actually they make fewer negative comments, […] So I feel that 
this depends a lot on how Muslims stand on this issue. 
 (Focus group, Hungary) 
At times the research participants revealed how they had 
internalised the need for the surveillance of Muslim minds 
and bodies. In Germany young Muslim men spoke proudly 
of their participation in Muslim-led demonstrations against 
radicalisation and terrorism. While feeling that it was unfair 
that the level of police presence and surveillance at these 
demonstrations was much greater than at demonstrations 
about other issues or by other groups, they nevertheless 
argued that this provided a chance for them to show the 
police that they were ‘good’ people. 
B: Of course it gives us an insecure feeling, but […] it can 
also lead [the state] to see us as we are and change their 
mind about what they thought before and have a good view of 
organisations like ours.
A: Actually, now if I think they are watching us it doesn’t matter. 
They can observe us. If they observe us, then they can see that 
we are not in favour of radicalisation and terrorism. If they don’t 
watch us, nobody will know. 
 (Focus group, Germany) 
While the interviewees welcomed state surveillance as an 
opportunity to show that they were ‘good’ Muslims, they 
also recognised that such an opportunity arises in a con-
text of policing that places them under greater surveillance 
and generates insecurity. They act under the burden of 
having to prove their good citizenship. Thus their actions 
are responding to the suspicion and fear that their identi-
ties generate. 
The harm arising from the fear of constant state surveil-
lance is not fully captured by the individual right to privacy 
as it is also experienced as communal harm.362 For example 
the interviews for this report have shown that the internal-
isation of the need for surveillance by Muslims erodes the 
expression of solidarity towards particular groups under 
suspicion, such as new migrants or young Arab men; fur-
thermore, the suspicion that any individual could be an 
informant hinders collective action. 
362 Diala Shamas, ‘Living in Houses without Walls: Muslim Youth in New York City in 
the Aftermath of 9/11’ in Susan Opotow and Zachary Shemtob (eds.) New York 
After 9/11 (Fordham University Press, New York, 2018). 
The fear of coming under suspicion also prevented Muslims 
from providing support or expressing solidarity with indi-
viduals or families that are under suspicion from the state; 
such families find themselves ostracised and isolated. Some 
interviewees saw this as an intentional part of the state’s 
counter-terrorism strategy; creating a hostile environment, 
driving a wedge between those who are ‘at risk’ of radicali-
sation from those deemed dangerous and risky: 
You can't give emotional support either ... because you're 
going to count as if you were collaborating ... the idea is to 
criminalise the environment, how many more suspicious people... 
So, that affects the relationships between the family, the neigh-
bourhood and the entire community  (Focus group, Spain) 
As [Muslims] have to prove that they are against [terror-
ism], this creates a tremendous vacuum for a family [under 
suspicion], […] the entire Muslim community asked their children 
not to play with the children of that family. They put you between 
a rock and a hard place. If I say that I just didn’t believe the police, 
does that mean I am condoning a terrorist? To put it another way, 
if I know a person better than the police, regardless of any investi-
gation, […] and I have never detected anything [dangerous] about 
him, and perhaps I know more about his ideology than that police 
[…], I should have the right to believe that he is not a terrorist but 
if you express this, it is like you are justifying a terrorist when he 
should really be presumed innocent until proven guilty. 
 (Focus group, Spain) 
Those who are ostracised in effect lose their right to the 
presumption of innocence. Members of the wider commu-
nity fear coming under state suspicion and so feel com-
pelled to prove their own innocence by actively distancing 
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Part 1 of this report outlined the EU’s key contributions 
to the development of Member States’ counter-terror-
ism laws and policies. Through the Frame Decisions and 
the Directive on Combatting Terrorism (DCT) the EU 
expanded the scope of European criminal law, requiring 
states to criminalise ‘pre-emptive’ terrorism offences. 
Through funding and coordination, it has supported and 
encouraged Member States’ development and imple-
mentation of counter-radicalisation programmes. Its 
legislation and strategies for countering terrorism and 
radicalisation shape and influence the implementation 
and enactment of national policy and practice. In Part 2 
this report documented personal experiences of securi-
tised racialisation, discrimination and surveillance gath-
ered from the testimony of 115 focus group participants 
and insights on the impact of security measures from 
interviews with 96 key stakeholders. 
However, the contribution of EU legislation, strategies and 
policies outlined in part 1 to these personal experiences, 
while plain to see, is not always straightforward or linear. 
It is clear that European policy and legislation enables and 
supports the construction of Muslims as the natural focus 
of state concern and suspicion when combatting terror-
ism. While a wide range of state actions, discourses and 
strategies maintain this understanding, counter-terrorism 
and counter-radicalisation policies play a significant and 
critical role in developing, legitimising and embedding it. 
The pre-emptive offences created by the DCT are 
non-propositional; they do not identify, name, or seek 
to target Muslims or any ethnic or religious group. They 
require states to criminalise terrorist acts. What counts 
as terrorism shapes decisions about the allocation of 
European and national policing and counter-radicalisa-
tion efforts and resources. The DCT’s vague and broad 
definition of terrorism leaves states with significant dis-
cretion to determine which of the many actions that fall 
within the scope of the definition are considered terrorist 
actions, and just as importantly, what to exclude from this 
labelling. This allowed Hungary to prosecute Ahmed H 
for terrorism after he threw stones at police at a border 
crossing, while right-wing violence rarely registers as 
terrorism. The failure to adequately report, record and 
charge right-wing violence and activities as terrorism rein-
forces the racialised association of Islam with terrorism, 
naturalising the assumption that Muslims should be the 
focus of security measures. This is supported further by 
counter-radicalisation policies that emphasise ideology as 
the main driver of radicalisation, despite evidence for this 
remaining contested. 
The DCT’s ‘pre-emptive’ offences have tipped the balance 
of prosecutions towards offences of preparation, partici-
pation and public provocation. By criminalising conduct 
before any terrorist conspiracy or attempt materialises 
evidence of identity and ideology become salient to 
securing convictions. This risks ensnaring fantasists and 
‘loud mouths’ in the criminal justice system. Reliance 
on evidence of utterances and associations infringes on 
fundamental freedoms of expression and association. It 
raises the spectre of a ‘criminal law of the enemy’, in which 
prosecution emphasises the dangerousness of the indi-
vidual in the absence of evidence of dangerous actions. 
Pre-emptive offences that shift the focus of the criminal 
law to earlier points in time also enable the earlier deploy-
ment of state investigation and surveillance powers. 
Surveillance and suspicion are central to counter-radicali-
sation measures that enrol the whole of society in watch-
ing for signs of radicalisation. The EU’s initial approach to 
counter-radicalisation explicitly and exclusively focused 
on Muslims and Islam and was echoed, replicated and 
reinforced by states as they adopted, developed and 
implemented counter-radicalisation plans. Without 
explicitly naming Muslims it is clear to many of those 
implementing and enacting the policies who should be 
the focus of attention and surveillance. 
The research in this report has documented frequent 
and numerous instances of the religious practices, 
beliefs and views of Muslims attracting the attention of 
security actors and prompting investigation and ques-
tioning. The participants’ testimonies have documented 
how the racial and religious identity of Muslims inform 
the concerns that take shape in the imagination of state 
actors and the possible explanations that they develop 
in interpreting and understanding the views, comments 
or actions of Muslims. EU and Member State policies that 
have contributed to framing mosques as objects of suspi-
cion have grown into wider societal suspicion of mosques, 
Islamic schools and the act of praying. The association of 
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Islam with violence, and suspicion of Muslims as potential 
terrorists has left many Muslims feeling forever vulnerable 
to discrimination and abuse that is rooted in fear of their 
Muslim identity. 
EU and national-level strategies and policies have com-
bined to produce a moderate/extremist dichotomy which 
implies that all Muslims have the potential for incipient 
violence. Understandings of who is an extremist are 
informed by counter-terrorism policies and practices, 
and circumscribe permissible and legitimate ways of 
being Muslim. The search for the extremist legitimises 
the use and deployment of ‘indicators of radicalisation’ 
that enable and authorise state and social surveillance. 
Muslims find themselves having to show that they are 
‘moderate’ by vocally and actively condemning terror-
ism. Many live with the fear that careless expressions of 
thoughts and ideas risks being misconstrued and will lead 
them to be labelled extremist. 
The research finds that counter-terrorism and coun-
ter-radicalisation policies and practices supported and 
developed by the EU have eroded the rule of law and 
infringed on the enjoyment of fundamental freedoms of 
religion and belief, association and expression, and rights 
to liberty, fair trial and non-discrimination. While recog-
nising that local social, political, economic and cultural 
contexts generate counter-terrorism policies, practice 
and discourses, there are ways in which the EU can bolster 
the protection of human rights and ensure adherence to 
the rule of law. 
There should be more detailed consideration of equality, 
human rights and rule of law in the processes for formu-
lating legislation and policy on counter-terrorism and 
counter-radicalisation. Furthermore, an informed public 
debate and assessment of the proportionality and neces-
sity of security measures requires information on the 
nature of the threat of terrorism in Europe, as well as data 
on the use of counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation 
laws and policies. Equality data is vital to monitoring the 
impact of counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation 
measures on different groups. 
The protection of human rights, non-discrimination 
and the rule of law must be more clearly and effectively 
embedded into EU counter-terrorism strategies, nor-
mative frameworks and policies. One example of how 
this can be achieved is the UN Global Counter-Terrorism 
Strategy, in which ‘measures to ensure respect for human 
rights’ account for one of the strategy’s four pillars.363 This 
ensures attention, action and resources on human rights 
and the rule of law. 
Civil society plays a critical role in empowering communi-
ties, enhancing resilience, and supporting accountability 
and transparency. Yet, counter-terrorism and counter-rad-
icalisation measures have been used to limit civic space; 
the broad definition of terrorism and vague concept 
of violent extremism has allowed States to label and 
stigmatise critics in civil society as “terrorists”, “violent 
extremists” or “threats to national security”. Meaningful 
consultation and dialogue with CSOs, particularly those 
that have direct understanding and experience of the 
groups impacted by counter-terrorism and counter-radi-
calisation measures would enable greater understanding 
how they affect fundamental rights and freedoms. 
While the research for this report was completed by 
October 2020, the trends that we identify in this research 
- intensified suspicion, discrimination and surveillance of 
Muslims - persist in the response of Member States and the 
EU to the terrorist attacks in France and Austria in October 
and November 2020. In France, this included government 
closure of the leading anti-racism organisation, and ENAR 
member, the Collective Against Islamophobia in France 
(CCIF)364. In Austria, armed police raided the home of Dr 
Farid Hafeez, one of Europe’s foremost academic experts 
on Islamophobia.365 The European Commission’s a new 
Counter-Terrorism Agenda, published in December, pro-
poses worrying measures for further surveillance through 
data-sharing, and misses an opportunity to more fully and 
effectively address concerns about discrimination, human 
rights and the rule of law.366 The following recommenda-
tions, addressing the findings from the research in the 
report, are important steps towards ensuring the EU and 
Member State are able to counter-terrorism while ensur-
ing respect for human rights, equality and the rule of law. 
363 UNGA Res 60/288 (20 September 2006) UN Doc A/RES/20/288. 
364 Amnesty International, ‘France: shutting down anti-racist organisations 
risks freedoms’ 20 November 2020. <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/
news/2020/11/france-shutting-down-antiracist-organisation-risks-freedoms/> 
(accessed 14 March 2021) 
365 ‘Austria: Outrage after authorities target academic as part of 'terrorism' 
crackdown’ Middle East Eye (2 March 2021), <https://www.middleeasteye.net/
news/austria-farid-hafez-academic-targeted-terrorism-crackdown-outrage> 
(accessed 14 March 2021). 
366 European Commission, ‘A Counter-Terrorism Agenda for the EU: Anticipate, 
Prevent, Protect and Respond’ COM(2020) 795 final, 9 December 2020. 
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1 EU counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation strategies should emphasise and detail 
measures, actions and activities to support and 
promote the protection of human rights, equality and 
the rule of law.
2 The EU should reject the development of any new ‘pre-emptive’ criminal law offences and 
should review the DCT, to ensure that its pre-emptive 
offences are only retained to the extent they are 
strictly required by UN Security Council Resolutions. 
3 All EU counter-terrorism legislation should contain a sunset clause (that is, they should be 
temporary and automatically expire after a fixed time 
unless explicitly renewed) and should require national 
implementation measures to also have a sunset clause.
4 Counter-terrorism legislation, strategy and policy documents should draw on and explicitly 
reference the international standards, principles and 
guidelines on human rights, non-discrimination and 
the rule of law that should inform and shape the 
implementation of counter-terrorism and counter-
radicalisation measures. 
5 Europol’s annual EU Terrorism and Situation Trends Report (TESAT) should provide more 
comprehensive and detailed data. In particular, it 
should separate data on convictions from data on 
acquittals. It should also present full data on arrests, 
charges and convictions or acquittals for different 
types of offence, allowing clearer understanding of 
the role of pre-emptive, membership and propaganda 
offences as well as offences involving violence or direct 
harm to others. 
6 All EU counter-terrorism measures should be subject to effective ex ante human rights, 
equality and rule of law impact assessment. This 
could be conducted by the European Commission 
and European Parliament with the support of the EU 
Fundamental Rights Agency
7 There should be greater role for national parliaments and national human rights bodies in 
commenting on counter-terrorism proposals. 
8 Member states’ human rights and equality bodies should have the powexr, mandate and 
resources to conduct regular assessments of the 
impact of counter-terrorism legislation and policies on 
equality, human rights and the rule of law. 
9 EU institutions should regularly and proactively engage with civil society organisations on 
counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation measures 
to understand their efficacy and impact on human 
rights, equality and the rule of law.
10 EU institutions should provide funding to support civil society organisation to monitor, 
document and assess the impact of counter-terrorism 
and counter-radicalisation measures on human rights, 
equality and the rule of law. 
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11 EU institutions should publicly condemn Member States’ abuse of counter-terrorism and 
counter-radicalisation measures against civil society. 
12 The EU should refrain from using vague and general labels such as Jihadism, Islamism, 
and political Islam. They should recognise that any 
analytical value of these terms is outweighed by their 
stigmatising impact. The term ISIS-inspired terrorism 
and Al-Qaeda-inspired terrorism should be used where 
appropriate. 
13 Individuals and organisations that are the target of false denunciation should be recognised as 
victims so that they can have access to legal, financial 
and psychological support.
14 Member States must ensure there are accessible, confidential and independent complaint 
mechanisms for individuals disproportionately affected 
by security and counter-terrorism measures.
15 The EU should adopt the draft ‘horizontal equality’ directive to ensure more 
comprehensive protection against discrimination on 
the grounds of religion and belief.
16 The EU and Member States should collect equality data on the implementation of counter-
terrorism and counter-radicalisation policies.
17 The EU and Member States should collect equality data on the implementation of counter-
terrorism and counter-radicalisation policies. 
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